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ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING,” AND
“INCOMPETENT” STATE COURT JUDGES AND THE
QUESTIONABLE REMOVAL OF STATE LAW CLASS
ACTIONS TO PURPORTEDLY “IMPARTIAL” AND
“COMPETENT” FEDERAL COURTS—A HISTORICAL
PERSPECTIVE AND AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF
CLASS ACTION DISPOSITIONS IN FEDERAL AND
STATE COURTS, 1925–2011
WILLY E. RICE
ABSTRACT
Judges as well as members of plaintiffs’ and defense bars agree: a
class action is a superior, efficient, and inexpensive procedural tool to
litigate disputes that present similar questions of fact and law. To be sure,
corporations and insurers have a long history of filing successful class
actions against each other in state courts. Yet those corporate entities
convinced Congress to embrace an uncommon view: continuing to allow
allegedly “hostile” and “biased” state judges and juries to hear and decide everyday consumers’ “purely substantive state law class actions” is
unfair and inefficient. Responding to the plea, Congress enacted the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).
Reading CAFA’s purpose and findings, one discovers several questionable assumptions: (1) Out-of-state corporate defendants are more
likely to lose consumer-initiated class actions in state courts, (2) allowing
multinational insurers and corporations to remove consumers’ “purely
state law class actions” to federal courts will increase efficiency between
states’ and the federal judiciaries, and (3) federal judges are more “imProfessor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law!San Antonio. M.A.,
Ph.D.—University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill; Postdoctoral Fellow—The Johns
Hopkins University; J.D.—The University of Texas at Austin; and an American Bar
Foundation Scholar. The author is forever indebted to Hubert M. “Tad” Blalock, David
R. Heise, Donald E. Muir, Forrest W. Young, Francis A. Bottini, Jr., and Eugene R.
Anderson for sharing their statistical and legal expertise with the author for numerous
years. To be sure, their unselfish guidance and insight improved the Article. The author
also thanks two audiences of practitioners, judges and colleagues who submitted invaluable comments and suggestions at forums in San Antonio and San Diego. Any errors or
omissions are the author’s alone.
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partial” and significantly less likely to allow extralegal factors to influence the dispositions of class actions.
To determine whether reformers’ assumptions were sound, the author
sampled, read, and coded 2,657 federal and state court class actions and
ordinary decisions. This Article discusses the historical and empirical
findings and provides evidence that refutes reformers’ assumptions about
class action litigation in state and federal courts. Also, this Article questions the rationality of Congress’s sweeping removal reforms, which find
no sound support in law or in fact. Moreover, this Article highlights several unintended consequences of class action reforms, which insurers and
corporations are likely to regret. Finally, given that CAFA’s removal
provisions are likely to undermine traditional principles of judicial federalism, this Article encourages the Supreme Court or, preferably, a more
enlightened Congress, to address the concerns raised here as soon as the
opportunity arises.
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INTRODUCTION
Opinion research consistently reveals that a wide spectrum of Americans fervently embrace the concept of federalism—the allocation and
separation of powers between states and the federal government.1 To be
sure, federalism appears in a variety of flavors—constitutional,2 political,3
economic or regulatory,4 fiscal,5 and judicial.6 Most often, numerous
1

Cf. Todd E. Pettys, Competing for the People’s Affection: Federalism’s Forgotten
Marketplace, 56 VAND. L. REV. 329, 352 (2003) (“History clearly suggests ... [that] state
and federal governments continue to compete for supremacy in the public’s eyes and that
citizens have favored changes in the distribution of regulatory power when they have
judged it to be in their best interest.”). There is more. In fact, in recent years, broad bipartisan coalitions of elected officials have fashioned legislation that would make it difficult
for Congress to enact laws and for the executive branch to issue orders that would
preempt states’ ability to regulate a broad range of activities, including the sale and
distribution of drugs, the environment, health-related issues, and workers’ safety. See
Stephen Labaton, Anti-Federalism Measures Have Bipartisan Support, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
6, 1999, at A12; see also Federalism Accountability Act of 1999, S. 1214, 106th Cong.;
Federalism Preservation Act of 1999, H.R. 2960, 106th Cong.
2
See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The “Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s
Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 429, 439–40 (2002) (observing that “[t]here is
no agreed-upon definition of constitutional federalism. As a structural principle, federalism requires that power should be divided among layers of government. As the Constitution makes plain, the national government was designed to be one of limited powers, with
central responsibilities retained for the states. Beyond these generalities lie deep disagreements about how precisely the federalism principle should be specified and implemented.”); Vince Lee Farhat, Term Limits and the Tenth Amendment: The Popular Sovereignty Model of Reserved Powers, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1163, 1164 n. 14 (1996)
(defining “constitutional federalism” as “the political agenda of states’ rights, justified
from the Tenth Amendment perspective.”); H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of
Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 633, 633 (1993) (observing that in “the United States
of America, one might assume [that] there could be no question about the legal character
of federalism. The very name suggests the federal character of what many Americans still
refer to as ‘the Union.’ ... It is, therefore, notable that for most of the last half-century, the
United States has had no constitutional law of federalism.”).
3
See Mary Brigid McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of “Our Federalism,” 27 GA. L. REV. 697, 710 n.78 (1993) (defining “political federalism” as “the balance of power between the political branches of the Federal Government and the States”).
4
See, e.g., Robert P. Inman & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Making Sense of the Antitrust
State-Action Doctrine: Balancing Political Participation and Economic Efficiency in
Regulatory Federalism, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1203, 1232 (1997) (“The task of a wellarticulated theory of regulatory federalism ... is to define the separate domains for federal
antitrust rules on the one hand and state business regulations on the other.”); Thomas M.
Jorde, Antitrust and the New State Action Doctrine: A Return to Deferential Economic
Federalism, 75 CAL. L. REV. 227, 236–37, 241 (1987) (discussing how the roots of the
state action doctrine are found in the values of economic federalism).
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commentators and jurists devote a substantial amount of time and resources
to discussing and questioning the Supreme Court’s decisions surrounding
regulatory, economic, and fiscal federalism.7 But judicial federalism also
generates a significant amount of controversy, analysis, and commentary.
As an example, numerous legal scholars8 have criticized federal judges for
allegedly violating the Erie doctrine.9 Still, other commentators have attacked federal courts of appeals and their panels for purportedly making
too many Erie guesses when deciding diversity-of-jurisdiction disputes.10
5

See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2551
(2005) (“Fiscal relationships between federal and state governments ... operate in very
different ways than do regulatory relationships. Most obviously, though regulatory federalism primarily seeks to define and protect separate zones of authority for the two levels
of government, much of fiscal federalism addresses more subtle problems resulting when
both levels are involved concurrently.”). See generally WALLACE E. OATES, FISCAL
FEDERALISM 19 (1972) (defining fiscal federalism and providing a thorough analysis of
economic federalism).
6
See infra notes 39–47, 49–59 and accompanying text.
7
See Super, supra note 5, at 2551–62 and accompanying notes (presenting a thorough
outline and discussion of the ongoing debate among various constitutional scholars and
theorists about fiscal, regulatory and economic federalism). In addition, so-called “pure
federalists” devote a lot of time questioning whether the federal government may regulate
all commerce or whether the Commerce Clause gives the federal government superior
power to regulate commerce even within the various states. See Matthew Søberg Shugart,
Constitution Day and Federalism, FRUITS & VOTES (Sept. 16, 2005), http://fruitsandvotes
.com/?p=103 (defining “pure federalism” as “the existence of separate sovereign levels of
authority ... that the founding fathers committed to parchment ... 218 years ago. But
nowhere does this federal constitution require that Congress give money to the states
without strings, or that it give money to the states at all.”). See generally Mark Tushnet,
Federalism’s Future—Why the Supreme Court Overruled National League of Cities, 47
VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1634–50 (1994) (providing a general discussion of pure federalism
and its limitations).
8
See, e.g., Laurel E. Miller, Forum Non Conveniens and State Control of Foreign
Plaintiff Access to U.S. Courts in International Tort Actions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1369,
1390 (1991) (arguing that allowing a federal diversity court to dismiss a lawsuit—in
which a state court applies its forum non conveniens law—would violate the Erie doctrine, “[b]ecause a forum non conveniens dismissal affects the suit’s substantive outcome”); Carole A. Quinn and R. Scott Weide, Violation of the Erie Doctrine: Application
of a Rule of Federal Common Law to Issues of Patent License Transferability, 32
CREIGHTON L. REV. 1121, 1141 (1999) (asserting that “those federal courts which have
created and/or applied a ‘federal rule’ to resolve issues of patent license transferability
have violated the Erie doctrine”).
9
See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938) (requiring federal courts
to apply state supreme courts’ decisions when determining questions of state law).
10
See id. at 78 (requiring federal courts to make reasonable guesses about how states’
supreme courts would decide certain questions of law if the latter courts have not considered or decided those questions); see also Wentwood Woodside I, LP v. GMAC Com-
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According to critics, federal appellate courts should certify11 arguably
state law questions to state supreme courts rather than guess how state
courts would interpret and/or apply state laws.12
On the other hand, the allegedly “biased,” “hostile,” “discriminatory,”
“incompetent,” “unprincipled,” and “out-of-control” state court judges
also received a sizeable amount of criticism.13 In particular, both jurists
and commentators have asserted that outrageous and unprincipled state
court judges as well as plaintiffs’ lawyers are destroying the “fundamental
principles” of judicial federalism.14 To be sure, one can readily find these
mercial Mortg. Corp., 419 F.3d 310, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) (“Neither the Texas Supreme
Court, nor indeed any of the courts of Texas, has ever considered whether a plaintiff like
Wentwood belongs to the class that section 4012a protects. We must, therefore, make an
Erie ‘guess’ about how the Texas Supreme Court would answer this question.”); Howe v.
Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cir. 2000) (“To determine Louisiana law ...
this [c]ourt should first look to final decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. If the
Louisiana Supreme Court has not ruled on this issue, then this [c]ourt must make an ‘Erie
guess’ and ‘determine as best it can’ what the Louisiana Supreme Court would decide.”).
11
See, e.g., Garcia v. Fed. Ins. Co., 473 F.3d 1131, 1136 (11th Cir. 2006) (stressing
that a federal court should certify a question to the state supreme court—to avoid engaging in unnecessary speculation—when significant doubt exists about the answer to a
material state law question). But see Anderson v. Siemens Corp., 335 F.3d 466, 470 (5th
Cir. 2003) (citing Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974) and quoting TEX R.
APP. P. 58.1) (“It is within our discretion to certify a state law question to the relevant
state supreme court. The Supreme Court of Texas may answer questions of law certified
to it by a federal appellate court only if ‘the certifying court is presented with determinative questions of Texas law having no controlling Supreme Court precedent.’”).
12
See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Logical Structure of Fraudulent Transfers and
Equitable Subordination, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 157, 220 (2003) (“[S]ince the fraudulent transfer remedy is a routine feature of state law, equitable subordination might likewise be invoked as a matter of state law. Cases ... to the contrary should therefore be
viewed as bad ‘Erie guesses’ as to the content of state law.” (footnotes omitted)); Dolores
K. Sloviter, A Federal Judge Views Diversity Jurisdiction Through the Lens of Federalism, 78 VA. L. REV. 1671, 1679–80 (1992) (admitting that “state courts have found fault
with a [significant] number of [the Third Circuit’s and district courts’] ‘Erie Guesses.’
Despite our best efforts to predict the future thinking of the state supreme courts within
our jurisdiction on the basis of all of the available data, we have guessed wrong on questions of the breadth of arbitration clauses in automobile insurance policies, ... the availability of loss of consortium damages for unmarried cohabitants, ... the ‘unreasonably
dangerous’ standard in products liability cases ... and the applicability of the ‘discovery
rule’ to wrongful death and survival actions .... And this list is by no means exhaustive.”
(footnotes omitted)).
13
See infra notes 14, 21, 95, 348 and 617 and accompanying text.
14
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1626, 1651 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch)
(“[T]he minute the lawyers start talking about a class action and they send a demand
letter, the companies know they are dead if the case is brought in Madison County, IL.
No matter how right they may be, they are dead because the judges in that particular
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latter sentiments if one reviews the ongoing, heated debates about the
proper venues for various class actions.15 More specifically, in recent
years, class action reformers—primarily national and multinational corporations and insurance companies—have lobbied Congress intensely, encouraging that legislative body to move alleged “class actions of national
importance” from state to federal courts.16 According to reformers, class
actions often involve complex legal and national-interest issues.17 Thus,
federal courts should have sole jurisdiction to hear “national class actions,” because (1) state court judges are allegedly prejudiced against outof-state corporate defendants, and (2) only federal courts are sufficiently
competent to adjudicate complex class action controversies.18
Fairly recently, embracing class action reformers’ arguments,19 Congress enacted the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA).20 Simply
put, CAFA “federalizes” very large swaths of purely substantive state law
class actions, and it allows corporate defendants to remove those so-called
“class actions of national importance” to federal courts.21 To repeat, in
jurisdiction are in the pockets of the local lawyers with whom the out-of-State lawyers
who have these class actions align themselves in order to go in there and get these outrageous verdicts that would not be obtained in any fair court of law.”).
15
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, THE ROGUE COURTS OF MADISON COUNTY: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF EGREGIOUS
CASES IN THE COURTS OF MADISON COUNTY, ILL., 13–14 (2003) [hereinafter U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM].
16
See NAMIC Supports President’s Commitment to Tort Reform, INS. J. (Jan. 7,
2005), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/2005/01/07/49419.htm (“‘We are
extremely pleased to see the high priority President Bush is giving to the issue of legal
reform,’ said National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies (NAMIC) Federal
Affairs Senior Vice President, David A. Winston .... On class action reform Winston
stated, ‘This is one of our top priorities .... Due to the dramatic increase in the filing of
class action lawsuits in the U.S. in the last decade—many of which are frivolous—our
member companies, as well as other businesses in other industries, have been forced to
divert their valuable resources from their businesses.’”).
17
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 15, at 13.
18
Cf. infra notes 78–79 and accompanying text.
19
See infra notes 384–97 and accompanying text.
20
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4.
21
See Industry Basks in Class-Action Victory, NAT’L UNDERWRITER P&C (Dec. 3,
2005), http://www.propertycasualty360.com/2005/12/19/7-industry-basks-in-classaction-victory
(“For eight long years, the insurance industry battled on Capitol Hill to put a lid on what
they considered to be an out-of-control tort system. With Republicans firmly in control of
both houses of Congress and the White House, they finally were able to see at least one
of their dream bills passed. Insurers were positively giddy when President George W.
Bush signed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 into law. After all, the law moves a
lot more cases into the more predictable federal courts, limits ‘venue shopping’ by trial
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some quarters, a prevailing view exists: state court judges and juries are
hostile to out-of-state corporate and non-corporate defendants.22 Certainly,
from the reformers’ perspective, the latter conditions are actual rather than
imaginary perils of litigating class actions in state courts. Thus, according
to corporate defendants and the defense bar, “national” class actions must
be litigated in federal courts, where the litigation field is arguably more
leveled for both out-of-state corporate defendants and in-state consumersplaintiffs.23
In contrast, states’ righters acknowledge that both plaintiffs and defendants will confront various risks when litigating class actions in state
courts; however, states’ righters insist: intentionally biased and hostile
state court judges and juries are simply imaginary rather than actual risks
of litigating class actions in state courts.24 Furthermore, proponents of
states’ rights argue that allowing out-of-state corporate defendants to remove truly substantive state law class actions to federal courts is a radical
departure from commonly accepted notions of judicial federalism.25 And
opponents of class action reforms insist that removing the majority of
class actions from allegedly hostile and discriminatory state courts to federal courts severely undermines the separation of powers between federal
and state courts.26
Positively, class action reforms in general and the long terms effects of
CAFA in particular are important topics. Thus, CAFA will be discussed
necessarily and briefly at relevant points throughout this Article. But it is
important to emphasize that CAFA is not the central focus of this Article.
Quite simply, the literature is replete with CAFA-related articles.27 Inlawyers seeking friendly jurisdictions (called ‘judicial hellholes’ by the industry), and
places limits on state class actions.”).
22
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 15, at 11.
23
See, e.g., id. at 10.
24
See discussion infra Part II.A and accompanying notes.
25
See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.
26
See infra notes 49–59 and accompanying text.
27
A search on May 4, 2011 generated nearly two hundred CAFA-related articles. See,
e.g., Diane B. Bratvold & Daniel J. Supalla, Standard of Proof to Establish Amount in
Controversy when Defending Removal Under the Class Action Fairness Act, 36 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1397, 1401 (2010) (discussing a circuit split over the standard of proof
for determining the amount in controversy in CAFA removal cases); Stephen B. Burbank,
The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A Preliminary View, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 1439, 1445 (2008) (presenting a pre- and post-CAFA description of the
jurisdictional rules governing federal diversity class action litigation); Alexander
Lemann, Sheep in Wolves’ Clothing: Removing Parens Patriae Suits Under the Class
Action Fairness Act, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 123 (2011) (examining the applicability of
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stead, this Article presents a fairly comprehensive discussion as well as an
empirical analysis of a persistent, poorly studied, and divisive question:
whether allegedly biased state court judges and juries have a greater propensity to decide against out-of-state corporations and insurers who are
defendants in state law class actions.
Stated more succinctly, this Article addresses two major questions: (1)
whether in-state and out-of-state litigants are significantly more or less
likely to “win” state law class actions in state courts or in federal courts,
and (2) whether state court judges or federal judges are significantly more
or less likely to allow impermissible, discriminatory or extralegal factors
influence the disposition of class actions in state and federal courts, respectively. Perhaps answers to these questions will shed some light on the
more general question: whether purportedly “incompetent and biased”
state judges and juries are significantly more likely to resolve class actions
differently than allegedly “more competent, unbiased, and less hostile”
federal judges and juries.
Thus, Part I discusses, extremely briefly, judicial federalism. Necessarily, this succinct discussion will focus on the Framers of the Constitution’s intent when they adopted a federalist system that allocates power,
establishes a division of labor, and creates checks and balances between
state and federal judiciaries. But even more importantly, Part II highlights
and discusses the proven risks and the imaginary perils of litigating actions generally and class actions particularly in purportedly “impartial”
federal courts and allegedly “hostile and biased” state courts. Finally and
inescapably, the closing discussions in Part II focus, briefly, on the following procedural issues: (1) the scope of federal courts’ jurisdictional powers
to hear diversity actions between parties from different states, (2) the
scope of allegedly “unprincipled” and “prejudiced” state court judges’
power and expertise to hear disputes between citizens and noncitizens who
reside within the borders of a state, and (3) the extent of both federal and
state court judges’ legal competence to certify and adjudicate various class
actions judiciously and efficiently.
When Congress was debating whether class action reforms were necessary, a significant split emerged among legislators. Some asserted that
enacting CAFA would severely undermine the Framers’ intent regarding

the Class Action Fairness Act’s removal provisions to parens patriae suits); Adam N.
Steinman, “Less” Is “More”? Textualism, Intentionalism, and a Better Solution to the
Class Action Fairness Act’s Appellate Deadline Riddle, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1183, 1189
(2007) (summarizing CAFA’s jurisdictional and appellate provisions).
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judicial federalism.28 Others maintained that class action reforms would
restore the “proper” allocation of powers between state and federal
courts.29 Therefore, Part III presents a short overview of CAFA’s stated
purposes and a discussion of that act’s controversial provisions regarding
the proper venue for litigating supposedly “class actions of national importance.”
In addition, using CAFA as a point of reference, Part III outlines the
insurance industry and insured corporate entities’ ostensible reasons for
using their substantial political clout and financial resources to help enact
CAFA. As mentioned earlier, class action litigation is plagued with substantial perils, regardless of whether the actions commence in supposedly
“unfriendly” and “prejudicial” state courts, or in professedly “impartial”
and “highly proficient” federal courts.30 Yet, during the 2005 congressional debates over whether to enact class action reforms, the powerful insurance industry and other class action reformers also cited many arguably
fictitious perils, pitching them to justify allowing out-of-state, corporate
defendants to remove purported “national class actions” from allegedly
“biased” state courts to federal courts.31
Why would national insurers and their insured corporate clients introduce lists of arguably fictitious perils into the class action debate? Were
the insurers truly interested in eradicating allegedly “biased” and “hostile”
state court proceedings, or were the insurers and insured corporations
determined to “turn 200 years of judicial federalism on its head”? Since
the latter has been suggested, Part III also focuses more closely on insurers’ critical role in helping to remove purely substantive state law class
actions from state to federal courts.
As discussed more fully in Part IV, corporations as well as insurance
companies have a long history of filing class action lawsuits among themselves.32 Thus, even a cursory examination of case law and the legal literature demonstrates that whether a class comprises similarly situated consumers, corporations, or insurance companies, class representatives and
28

Michael D. Y. Sukenik & Adam J. Levitt, CAFA and Federalized Ambiguity: The
Case for Discretion in the Unpredictable Class Action, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 233, 235–
36 (2011).
29
John Stevens, Securing “Steady, Upright and Impartial Administration of the
Laws”—The Federalist-Based Imperative for Class Action Reform, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 361, 377 (2005).
30
See, e.g., id. at 372.
31
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 15, at 2, 4.
32
See Ross E. Cheit & Jacob E. Gersen, When Businesses Sue Each Other: An Empirical Study of State Court Litigation, 25 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 789, 790 (2000).
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counsels must prepare for and confront numerous serious perils in federal
courts.33 Also, as discussed in Part IV, some of the procedural hurdles
include inter-circuit conflicts over the criteria for determining jurisdiction,
conflicting interpretations of class certification rules, inter- and intracircuit conflicts over the proper choice of law rules under the Erie doctrine, Erie-guessing problems, and conflicts over whether federal district
courts must apply state laws, the laws of a specific federal circuit, or the
laws of a specific panel within a federal circuit.34
Arguably, CAFA’s fairly new jurisdictional and removal rules will increase rather than reduce the numbers of known procedural and substantive hurdles that class action litigants presently face in federal courts.
Therefore, Part IV presents a fairly brief discussion of some possibly unintended, post-CAFA consequences that corporate plaintiffs are likely to
encounter when they commence class actions in federal courts. Part IV
also discusses some unexpected perils that insurance companies are likely
to come across in a post-CAFA era as class action plaintiffs and defendants in federal courts.
Part V is the final section in this Article. It presents the results of an
empirical study of class action cases litigated in federal and state courts
between 1925 and 2011. These results were compiled in a database. As
reported in Part V, the database reveals that disgruntled consumers and
third-party victims filed class actions in both state and federal courts
against a large assortment of national and multinational insurance companies, insured corporations, businesses, and public and private institutions.35 Thus, in Part V, several important statistical findings are reported.
For example, when comparing class action defendants and plaintiffs’ likelihoods of success, the results are clear: multinational insurance companies
and other corporate defendants have a greater likelihood of “winning”
class actions in allegedly “hostile,” “biased,” and “incompetent” state
courts.36 But even more relevant, the study reveals: either consciously or
unconsciously, allegedly “impartial” federal judges as well as purportedly
“biased” state court judges permit extra-legal or irrelevant factors—like
33

See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (citing Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962)) (“[F]ederal standing requires an allegation of a present or
immediate injury in fact, where the party requesting standing has ‘alleged such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues.’”).
34
See infra notes 459–83 and accompanying text; see also Class Action Fairness Act
of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat 4, 5.
35
See infra Part V.
36
See infra Part V.C.
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the geographic location of the deciding court and the legal statuses of class
action complainants—to influence class action outcomes.37
Finally, as of this writing, CAFA’s removal and jurisdictional rules
have begun to generate serious intra-circuit and inter-circuit conflicts
among federal courts.38 Therefore, this Article concludes by inviting the
Supreme Court to seize the opportunity to review one or several of those
procedural conflicts. And, in light of the empirical findings and historical
analysis reported in this Article, the author encourages the Court to declare
that CAFA’s removal rule is constitutionally overboard, because (1) the
jurisdictional procedural rule evolved in whole part from a set of beliefs
and conclusions which have no firm foundation in fact or in law; and (2)
the “case of national importance” procedural rule interferes excessively
and unreasonably with state court judges’ long recognized authority, competence, judiciousness, and efficiency to hear and decide class actions
involving purely substantive state law disputes.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW: THE FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND
JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
“Fundamental principles of federalism” is a phrase that appears frequently in reported cases,39 the Congressional Record,40 and legal litera37

See infra Part V.D.
See infra Part V.E.
39
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“[T]he Qualifications Clauses are exclusive.... [I]t is well settled that the
whole people of the United States asserted their political identity and unity of purpose
when they created the federal system. The dissent’s course of reasoning suggesting otherwise might be construed to disparage the republican character of the National Government, and ... that course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental principles of
federalism.”); United States v. Martinez-Cortez, 354 F.3d 830, 833 (8th Cir. 2004) (Lay,
J., dissenting) (“The majority opinion fails to address the fundamental principles of
federalism and deference owed by federal courts to state courts in processing their own
criminal cases.”); Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 184 (2nd Cir. 1999) (concluding
that a lower federal court offends the most fundamental principles of federalism when
that tribunal attempts improperly to decide a purely a question of state law); Bell v. Hill,
190 F.3d 1089, 1093 (9th Cir. 1999) (Rymer, J., dissenting) (arguing that issuing a federal writ of habeas corpus to a state court—merely on the basis of the Ninth Circuit’s case
law—violates fundamental principles of federalism); People v. Brisendine, 531 P.2d
1099, 1113 (Cal. 1975) (“[T]he California Constitution is, and always has been, a document of independent force. Any other result would contradict not only the most fundamental principles of federalism but also the historic bases of state charters.”).
40
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1796, 1821 (2005) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley)
(“The amendment, in short, is a radical attempt to avoid the fact that in some areas Congress has chosen to leave the decision of what substantive law should govern conduct to
38
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ture.41 Some commentators argue that the Framers developed and inserted
fundamental principles of federalism conspicuously in the Constitution.42
the legislative process of each state. By having judges dismiss the laws of all states but
one, the Public Citizen amendment violates fundamental principles of federalism.”); 150
CONG. REC. S8055, 8071 (daily ed. July 14, 2004) (statement of Sen. Wayne Allard)
(citing JOSHUA K. BAKER, IS DOMA ENOUGH? AN ANALYSIS, INST. FOR MARRIAGE &
PUB. POLICY (2004) (“Many legal analysts argue that a constitutional amendment that
creates a national definition of marriage violates fundamental principles of federalism.”));
146 CONG. REC. 2899, 2912 (2000) (statement of Rep. Sherwood Boehlert) (“Mr. Chairman, I rise in strong opposition to this bill. The detrimental effects of [the Private Property Rights Implementation Act of 2000] are likely to be felt by virtually every citizen in
virtually every community in this country.... [T]his bill disempowers citizens and their
towns and cities and counties, and skews local zoning rules to give developers the upper
hand. It removes the incentive to negotiate zoning disputes, replacing that incentive with
the threat of federal court review.... Let us not take power away from citizens and localities. Let us not overturn the fundamental principles of federalism.”).
41
See, e.g., Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1361 (2006) (reporting that the
United States ratified the U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime but
attached a reservation that preserved the nation’s “fundamental principles of federalism”); Michelle Lawner, Why Federal Courts Should Be Required to Consider State
Sovereign Immunity Sua Sponte, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261, 1270 (1999) (asserting that
“fundamental principles of federalism ... compel the Court to protect state sovereignty”);
Jason Lynch, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General
in Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1998, 2032 (2001) (rejecting the notion that
state attorneys general violate fundamental principles of federalism and separation of
powers when they prosecute multistate cases); Note, Litigating the Defense of Marriage
Act: The Next Battleground for Same-Sex Marriage, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2684, 2688
(2004) (arguing that the Defense of Marriage Act “abuses the Full Faith and Credit
Clause and contravenes fundamental principles of Federalism”).
42
See, e.g., U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838–39 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[I]t seems appropriate to add these few remarks to explain why
[the dissenter’s] course of argumentation runs counter to fundamental principles of federalism. Federalism was our Nation’s own discovery. The Framers split the atom of sovereignty. It was the genius of their idea that our citizens would have two political capacities, one state and one federal, each protected from incursion by the other. The resulting
Constitution created a legal system unprecedented in form and design, establishing two
orders of government, each with its own direct relationship, its own privity, its own set of
mutual rights and obligations to the people who sustain it and are governed by it. It is
appropriate to recall these origins, which instruct us as to the nature of the two different
governments created and confirmed by the Constitution.”); Adam Nagourney, G.O.P.
Right Is Splintered on Schiavo Intervention, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 2005, at A14 (“[Congress’s vote to allow] ... federal courts to take over the Terri Schiavo case has created
distress among some conservatives who say that lawmakers violated a cornerstone of
conservative philosophy by intervening in the ruling of a state court.... David Davenport
of the [conservative] Hoover Institute [stated] ...‘[Congress’s intervention] really is a
violation of federalism.’ ... Some more moderate Republicans are also uneasy. Senator
John W. Warner of Virginia, the sole Republican to oppose the Schiavo bill ... said: ‘This
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Other constitutional scholars, however, disagree.43 While acknowledging
that a core set of principles generally allocate jurisdictional powers between the states and branches of the federal government, many jurists
stress that judicial interpretations of the Constitution,44 congressional
statutes45 and the executive branch’s policies46 have created and shaped
our ever evolving principles of federalism. Once more, there are several
types and theories of federalism, and imaginative commentators are forevsenator has learned from many years you’ve got to separate your own emotions from the
duty to support the Constitution of this country. These are fundamental principles of
federalism.’”).
43
See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1,
9–10 (2004) (“Both the text and historical understandings of the Constitution plainly
contemplate balance between national and state power .... [But while the] text and history
of the Constitution are important starting points ... they are necessarily incomplete
guides; after all, that incompleteness is the major reason we turn to doctrinal development.”).
44
See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term—Foreword: The Document and the Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 26–27 (2000) (“[T]he Constitution has
often proved more enlightened and enlightening than the case law glossing it.... The
document, of course, must be interpreted ... [The documentarians] seek inspiration and
discipline in the amended Constitution’s specific words and word patterns, the historical
experiences that birthed and rebirthed the text, and the conceptual schemas and structures
organizing the document.... [The doctrinalists do not attempt to comb] meaning from
constitutional text, history, and structure. Instead, they typically strive to synthesize what
the Supreme Court has said and done ... in the name of the Constitution.... Judges have
often transformed sound and widely accepted constitutional principles into normatively
insensitive or outlandish lines of case law.”); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 905 (1997) (concluding that a federal statute—which compelled state officers to
execute federal laws—was unconstitutional and observing that although “no constitutional text [covered or addressed the] precise question, the answer ... must be sought in historical understanding and practice, in the structure of the Constitution, and in the jurisprudence of this Court”).
45
See Young, supra note 43, at 9 (“Congress stakes its claim to regulate certain aspects of life while eschewing others and ... creates mechanisms of shared state and federal responsibility.”).
46
See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 825, 827–29 (2004) (“In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the U.S.
Supreme Court invalidated California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA),
which required insurance companies doing business in California to disclose all policies
they or their affiliates sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945. According to the Court, the
state’s law unconstitutionally interfered with the foreign affairs power of the national
government.... The Court’s conclusions in Garamendi ... come as something of a surprise,
for ... the essence of the decision is that the President, at least in some circumstances,
does have this preemptive power in foreign affairs.... The final outcome ... was that a
state law fell, not because the law was in itself unconstitutional, but because the executive
branch disagreed with it as a policy matter.” (footnotes omitted)).
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er creating novel theories about federalism and the Framers’ intent.47 But
those numerous theories will not be discussed here. Instead, this Part presents a very brief and necessary discussion about judicial federalism, another branch of the separation of powers doctrine.48
Briefly put, Article III of the Constitution49 created a federal judiciary,
and it gives the Supreme Court and lower federal courts powers to resolve
constitutional as well as federal statutory and regulatory disputes.50 In
addition, depending on the status of the parties in a legal action, the Judiciary Act of 178951 gives the federal judiciary additional powers and jurisdiction over states and their citizens.52 But state courts also have power to
hear and resolve controversies. Therefore, one might ask: what are the
unique parameters of judicial federalism? At the outset, it is worth men47

See Adam M. Giuliano, Emergency Federalism: Calling on the States in Perilous
Times, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 341, 345 (2007) (discussing the Framers’ intent and
assessing “what the Constitution says [about how] emergency federalism might apply to
the War on Terror and homeland security”); Robert B. Thompson, Corporate Federalism
in the Administrative State: The SEC’s Discretion to Move the Line Between the State
and Federal Realms of Corporate Governance, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1143, 1144
(2007) (discussing how state regulators abrogated their duties and allowed federal regulators to expand corporate governance rules and the obligations of officers and directors).
48
See Thomas E. Baker, A Catalogue of Judicial Federalism in the United States, 46
S.C. L. REV. 835, 842–44 (1995) (“From the earliest days of the Republic, the judicial
inquiry has always been two-dimensional. The scope of the federal judicial power always
is determined, first, by examining Article III of the Constitution and, second, by interpreting the particular enabling act of Congress.... The constitutional principle of separation of
powers is evident in the resolution of issues of federal court jurisdiction.... Like separation of powers, the principle of federalism is not found in so many words in the text but
nonetheless is an essential part of the Constitution’s structure.” (footnotes omitted)).
49
U.S. CONST. art. III.
50
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides for original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court. It reads in pertinent part:
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to
time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall ... receive ... a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.
Id. § 1.
51
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 § 12.
52
The Judiciary Act of 1789 confirms the Supreme Court’s powers and states:
[T]he Supreme Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party, except between a state
and its citizens; and except also between a state and citizens of other
states, or aliens, in which latter case it shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction.
Id. § 13.
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tioning that judicial federalism in America is multifaceted. First, it is a
two-pronged system that comprises federal and state judiciaries,53 and,
within each judiciary, one finds a hierarchy of courts that have specific
and limited jurisdictional powers.54
Second, even though it is a dual system, judicial federalism “means
different things in different contexts.”55 The Supreme Court’s policing the
“boundaries of power between federal and state [courts],” limiting and
interpreting congressional powers under various federal statutes or preventing Congress from violating the constitution and its amendments all
comprise one meaning of judicial federalism.56 Judicial federalism, however, also means ensuring the existence of a stable and “fully developed
dual court system” that is efficient and impartial,57 instituting democratic
procedures to select, elect, and retain judges in both judiciaries, accepting
the principle that the Supreme Court may police state courts’ federal-law
rulings, and, even more importantly, acknowledging that state courts are
indeed competent to adjudicate federal questions of law.58
To reiterate, judicial federalism includes state and federal courts’ respecting each other’s powers and competencies to try and award remedies
in cases that involve both federal and state questions of law.59 But note: as
plaintiffs or as defendants, many national insurers and their insured—
national and multinational corporations, partnerships and other mediumto-large conglomerates—have embraced or fashioned arguably a difficult
conundrum regarding whether state courts or federal courts are the proper
forums to litigate state law disputes.60 On some occasions, large out-of53

See William G. Bassler, The Federalization of Domestic Violence: An Exercise in
Cooperative Federalism or a Misallocation of Federal Judicial Resources?, 48 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1139, 1176 (1996) (“American federalism also finds expression in our legal
system, with its dual set of federal and state courts.... But just as there is no fundamental
norm to [help us to understand] federalism in general, no overarching neutral principle
defines the contours of judicial federalism .... since.”).
54
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1; Judiciary Act of 1789 § 13.
55
See Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Federalism After Bush v. Gore: Some Observations, 23 JUST. SYS. J. 45, 47 (2002).
56
Id. at 47.
57
Robert A. Schapiro, Dual Enforcement of Constitutional Norm Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1399, 1399 (2005).
58
Solimine, supra note 55, at 47.
59
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV.
1141, 1142 n.1 (1988).
60
Compare Charles D. Weller, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Antitrust Exemption
for Insurance: Language, History and Policy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 587, 590 (1978), with U.S.
CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL REFORM, supra note
15, at 13–14.
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state and in-state insurance companies champion state courts’ right and
power to decide controversies in which insurers and/or their corporate
clients are defendants.61 During those moments, national and multinational
insurers routinely cite states’ jurisdictional powers under the McCarranFerguson Act,62 and fight fiercely to litigate mixed-claims, state substantive law and/or federal substantive law controversies in state courts.63
On other occasions, when those same insurers and their insured corporate clients “think” or “believe” that they are victims of state courts’ allegedly biased proceedings or discriminatory rulings, those corporate defendants frequently fight to remove general actions and class actions from state
to federal courts.64 Furthermore, during those episodes, corporate defendants often accuse state courts of being incompetent to decide mixed federal and state controversies.65 And those national and multinational insurers
and corporations also insist that state courts are “hostile” forums because
state court judges allegedly redefine, undermine or destroy settled principles of judicial federalism.66 Without a doubt, these and similar arguments
were presented extremely effectively before Congress during its debate
over CAFA, an act that allows corporate defendants to remove large percentages of state substantive law class actions from various state courts to
federal courts.67
II. ALLEGEDLY “BIASED” STATE COURT JUDGES AND “CORRUPT STATE
COURT PROCEEDINGS” VERSUS THE REAL PERILS OF LITIGATING IN STATE
AND FEDERAL COURTS
Long before the Constitutional Convention adopted the United States
Constitution in 1787 and the original states’ ratification,68 there were state

61
62

See Weller, supra note 60, at 590.
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945); see also infra notes 279–347 and accompanying

text.
63

See infra notes 279–347 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 15, at 9.
65
See, e.g., id. at 3.
66
See, e.g., id. at 13–14.
67
See generally id. (offering many, if not all, of these arguments two years prior to
the passage of CAFA).
68
See State v. Neufeld, 926 P.2d 1325, 1345 (Kan. 1996) (reporting that a Constitutional Convention framed the United States Constitution in Philadelphia in 1787, all
representatives of the original states except Rhode Island adopted and signed the Constitution on September 17, 1787 and eleven states ratified the Constitution by August 1788).
64
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courts.69 Those courts tried cases and issued an assortment of rulings under state constitutions and statutes as well as under English and American
common law.70 But even more relevant, nearly ninety years after the original states ratified the Constitution, diverse parties litigated federal claims
and causes of action primarily in state courts, because inferior federal
courts did not have general jurisdiction to try such cases.71
Under the Constitution, the judicial power of the federal government
extends “to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under ... the Laws of the
United States” and “to Controversies...between a State and Citizens of
another State.”72 And, under the Judiciary Act of 1789,73 federal courts
have jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states or
between a citizen of a state and an alien.74 As some constitutional scholars
have reported, neither the Constitutional Convention’s debates nor the

69

See Luke Bierman, From the Benches and Trenches—Three Views of State Appellate Courts, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 91, 91 (2005) (noting that some state courts have a very long
history that predates the federal judiciary); Ellen A. Peters, Capacity and Respect: A
Perspective on the Historic Role of the State Courts in the Federal System, 73 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1065, 1073 (1998) (“[Although] detailed information about the agenda of early state
courts [is absent for various reasons] .... the early courts rendered far reaching decisions,
especially on matters that would now be characterized as raising constitutional questions.”).
70
See PETER J. GALIE, ORDERED LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NEW
YORK 1 (1996) (reporting that some original states adopted state constitutions between
1776 and 1787 that later became models for the United States Constitution).
71
See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 320 (5th ed. 2003).
72
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
73
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73 § 11 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006)).
74
Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 states:
[T]he circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the
courts of the several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common law
or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the
sum or value of five hundred dollars, and the United States are plaintiffs, or petitioners; or an alien is a party, or the suit is between a citizen
of the State where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.
Judiciary Act of 1789 § 11. The Judiciary Act of 1875 removed the requirement
that one of the parties be a citizen of the forum state, and gave jurisdiction of all
suits in which the jurisdictional amount was met and “in which there shall be a
controversy between citizens of different States, or ... a controversy between
citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or subjects ....” Judiciary Act of
1875, 18 Stat. 470 § 2.
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First Congress’s records explain why the Constitution and the Judiciary
Act award “diversity jurisdiction”75 to federal courts.76
One fact, however, is unquestionable: since the nation ratified the
Constitution and embraced federalism in its various forms, tensions between federal and state judiciaries have been very real and pronounced.77
And, even though state courts have been highly competent to hear and
decide federal-law causes of action for centuries,78 debates persist in the
literature and, more recently, in Congress, over whether state courts are
competent, dispassionate, and reliable enough to decide federal claims or
causes.79
Certainly litigants must confront and prepare for known procedural
and substantive legal barriers if they expect to prevail in either state or
75

Although 28 U.S.C.§ 1332(a) extends federal courts’ jurisdiction to suits between
“citizens of different states,” “diversity jurisdiction” embraces both diversity actions and
alienage cases.
76
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed. 2011).
77
Cf. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662–63 (1978) (recognizing that
duplicative litigation in as well as concomitant tension between state and federal courts
are major concerns and “as the overlap between state claims and federal claims increased,
this Court soon recognized that situations would often arise when it would be appropriate
to defer to the state courts”); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 93 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that “uncertainty of the standards creates a continuing source of tension between state and federal courts” and suggesting “[t]he problem is
... that one cannot say with certainty that material is obscene until at least five members
of this Court, applying inevitably obscure standards, have pronounced it so.”).
78
See Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990) (“We begin with the axiom that, under our federal system, the States possess sovereignty concurrent with that of the Federal
Government, subject only to limitations imposed by the Supremacy Clause. Under this
system of dual sovereignty, we have consistently held that state courts have inherent
authority, and are thus presumptively competent, to adjudicate claims arising under the
laws of the United States.”). But see Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947) (reaffirming
the principle that a state court cannot “refuse to enforce the right arising from the law of
the United States because of conceptions of impolicy or want of wisdom on the part of
Congress in having called into play its lawful powers”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
79
Compare 151 CONG. REC. 2631, 2652 (2005) (statement of Rep. William Delahunt)
(“[W]e have before us [the Class Action Fairness] bill that would sweep aside generations of State laws that protect consumers. Citizens will be denied their basic right to use
their own State courts to file class action lawsuits against companies.”), with id. at 2092
(statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“Article III of [the Constitution] extends Federal
jurisdiction to suits between ‘citizens of different States.’ The purpose of extending this
‘diversity jurisdiction’ to citizens is to prevent the citizens of one State from being discriminated against by the courts of another State. However, over the years, this purpose
has been increasingly thwarted by clever pleading practices of enterprising class action
attorneys.”).
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federal courts. Thus, this realization generates no serious debate because
predictable legal hurdles affect both in-state and out-of-state litigants.80
There is, however, a broader concern: whether state and federal courts are
equally competent, dispassionate, and reliable in preventing extra-legal
“perils” from determining or influencing in-state and out-of-state litigants’
likelihood of prevailing or “winning” in those respective tribunals.
Some jurists, corporate officials, and liability insurers insist that extralegal perils are rampant in state courts.81 Consequently, defendants in
those cases assert that state court judges are significantly more likely to
allow non-legal factors to adversely affect out-of-state litigants’ chances
of winning.82 There is, of course, the counter argument: extra-legal perils
are found in both federal and state courts, and neither state nor federal
judges are more or less likely to allow unwarranted perils to determine instate and out-of-state litigants’ chances of winning. In addition, controversy also surrounds another issue: whether state and federal courts are more
or less likely to permit real and arguably imaginary perils or factors to
determine the disposition of class actions in state and federal courts.
Therefore, the following sections review and discuss both real and imaginary perils of litigating civil actions generally and class actions particularly.
A. In-State and Out-of-State Litigants’ Actual and Imaginary Risks of
Litigating Civil Actions in State and Federal Courts
1. Proven and Perceived Perils in State Court Proceedings
Early on, jurists, legislators and commentators voiced legitimate concerns about the proven risks of litigating civil actions in state courts and
about reducing state court judges’ alleged propensity to allow extralegal
variables to influence the disposition of disputes.83 For example, during
80

It is fairly easy to identify an “in-state” litigant when: (1) that person resides in or is
incorporated with a certain state, and (2) that person is either the plaintiff or defendant in
the state court proceeding. On the other hand, when a diversity action commences in a
federal district court, distinguishing “in-state” from “out-of-state” litigants becomes a bit
more difficult. In this Article, a person is an “in-state” litigant if: (1) that person either
resides or has a principle place of business in the state, and (2) that person invokes federal jurisdiction in a federal district court within his state, or (3) that person is named as
defendant in a diversity action in the federal district court.
81
See, e.g., U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & U.S. CHAMBER INSTITUTE FOR LEGAL
REFORM, supra note 15, at 3.
82
See, e.g., id. at 6.
83
3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
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debates in the First Congress, James Madison—a strong proponent of
federal diversity jurisdiction—encouraged legislators to remember what
was common knowledge at the time: the administration of justice in some
state courts was unquestionably “tardy and even defective.”84 Moreover,
state court judges were often unqualified85 and they served short terms.86
As a consequence, the quality of justice in state courts was less than ideal.87
Also, early on, state legislatures often dominated state courts.88 Therefore, some state legislatures’ intentional interference undermined the administration of justice in those tribunals.89 For instance, after state courts’
findings, rulings or judgments, state legislatures often intervened and
“fines [were] remitted, judicially established claims disallowed, verdicts of
juries set aside, the property of one given to another, defective titles secured, marriages dissolved, [and] particular persons held in execution of
debt released ....”90

84

See id.
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Sligh, 1 H. & McH. 434, 437 (1772) (“It appears, from the
notes of T. Jenings, Esq. who was counsel in this cause, and of W. Cooke, Esq. that the
Justices [who were present could not] determine the points [of laws, and secured] ... the
opinions of some of the gentlemen of the bar, [who were] not engaged in the cause ....”).
86
See, e.g., PAUL SAMUEL REINSCH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY
AMERICAN COLONIES 27–28 (1899) (reporting that “judges had a term of one year only....
Under this regime, the administration of the rules of the common law would of course be
impossible.... [I]t was only in 1754 that a lawyer ... became chief justice. Samuel Livermore, chief justice in 1782, though trained in the law, refused to be bound by precedents,
holding ‘that every tub should stand on its own bottom;’ and looking upon the adjudications of English tribunals only as illustrations.” (citation omitted)).
87
Cf. Hinchman v. Clark, 1 N.J.L. 340 (1795) (“Where the law is in any degree ambiguous, and will admit of two constructions, one consonant to justice and humanity, the
other contrary to these principles, it never should be done. Judges in the worst of times
have been ashamed to do what we are called upon to do, unless where the construction
was forced upon them, and was unavoidable. Let us not, in this government professedly
founded upon the rights of human nature, begin our administration of justice with the
doctrines and maxims which sometimes dishonored the character of the nation from
which we and our institutions have alike sprung.”).
88
See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia, Query 13, 120–21
(1784), reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 319–20 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (documenting Jefferson’s harsh criticism of the post-revolutionary Virginia courts for their lack of independence and for allowing the Virginia Legislature to dominate and influence judicial proceedings and rulings.).
89
See id. at 320.
90
See Edward S. Corwin, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention, 30 AM. HIST.
REV. 511, 519–20 (1925).
85
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On the other hand, fear of imaginary perils in state courts generates the
most debate and unfounded concerns about the plight of out-of-state litigants in those courts.91 What are the imaginary risks of litigation in state
courts? Historically, the belief that state courts are prejudiced, hostile, or
biased against out-of-state citizens has been a prominent fear.92 Of course,
the precise origin of this particular imaginary or supposed risk is unknown.93 However, during debates in the First Congress, James Madison
stated:
[Regarding] disputes between citizens of different states ... it is [not] a
matter of much importance. Perhaps [those disputes] might be left to
the state courts.... [A] strong prejudice may arise, in some states,
against the citizens of others, who may have claims against them.... A
citizen of another state might not ... get justice in a state court, and ... he
might think [he is] injured.94

Very likely, Madison’s comments started and continue to fuel the fear
about state courts’ imaginary prejudices against out-of-state litigants.95
Also, to justify the removal of diversity cases to federal courts, advocates
who championed the rights of “foreign” litigants highlighted some supposed “inadequacies” that infected state court proceedings and cited noncitizens’ allegedly increased “possibility” of facing “difficult” proceedings
in state court. 96
91

See Justin D. Forlenza, CAFA and Erie: Unconstitutional Consequences?, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1065, 1070–71 (2006).
92
See id. at 1071.
93
See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3601 (3d ed. 2009) (“It is unclear what prompted
the concern about the inadequacy of or bias in the state courts and whether it was justified.”).
94
See 3 DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 533 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836).
95
See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898) (“The object of the
provisions [giving jurisdiction to] circuit courts ... of controversies between citizens of
different States ... was to secure a tribunal presumed to be more impartial than a court of
the state in which one of the litigants resides.”); Kopff v. World Research Grp., LLC, 298
F. Supp. 2d 50, 55 (D.D.C. 2003) (embracing the belief that the Constitution and federal
law created federal diversity jurisdiction to prevent state courts from actually discriminating against nonresident defendants); Donald R. Songer, Martha Humphries Ginn &
Tammy A. Sarver, Do Judges Follow the Law When There Is No Fear of Reversal?, 24
JUST. SYS. J. 137, 139 (2003) (“The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 created diversity
jurisdiction to protect out-of-state citizens from the biases inherent in the various state
courts.” (citing EDWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1989))).
96
See WRIGHT, supra note 93; see also Bank of the U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87
(1809) (Marshall, C.J.) (“[Accepting as true] that the tribunals of the states will adminis-
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But, it should be stressed that citing out-of-state litigants’ fear of “potential local bias”97 in state courts as the primary justification for removing
state substantive law disputes to federal courts has been challenged.98 For
example, one commentator has suggested that, historically and presently,
state courts’ alleged bias or propensity to discriminate is not necessarily
the cause of non-citizens’ unfounded fears litigating in state courts.99 Instead, out-of-state litigants want to evade local substantive laws and state
courts’ evenhanded application of those laws to citizens and noncitizens.100 Arguably, this latter explanation has some appeal, even though
one cannot pinpoint the exact origin of out-of-state corporations’ and citizens’ unproven fears or imaginations about state courts judges’ purported
inability to be impartial and judicious.
2. Proven and Imaginary Perils in Federal Diversity Proceedings
Again, the Constitution and an act of Congress created federal diversity jurisdiction ostensibly to increase the likelihood of in-state and out-ofstate litigants’ receiving equal treatment in federal courts.101 But jurists
have questioned and even criticized that justification, asserting that diversity jurisdiction only enhances the disorderly administration of justice in
the United States.102 Do plaintiffs have unfounded concerns about the risk
of litigating state law claims in federal courts? A reasonable review of the
literature reveals that neither in-state nor out-of-state litigants should have
ter justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description, it is not
less true that the constitution ... either entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views
with such indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or
between citizens of different states.”).
97
See Lumberman’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
98
See John Burritt McArthur, Good Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference
Erie Rule for Louisiana State Court Decisions, 66 LA. L. REV. 313, 317–18 (2006).
99
Id.
100
Id.
101
Forlenza, supra note 91, at 1070–71.
102
See, e.g., Elbert, 348 U.S. at 53–54 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[O]ur holding
[is] such a glaring perversion of the [original] purpose [for granting] diversity jurisdiction
... that it ought not to go without comment, as further proof of the mounting mischief
inflicted on the federal judicial system by the unjustifiable continuance of diversity
jurisdiction.”); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
GOVERNMENT 37 (Harv. Univ. Press, 1955) (Justice Jackson wrote: “[I]n my judgment
the greatest contribution that Congress could make to the orderly administration of justice
... would be to abolish the jurisdiction of the federal courts which is based solely on the
ground that the litigants are citizens of different states.”).
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such unfounded fears.103 On the other hand, for those who commence
diversity actions in federal courts, the actual risks are substantial and most
litigants are cognizant of the perils.104 For example, both in-state and outof-state litigants understand and appreciate that legal expenses and other
unexpected costs can be burdensome and even staggering if litigants want
to enter and remain in federal court until finality.105 In addition, the federal
docket is overburdened with diversity cases, and those controversies present numerous questions of law, which many federal judges are precluded
from addressing intelligibly and in a timely manner because financial
resources are inadequate.106
But even more significantly, proven judicial bias is an outstanding and
unwarranted peril that in-state plaintiffs and defendants must confront in
federal courts.107 First, unlike the imaginary biases and hostilities that
allegedly exist in state courts,108 empirical research shows consistently that
federal judges often permit their preferences and attitudes about laws and
procedures to influence the disposition of cases.109 More telling, federal

103

ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 288 (3d ed. 1999).
See id. (explaining cost); E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing
Civil Cases to Federal Court Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 202
(2005) (claiming federal courts can misinterpret state law).
105
See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 103, at 288–89 (asserting that the initial justification for federal diversity jurisdiction has vanished and that diversity actions are too
costly); Percy, supra note 104, at 201 (“Given the lack of firm evidence that local prejudice actually exists in state courts ... and in light of the serious cost of diversity jurisdiction .... diversity jurisdiction raises serious federalism concerns.”).
106
See, e.g., David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 322–24 (1977) (reporting and reviewing statistics which
confirmed that diversity actions and questions are overburdening federal courts and
undermining the quality of justice because financial resources are expensive and limited).
107
See generally Songer, supra note 95 at 138.
108
See, e.g., Stone Grissom, Diversity Jurisdiction: An Open Dialogue in Dual Sovereignty, 24 HAMLINE L. REV. 372, 385 (2001) (“Opponents of diversity jurisdiction argue
that there no longer exists enough bias against out of state residents to justify ... [the]
costly and burdensome doctrine.... [S]ince the decision in Erie, the federal courts have
applied state laws consistently in diversity cases. Thus, commercial interests may no
longer use the federal forum to find protection against biased state legislatures.”); James
E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1925, 1942 (2004) (questioning whether state judges are biased in favor of
citizens and noting that state court bias could become a problem that might affect the
adjudication of disputes between in-state and out-of-state litigants).
109
See Songer, supra note 95 at 138 (listing numerous studies of judicial bias in federal courts and reporting the empirical findings).
104
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judges have admitted that their prejudices and attitudes affect the outcome
of diversity jurisdiction cases more wittingly than unwittingly.110
Thus, it is warranted to ask: who is more likely to benefit from federal
judges’ bias in diversity jurisdiction cases, in which the disputes involve
state law claims? The answer is not too complicated: out-of-state litigants—national corporations and their insurers—have a higher probability
of receiving favorable procedural and substantive outcomes in federal
courts than in-state litigants.111 More specifically, one reputable study
revealed that out-of-state corporations have a greater likelihood of prevailing in those tribunals than in-state corporations.112 Similarly, nonlocal
individuals’ probability of prevailing in diversity actions is statistically
and significantly greater than in-state individuals.113 Therefore, in light of
documented judicial bias in federal courts, another question is warranted:
why move the bulk of states’ substantive law class action from state to
federal courts when the risk of judicial bias is significantly more prevalent
in the latter courts? Consider the discussion in the next section.
B. Proven and Unproven Risks of Litigating Class Actions in Federal and
State Courts
1. A Brief History of Class Action
For centuries, English law has been very clear: if a plaintiff or a defendant has a material interest in a legal controversy, a complaint must list
or identify that person as a “named party.”114 The rule was fashioned to
ensure that a court’s judgment would bind all interested parties and was
called a “joinder,” since all interested parties had to be joined in the
case.115
110

Id. (reporting that the “admissions of a number of sitting federal judges” reinforce
the findings of judicial bias in federal courts).
111
See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Commentary, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 1142 (1996) (“Instead of faring poorly, nonlocals
... enjoy an elevated win rate.”).
112
Id. (“An out-of-state corporation suing a corporation either incorporated or having
its principal place of business in the forum state has a win rate of 84.47%, whereas an instate corporation suing an out-of-state corporation has only a 66.66% win rate.”).
113
Id. (“[O]ut-of-state individual plaintiffs suing in-state individual defendants have a
win rate of 67.78%, whereas in-state individuals suing out-of-state individuals have a win
rate of only 57.06%.”).
114
See 1 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS
§ 1.09, 1–22 (3d ed. 1992).
115
See id. (“[English] equity courts imposed a compulsory joinder rule that all parties
materially interested—either legally or beneficially—in the subject of the suit had to be

2012]

ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING”

445

But frequently, a joinder was extremely impractical and onerous for
several reasons. Litigants often did not file meritorious cases because the
pool of interested parties was too large; consequently, the representative
had difficulty identifying and locating all parties.116 In addition, assuming
all interested persons were located, they were difficult to manage because
the class comprised such large numbers.117 Furthermore, misjoinder, or the
practice of including persons who should have been excluded from the
pool of interested parties, often occurred.118 Without a doubt, both individually and collectively, mandatory joinder and misjoinder were real
risks for litigants in England and as a consequence, they were major procedural headaches, forcing litigants to invest excessive time and generating unexpected financial costs.119
While English courts of law and equity courts embraced the compulsory joinder rule, England’s Court of Chancery decided to adopt a less burdensome and a more liberal method to join interested parties.120 Chancery

made parties so there might be a complete decree to bind all.” (citing 1 REPORT ON CLASS
ACTIONS, ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION 5 (1982))).
116
Cf. Joll v. Curzon, (1847) 136 Eng. Rep. 501, 503 (stressing that under the rules of
joinder, “[t]he defendant is bound to state the names of all ... persons with whom the
contract was made.... [T]he affidavit must give the names and residences of the several
parties with convenient certainty ....” The court then concluded that defendant’s plea
revealed “that some of the parties [could not] be brought into court at all” because of
inconvenience).
117
See Thimblethorp v. Hardesty, (1702) 87 Eng. Rep. 1133 (K.B.) 1133 (finding that
there were too many parties, but concluding that the action should had commenced “in
the joint names of the principal and the ancients.... [T]he debt upon the account stated
[involves] ... many particular persons, and they all ought to join in the action ....”).
118
See Pearce v. Watkins, (1852) 64 Eng. Rep. 1132 (Ch.) 1133–34 (“[I]t is a rule of
this [c]ourt that a [p]laintiff cannot join himself with another person who has no interest.
The rule of this [c]ourt as to misjoinder, that is to say, the joinder of parties who have
conflicting interests, is a very strict rule.”).
119
Cf. M’Intyre v. Miller, (1845) 153 Eng. Rep. 304, 308 n. (a) (“Pearson obtained a
rule to [explain] why the peremptory undertaking should not be enlarged and why the
defendant should not join in demurrer, ... [why] the plaintiff [should not have] liberty to
sign [a] judgment for want of such joinder, and why the defendant should not pay the
costs of the application. Bovill [explained] ... that there was no power to compel a party
to join in demurrer, and no power in the [c]ourt to award costs, which could only be
given when the parties put themselves upon the judgment of the Court, and judgment was
actually given; ... [but in this case, there was] no judgment ... and no costs [were] awarded.” (citing Cooper v. Painter, 153 Eng. Rep. 308, 308)).
120
William Weiner & Delphine Szyndrowski, The Class Action, from the English Bill
of Peace to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23: Is There a Common Thread?, 8
WHITTIER L. REV. 935, 936–38 (1987).
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allowed litigants to file a bill of peace.121 Designed “to prevent a multiplicity of suits,” the bill of peace covered all interested parties and subjected every litigant to the same rulings, outcomes, judgments, or damages.122
There were two types of bills—pre- and post-trial bills of peace.123 Before commencing a lawsuit, a representative of a group could file a pretrial bill of peace and ask the court to join all interested persons if there
were simply too many persons to locate in a timely manner or to identify
precisely.124 However, once one’s cause of action had been tried in a court
of law and the court had entered its judgment, the successful party could
file a post-trial bill of peace.125 A court would grant the latter “to prevent
further and useless litigation.”126
Of course, a representative could commence or defend against an action on behalf of other interested persons and himself.127 But the bill of
peace petitioner had to prove three elements.128 He had to establish that:
(1) multiple lawsuits had been filed repeatedly against the representative,
(2) several persons had threatened to bring separate suits against the individual, and (3) multiple lawsuits had been filed in the same court.129 In
addition, the representative had to establish that all group members had a
material interest in the issues and the lawsuits.130 If the petitioner satisfied

121

See How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, (1681) 23 Eng. Rep. 277, 277 (Two substantive questions appear in this case: (1) whether the Lord of Bromsgrove Manor “had a
grant of free warren”; and if so, (2) “whether there were sufficient common left for the
tenants.” The Lord Chancellor declared that, “these matters were properly triable at
common law; and he did not see, what jurisdiction the chancery had of this cause.” But
plaintiffs argued: “[T]he bill was ... a bill of peace.” The court declared that bills of peace
are proper in equity.).
122
Disney v. Robertson, (1719) 145 Eng. Rep. 588, 588 (“[A] bill of peace ... binds
all parties ... [and is] retained to prevent a multiplicity of suits.”).
123
See Corp. of London v. Attorney-Gen., (1848) 9 Eng. Rep. 829, 838.
124
Id.
125
Id.
126
Id.
127
See generally Lord Stawell v. Atkins, (1795) 145 Eng. Rep. 967.
128
Id. at 968.
129
See id. (“[A] suit is in the nature of a bill of peace, which can be brought only [under three conditions]: 1st, Where [a] party is harassed by repeated suits. 2dly, Where
several persons claiming under a general right threaten to bring separate suits, as in
parochial or manerial rights dispute(s). 3dly, Where a bill for tithes has been instituted in
the same court.”).
130
See Gage v. Lister, (1705) 22 Eng. Rep. 147, 147 (“[Where several persons have
one and the same rights and each person wants to secure remedies for their disturbed
several rights, the persons may apply for a bill of peace]...to prevent [e]xpence, and [a]
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those elements, the court granted a bill of peace.131 Again, that judgment
applied to all interested members in the group.132
In the United States, the class action evolved out of England’s bill of
peace. In the mid-1800s several states adopted the practice of allowing a
representative to file a lawsuit on behalf of numerous interested persons,133 and the states codified that principle in their respective Field
Codes.134 The first class action rule per se was Rule 38 of the Federal
Equity Rules.135 It was adopted in 1913 and was the predecessor to the
current Federal Rule 23(a), which states:

[m]ultiplicity of [s]uits [the court] ... will establish the [r]ight of all [p]arties concerned
....”) (emphasis omitted).
131
See Atkins, 145 Eng. Rep. at 968.
132
See Gage, 22 Eng. Rep. at 147.
133
See 3 HERBERT B. NEWBERG & ALBA CONTE, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS,
§ 13.04, 13–14 n.24 (3d ed. 1992) (The Field Code of 1849 states in part: “[When a
question concerns] a common or general interest of many persons, or when the parties are
very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or
more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.”).
134
See Haxton v. Haxton, 705 P.2d 721, 726 (Or. 1985) (“[Field Codes were simply]
a comprehensive codification of [states’] laws .... [The] codes were the product of a
commission directed by David Dudley Field between ... 1846 and 1865 .... [The commission was] formed to codify the law of New York. The codes are a restatement and reformation of then existing statutory and common law.... [The Field Codes were successful
and] they served as a model for many codification attempts elsewhere in the country,
including one of the first Oregon codes in 1853. The Field Codes were organized into
five separate codes: Code of Civil Procedure, Code of Criminal Procedure, Political
Code, Penal Code and Civil Code.”).
135
Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912) provided: “When the question is one of common or
general interest to many persons constituting a class so numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the whole.”
JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, FEDERAL EQUITY RULES (8th ed. 1933); see also Shaw v. Toshiba
Am. Info. Sys., Inc., 91 F. Supp. 2d 942, 950 (E.D. Tex. 2000) (“The English equity rule
permitting exceptions to compulsory joinder was adopted in United States jurisprudence
and was codified in the Federal Equity Rule 48 (1842), the New York Field Code of
1848, as amended in 1849, and Federal Equity Rule 38 (1912, the successor to earlier
Equity Rule 48 (1842)). The United States Supreme Court officially abandoned old
Equity Rule 48 in 1912 and adopted Equity Rule 38. Federal Equity Rule 38 ‘allowed
representative suits where the parties were too numerous for joinder. In contrast with the
prior rule [Federal Equity Rule 48], absent parties could be bound by subsequent judgments pursuant to this provision.’” (citations omitted)).
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One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative
parties on behalf of all members only if: (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions of
law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.136

Originally, Rule 23 prohibited any class action decisions or judgments
from binding absent class members, if a representative had not secured
those persons’ express consent and the class action sought various damages.137 Of course, the reason for securing members’ consent is not difficult
to comprehend, as it evolved from a fundamental legal principle: an in
personam138 judgment does not bind a person, if that person has not received service of process and is not party in a legal action.139 However, in
1966, an amendment expanded the reach of class actions under Federal
Rule 23.140
Most remarkably, under a new Rule 23(b)(3),141 a “common-question
damages” judgment in a class action could bind absent class members

136

FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
See 5 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.03 (3d ed.
1997) (reporting that original rule limited the binding effect of a damages ruling to class
members who affirmatively embraced an “opt-in” requirement or who directly participated in the class action).
138
See Brooks v. United States, 833 F.2d 1136, 1143 (4th Cir. 1987) (“A proceeding
in personam is a proceeding to enforce personal rights and obligations brought against the
person and based on jurisdiction of the person, although it may involve his right to, or the
exercise of ownership of, specific property, or seek to compel him to control or dispose
of it in accordance with the mandate of the court.” (citing 1 AM. JUR. 2D, ACTIONS, § 39,
at 573 (1962))).
139
See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 40 (1940) (“It is a principle of general application in Anglo-American jurisprudence that one is not bound by a judgment in personam
in a litigation in which he is not designated as a party or to which he has not been made a
party by service of process.” (citing Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877))).
140
See Notes of Rules Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. 69, 104–05 (1966).
141
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) states, in relevant part:
137
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even without those persons’ affirmative consent.142 To ensure that Rule
23(b)(3) did not violate absent members’ due-process rights, the Rules
Advisory Committee added some procedural safeguards.143 Under a newly
fashioned Rule 23(c)(2)(B),144 the committee inserted two important
clauses: (1) a mandatory notice clause that requires class action representatives to give sufficient and timely notices to absent members, and (2)
an opt-out provision that gives absent class members an opportunity to
exclude themselves from classes certified under Rule 23(b)(3).145

A class action may be maintained if Rule 23 (a) is satisfied and if: ...
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to class
members predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy. The matters pertinent to these findings include: (A) the class members’ interests in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy
already begun by or against class members; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; and (D) the likely difficulties in managing a class action.
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3).
142
See Notes of Rules Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. at 105; see also Hansberry, 311 U.S. at 41 (1940) (The court recognized and
embraced the exception to the general rule, “that, to an extent not precisely defined by
judicial opinion, the judgment in a ‘class’ or ‘representative’ suit, to which some members of the class are parties, may bind members of the class or those represented who
were not made parties to it.”).
143
Lawrence J. Restieri, Jr., The Class Action Dilemma: The Certification of Classes
Seeking Equitable Relief and Monetary Damages After Ticor Title Insurance Co. v.
Brown, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745, 1760 (1995).
144
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(2)(B) states, in relevant part:
For any class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to
class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified
through reasonable effort. The notice must clearly and concisely state
in plain, easily understood language: ... (v) that the court will exclude
from the class any member who requests exclusion;(vi) the time and
manner for requesting exclusion; and (vii) the binding effect of a class
judgment on [class] members under Rule 23(c)(3).
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B).
145
See Notes of Rules Advisory Committee on 1966 Amendments to Rule 23, 39
F.R.D. at 107 (1966) (A review of the Committee’s Notes reveals that the mandatory
notice and opt-out provisions were necessary “to fulfill requirements of due process to
which the class action procedure is of course subject.” (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 315–17 (1950); Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41
(1940))).
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Although constitutional scholars raised their misgivings about the legality of those two controversial provisions,146 the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of Rule 23(b)(3) damages classes.147 As of this writing, the Field Codes and the original and amended Federal Rule 23 comprise the summation of present-day class action rules.148 Also, barring
Mississippi, every state has embraced some class action procedure.149 Like
England’s bill of peace, federal and state class action rules and procedures
are designed to reduce multiple lawsuits, spread litigation costs, enhance
judicial efficiency, ensure that similarly situated persons secure access to
courts, ensure that all class members receive damages, and reduce the
costs of litigation.150
146

See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Some Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil
Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39, 44 (1967) (concluding that the sweep of Rule 23(b)(3) is “among
the more debatable of the innovations in the amended Rule,” and comparing the opt-out
procedure to the Book-of-the-Month Club); Marvin E. Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a
Judge’s Point of View, 32 ANTITRUST L.J. 295, 300 (1966) (indicating his preference for
an affirmative opt-in procedure, so that silence would not constitute consent to inclusion);
Charles A. Wright, Proposed Changes in Federal Civil, Criminal and Appellate Procedure, 35 F.R.D. 317, 338 (1964) (“In the situation which [Rule 23](b)(3) covers, there is
a strong feeling that the person who wants to go it alone, and to bring his individual
action with his own lawyer, should be permitted to do so.... Even with this protection [of
the right to opt-out], [Rule 23](b)(3) is a novel and controversial proposal ....”).
147
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 810–12 & n.3 (1985) (concluding that Rule 23(b)(3)’s notice and opt-out requirements are indispensable requirements
of due process rather than merely procedural niceties).
148
See H.R. REP. NO. 108-44, at 9 (2003).
149
See USF&G Ins. Co. of Miss. v. Walls, 911 So. 2d 463, 468 (Miss. 2005) (stressing that the Mississippi Supreme Court “has the exclusive power to make rules of practice, procedure, and .... [that] class actions[ rules] are not a part of Mississippi practice—
chancery, circuit, or otherwise.”); LINDA S. MULLENIX, STATE CLASS ACTIONS:
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (Matthew G. Ball & Todd L. Nunn eds., CCH 2000 with
annual updates); Richard T. Phillips, Class Actions & Joinder in Mississippi, 71 MISS.
L.J. 447, 453 n.14 (2001) (suggesting that New Hampshire and Virginia do not have class
action rules, but recognize “‘equitable class actions’ ... in consumer litigation”). But see
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 27-A (2011) (covering “class actions”); Prive v. N. H.-Vt.
Health Servs. No. 98-E-20, 1998 WL 375294, at *1 (N.H. Super. Ct. July 1, 1998) (observing that Rule 27-A, and FED. R. CIV. P. 23’s provisions are comparable); Kuznicki v.
Mason, 639 S.E.2d 308, 311 (Va. 2007) (reaffirming that Virginia’s Code § 55-79.53
allows a class action and relief if condominiums, time-sharing units, or propertyassociation matters produce the legal disputes); King v. Va. Birth-Related Neurological
Injury Comp. Program, No. HA-726-4, 1990 WL 751353, at *3 (Va. Cir. Ct. Nov. 9,
1990) (reaffirming that class actions are not generally allowed in Virginia and allowing
the twenty-nine individual physicians to sue defendant only on behalf of themselves
individually).
150
See Deposit Guar. Nat’l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 339 (1980) (“Where it is not
economically feasible to obtain relief within the traditional framework of a multiplicity of
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There is one final observation. Federal and state court class action
practices, procedures, and resolutions are not remarkably different.151 But
a variety of persons—insurers, insured corporate officers and directors,
laypersons, and even commentators who are not practitioners—have presented several arguably outlandish misconceptions about the risks that
class action litigants confront or are likely to confront in state and federal
courts.152 Consequently, in light of those misconceptions, gross imaginations have evolved. In fact, an extremely wide gulf has evolved between
what corporate defendants believe and the actual risks of litigating class
actions in state and federal courts.
2. Proven Class Action Perils in Federal Courts
All federal lawsuits have unavoidably inherent risks, which can decrease plaintiffs or defendants’ likelihoods of winning procedurally or on
the merits. And whether plaintiffs and defendants are in-state or out-ofstate litigants, their respective legal counsels should understand, appreciate, and prepare for those known risks. Similarly, defense counsels as well
as the counsels for the class understand that the class representative must
overcome several known procedural obstacles.
For example, under federal law, a class representative must prove that
she has standing to commence a class action.153 This means that the “litigant must normally assert [and prove] his own legal interests rather than
those of third parties.”154 Furthermore, the class representative must establish that a causal connection exists between her alleged injury and the
small individual suits for damages, aggrieved persons may be without any effective
redress unless they may employ the class-action device.”); In re American Reserve, 840
F.2d 487, 489 (7th Cir. 1988) (observing that a class action is a method to enforce rights
or deter the abridgment of rights which might not otherwise exist for individuals with
small claims).
151
See THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, AN EMPIRICAL
EXAMINATION OF ATTORNEYS’ CHOICE OF FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 54
(Federal Judicial Center, 2005) (After examining state and federal courts’ class certification rulings, motions, and other issues, the authors discovered that class action rulings
and the disposition of cases did not differ greatly between state and federal courts.).
152
See infra notes 244, 249–54, 386–90 and accompanying text.
153
See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 804 (1985) (“[F]ederal standing requires an allegation of a present or immediate injury in fact, where the party requesting standing has ‘alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues.’” (citing
Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204
(1962))).
154
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 804.
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defendant’s conduct, and that a favorable court ruling will undo or correct
the harm.155 Without doubt, whether a class representative can overcome
those barriers or perils is far from certain.
Second, a class representative must secure a class certification before
proceeding to a trial on the merits.156 And, as stated earlier, Rule 23(a)
outlines multiple elements that a class representative must satisfy before a
court will grant a motion for class certification.157 Again, the class representative must prove that: (1) joining all similarly situated parties is impracticable because the number is extremely large—numerosity, (2) class
members present common questions of law or fact—commonality, (3)
class members present similar claims or causes—typicality, and (4) the
representative “will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class”—adequate representation.158
In addition, a class representative must overcome another barrier. She
must persuade the court that a class action will not present manageability
problems.159 Stated another way, the representative must establish that
choice of law problems,160 the likelihood of timely and costly Erie guesses,161 and insufficient means to notify numerous class members162 will not
155

Id. (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Ams. United for Separation of Church
and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)); see also Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 67 F.Supp.2d
1140, 1141, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (denying a putative class of Burmese citizens’ motion
for class certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in an ATS case. The court concluded that the
plaintiffs—who alleged that Unocal had subjected them to forced labor, forced relocation, and various forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment in connection with the
pipeline construction project—did not have standing to seek injunctive relief. The court
declared that an injunction against the corporation probably would not redress their
alleged injuries since “the cessation of [the] alleged illegal acts would depend on the
independent actions of companies and governmental entities who [were] not parties to
[the] lawsuit.”).
156
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997).
157
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
158
See Windsor, 521 U.S. at 613.
159
Schwartz v. Upper Deck Co., 183 F.R.D. 627, 679 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
160
See In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 551 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (refusing to certify a
class because the risk of confusing the jury—“when taken together with the risk of improperly grouping different states’ laws”—would outweigh “any possible advantages to
be gained from certification.”).
161
See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.
1992) (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest
court of the state would decide.” (citing Comm’r of Internal Revenue v. Estate of Bosch,
387 U.S. 456 (1967); West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Commonwealth
Life Ins. Co. v. Neal, 521 F. Supp. 812 (M.D. La.), aff’d, 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1981)));
see also New Orleans Assets, LLC v. Woodward, 363 F.3d 372, 376, 377 n.10 (5th Cir.
2004) (acknowledging that the Louisiana Supreme Court had not addressed the disputed
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undermine the representative’s ability to manage the class action competently.163 Essentially, the class representative must convince the federal
district court that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.164
Without doubt, a federal district judge’s requiring a representative to
meet these minimum requirements before certifying a class presents
daunting and very real challenges. However, for emphasis, the obvious
must be stated: numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate representations are perils that complaining parties must overcome.165 And more
often than not, class action complainants are not medium-to-large corporations, employers, insurers, or national and international corporate officials.
Instead, consumers of various products and services are significantly more
likely to be complainants in class actions.166 But even more importantly,
federal courts are appreciably more likely to deny than grant those consumers’ motions for class certification.167
Of course, class members also face other established as well as unexpected risks, which can reduce complainants’ likelihood of prevailing in
federal court. Consider, for example, the plight of the class representative

question in this case, the Fifth Circuit refused to certify the case to the Supreme Court of
Louisiana, preferring instead “[to] make an Erie guess.”).
162
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747 (5th Cir. 1996) (“We first address the district court’s superiority analysis. The court acknowledged the extensive
manageability problems with this class. Such problems include [the difficulty of giving]
... notice to millions of class members ....”).
163
See In re Baycol Prods. Litig., 218 F.R.D. 197, 209–10 (concluding that, in light of
various theories or recovery under various state laws, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate
that a class action would be manageable. “Where plaintiffs ... failed to [present] clearly
defined classes [to the court given] on the variations in state law, the superiority requirement has not been met.” (citing In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 168 F.R.D. 203,
219 (S.D. Ohio 1996))).
164
See id. at 204.
165
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
166
See generally infra Table 3 and accompanying discussion in Part VI.
167
See, e.g., Nicholas M. Pace, Stephen J. Carroll, Ingo Vogelsang & Laura Zakaras,
Insurance Class Actions in the United States, 2007 INST. FOR CIV. JUST. 21–22, available
at http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2007/RAND_MG587-1.sum.pdf (reporting the
results of 564 “attempted class actions” against insurers and finding that “[o]nly 14
percent of the cases in [the] data set [became] certified classes. The judges denied certification in 11 percent of the cases, and the remainder—about 75 percent of the total—
never had a decision either way.... For all attempted class actions .... [t]he judge ruled in
favor of the defendant on some sort of dispositive pretrial motion in 37 percent of the
cases.”).
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in Latona v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co.168 Pietra Latona commenced a class
action against Carson Pirie Scott & Company, citing numerous violations
under various federal and state truth-in-lending and consumers’ protection
statutes.169 After identifying herself and another disgruntled consumer—
Priscilla Staniec—as the class representatives, Latona filed a motion for
class certification.170
The federal district court denied the class certification motion, citing
three unexpected risks that would have prevented the class from receiving
fair and adequate representation.171 First, the court found that the proposed
class’s attorney was married to Latona’s niece.172 Therefore, in light of the
alleged nepotism and related concerns that the Seventh Circuit has highlighted,173 the federal district judge concluded that Latona could not represent the class’s interests competently and fairly.174 Additionally, the court
noted that the second class representative—Staniec—was both psychologically and physically impaired.175 More specifically, during a two-year
period, “she was nonfunctional and confined to bed rest.”176 Therefore,
citing those personal problems and embracing the Sixth Circuit’s concerns
about class representatives’ unsuitability generally and their medical problems in particular,177 the Latona federal district court concluded that
Staniec could not adequately represent the class members’ interests.178
Certainly, one’s attempt to certify a class action for trial presents multiple difficulties for named plaintiffs or class representatives. But there is
168

Latona v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., No. 96 C 2119, 1997 WL 109979, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Mar. 7, 1997).
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at *2.
172
Id. at *1.
173
See Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86, 91 (7th Cir. 1977) (“Since possible recovery of the class representative is far exceeded by potential attorneys’ fees, courts
fear that a class representative who is closely associated with the class attorney would
allow settlement on terms less favorable to the interests of the absent class members.”).
174
Latona, 1997 WL 109979, at *2.
175
Id.
176
Id. (“Ms. Staniec has a benign brain tumor and a spinal condition, but she also believed that some of her periods of incapacitation could have resulted from just emotional
distress.”).
177
See In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d 1069, 1083 (6th Cir. 1996) (concluding that
plaintiff’s suitability as a class representative was very questionable because of plaintiff’s
psychological problems); see also In re Telectronics Pacing Systems, Inc., 168 F.R.D.
203 (S.D. Ohio 1996) (finding that plaintiff’s health problems prevented plaintiff from
representing the class).
178
Latona, 1997 WL 109979, at *2.
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more: a motion to certify a settlement-only class action presents unique
impediments179 for class members who question the merits of a proposed
settlement.180 To illustrate, consider the plight of the disgruntled class
members who challenged the class action settlements in Mars Steel v.
Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust.181
The class representative—William J. Tunney—retained the law firm
of Joyce and Kubasiak to file a class action against Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company (Continental).182 The action proceeded
on behalf of persons who had borrowed money from Continental using an
interest rate that was congruent with the bank’s prime rate (Tunney action).183 The complaint alleged that Continental committed fraud and
breached various contracts over a ten-year period by failing to charge an
interest rate that was pegged to the “prime rate.”184 A state court judge
certified the Tunney action as a nationwide class action.185 Three years
after filing the Tunney action, the class representative—along with the
class’s legal counsels—offered to settle the action. Continental rejected
the offer.186
However, two years after the state court certified the Tunney action,
Mars Steel Corporation filed a class action against Continental in a federal
court (Mars action).187 Jerome Torshen—the class representative—filed
the lawsuit on behalf of aggrieved consumers like those in the Tunney
suit.188 But unlike the multiple allegations in the earlier suit, the Mars
complaint only alleged that Continental violated the federal Civil Racket-

179
See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 619–20 (1997) (declaring that
a class representative must also satisfy Federal Rule 23(a) and (b) after petitioning a
district to certify a class action for settlement, but stressing that the court “need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present intractable management problems.”) (citation omitted).
180
Id. at 619.
181
Mars Steel Corp. v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi., 834 F.2d 677 (7th
Cir. 1987).
182
Id. at 678.
183
Id.
184
Id. at 678–79.
185
Id. at 679 (appointing “Joyce and Kubasiak to represent the class.”).
186
Id. (Under Joyce and Kubasiak’s settlement offer, “Continental would ... not ... oppose a request for an attorney’s fee of ... $1.25 million ... and the class members would
[have] an opportunity to [secure] new loans from Continental at below-market rates.
Continental refused the offer ....”).
187
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 679.
188
Id.
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eer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act189 during a ten-year interval.190
Although Rule 23 does not have a “tentative certification” provision,191 the federal district judge preliminarily approved the Mars settlement—without holding an evidentiary hearing—and simultaneously “[certified] the suit as a class action for settlement purposes only.”192 Shortly
thereafter, Continental accepted Torshen’s offer and settled the Mars class
action.193 Two class members, however, criticized and refused to embrace
the settlement.194 They were William Tunney and another class member
who decided to opt out of the Mars settlement in order to preserve the
state court class action.195
Ultimately, the district court conducted a “fairness” hearing and approved the settlement after concluding that the agreement was fair.196 Of
course, under the doctrine of res judicata, the court’s conclusion effectively extinguished the claims of all class members who did not opt out of the
settlement class action.197 In his appeal before the Seventh Circuit, Tunney
asserted that: (1) the judge erroneously certified a preliminary class action
for settlement purposes before certifying a class action for trial in the Mars
suit, (2) the settlement class action was fundamentally unfair because the
class notice was inaccurate and misleading, and (3) class members who
opposed the settlement did not have an opportunity to prove—either before or during the fairness hearing—that the class action settlement was
unfair.198

189

Id.; see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (2006).
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 679.
191
See In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 177 (5th Cir. 1979) (concluding that “Rule 23 does not deal specifically with a tentative settlement class”). But
see Comment, Developments in the Law—Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1557
n.111 (1976) (suggesting that Rule 23(c)(1) sanctions allow a tentative class action—“a
form of conditional certification”). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) and note to
Subdivision (c)(1) suggests that some forms of conditional certification may be appropriate. It reads in relevant part: “An order embodying a [class action] determination can be
conditional ... [and] can be altered or amended before the decision on the merits if, upon
fuller development of the facts, the original determination appears unsound.” FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(c)(1).
192
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680.
193
Id. at 679.
194
Id. at 680.
195
Id.
196
Id.
197
Id.
198
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680.
190
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First, the Seventh Circuit readily acknowledged that it is common for a
district court to defer a class certification for trial while there are ongoing
settlement negotiations.199 Second, the court of appeals conceded that a
district judge’s deferring a class certification during ongoing settlement
negotiations clashes with pertinent language in Rule 23(c)(1).200 But even
more importantly, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged that a court’s deferring a class certification—because of contemporaneous settlement negotiations—creates numerous practical problems for class members.201
What are those additional judge-made perils that class members must
anticipate and confront? Settlement negotiations become significantly
more complicated (1) when litigants do not know whether they are attempting to settle a class action or just an action that only addresses the
named plaintiffs’ interests, (2) when class members do not trust the named
plaintiffs—fearing that the latter will not adequately represent all members’ interests if a trial on the merits occurs,202 and (3) when the class
members are ignorant about the composition and size of the class.203
Moreover, a federal district judge’s waiting until a few interested parties certify and negotiate a class action settlement produces several other
adverse consequences and risks for class members. Some noted problems
are (1) premature and even collusive settlements, (2) an extremely low
probability of a district court certifying a class action for trial, and (3)
class members’ greater inability to opt out of a class action settlement
when they do not receive a prompt notice.204

199

Id.
Id. The named plaintiffs in the Mars suit filed their complaint in 1985, but the district judge did not certify it as a class action until 1986. Moreover the judge certified the
suit only for purposes of settlement. And to repeat an earlier observation, the district
judge approved the Mars settlement preliminarily before notifying the members of the
class. Id. However, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(c)(1) states: “At an early practicable time after a person sues or is sued as a class representative, the court must determine by order whether to certify the action as a class action.” FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1).
201
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680.
202
See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 532–33 (3d Cir. 2004)
(recognizing that class members must anticipate and confront the risks of interclass
conflicts and dueling class action before commencing a lawsuit and noting that “some
courts have created subclasses of class action plaintiffs where there are conflicts of interest among class members” (citing Davis v. Weir, 497 F.2d 139, 147 (5th Cir. 1974))
(noting that subclasses are generally utilized to eliminate antagonistic interests within a
class)); Am. Fin. Sys. Inc. v. Harlow, 65 F.R.D. 94, 109 (D. Md. 1974) (encouraging
combination of subclasses into one class where interests of class are not antagonistic).
203
Mars Steel, 834 F.2d at 680.
204
See id. at 680–81.
200

458

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:419

Certainly, class action members and their representatives must conquer
certification hurdles and overcome many additional procedural and substantive barriers if they expect to prevail. But in truth, class action defense
lawyers are the ones who generate those perils by raising and crafting a
variety of general or affirmative defenses.205 For example, in a class action, defense counsels must prepare for and overcome known risks. Two
of the most obvious risks are: (1) federal district courts prevent class action defendants from raising an assortment of procedural and substantive
defenses, thereby forcing defendants to settle a class action prematurely or
begrudgingly; or (2) district courts allow defendants to advance certain
defenses in a trial where a jury rejects them, thereby still causing a premature or a more expensive class action settlement.206
Finally, abuse of judicial discretion is arguably the most egregious risk
that defendants will face when defending against class actions. For example, abuse of discretion can occur when a federal district court rests its
decision “upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of
law or an improper application of law to fact.”207 To prove that federal
district judges abuse their authority, class action defendants often cite
“questionable” or “unwarranted” class certifications.208 In fact, some defendants have charged and appellate courts have found that: (1) district
courts embraced class action plaintiffs’ flimsy evidence and used that
questionable evidence to certify a class,209 (2) district judges certified class
actions even when plaintiffs’ claims were too individualized to satisfy
Rule 23(a)’s commonality and Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirements,210 and (3) district courts certified class actions without making
proper findings of fact and without applying controlling legal principles.211
205

See infra note 206.
See generally THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, ATTORNEY
REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE
FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: A REPORT TO THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
CIVIL RULES REGARDING A CASE-BASED SURVEY OF ATTORNEYS 30–43 (Washington,
DC: Federal Judicial Center, 2004) (reporting class action defense attorneys’ perceptions
about state and federal courts’ procedural and substantive rulings and the relationships
between those rulings and attorneys’ various choices—whether to settle, remove, or
litigate the class actions).
207
In re The Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 299 (3d
Cir. 1998) (quoting Int’l Union, UAW v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 820 F.2d 91, 95 (3d Cir.
1987)).
208
See infra note 209–11.
209
See, e.g., Oscar Private Equity Invs. v. Allegiance Telecom, Inc., 487 F.3d 261,
263–63 (5th Cir. 2007).
210
See In re LifeUSA Holding Inc., 242 F.3d 136,145–48 (3d Cir. 2001); see also
Cole v. General Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 730 (5th Cir. 2007) (“Plaintiffs have failed
206
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3. Proven Perils of Litigating Class Actions in State Courts
Persons who litigate class actions in state courts often must contend
with established risks, like those that class action litigants face in federal
courts.212 The reason is found in an earlier observation: federal and state
courts’ class action practices and procedural rules are very similar.213 In
fact, many states have completely adopted the federal class certification
requirements and procedures.214 Therefore, like their counterparts in federal courts, class representatives frequently have difficulty securing class
certification in state courts.215
Among other explanations, state courts are less likely to certify classes
because class representatives do not establish that: (1) the class representatives and attorneys are competent to represent all class members’ inter-

to adequately address, much less ‘extensively analyze,’ the variations in state law ... and
the obstacles they present to predominance. The district court was not in a position to
determine that ‘questions of law and fact common to the members of the class predominate’ in the vacuum created by plaintiffs’ omission. Given these significant variations in
state law and the multiple individualized legal and factual questions they present, we
conclude that plaintiffs have failed to carry their burden in establishing predominance and
that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class action.” (citing Spence v.
Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 2000); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
742–43 & n.15 (5th Cir. 1996))).
211
See, e.g., Gunnells v. Healthplan Servs. Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 421 (4th Cir. 2003)
(“The district court conditionally granted class certification against the plan’s claims
administrator, Healthplan Services Inc., as successor in interest to Third Party Claims
Management, Inc. (collectively, “TPCM”) and against individual and corporate insurance
agents who marketed and sold the plan. The court properly applied controlling legal
principles and made well-supported factual findings supporting its decision to certify a
class action against TPCM; thus, we see no abuse of discretion in that decision. However,
because the court rested its class certification against the individual agents on findings
grounded in a misapprehension of governing law, we must conclude that the court did
abuse its discretion in certifying those separate class actions.”).
212
See cases cited infra note 214.
213
Id.
214
See, e.g., Campbell v. New Milford Bd. of Ed., 423 A.2d 900, 903 (Conn. Super.
Ct. 1980) (“Since the requirements for certification of class actions in federal court under
rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are substantially similar to the Practice
Book requirements, federal case law may be used to aid our construction of these requirements.” (footnote omitted)); Hutson v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 837 So.2d 1090, 1092
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003) (reporting that Rule 1.220(a) of Florida Rules of Civil Procedure requires a party to establish numerosity, commonality, typicality and adequacy of
representation, and, that Rule 1.220(b)(3) requires plaintiffs to prove predominance,
superiority, and manageability).
215
See cases cited supra note 214.
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ests,216 (2) the proposed class presents predominant, common questions of
law and fact,217 (3) the representatives can manage a nationwide class
action in a state court,218 (4) subclasses can protect the various legal rights
of numerous class members,219 and (5) the representative can manage
fairly and efficiently competing state laws in a state court trial.220 Furthermore, even after a state court certifies a class for trial, representatives
still must confront some burdensome challenges—preventing a “claimjumping” assault,221 overcoming “causation barriers,”222 and proving “individual damages.”223
216

See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct., 15 P.3d 1071, 1082 (Cal. 2001) (reiterating that “the class action proponent bears the burden of establishing the propriety of class
certification”); Smith v. Nat’l Sec. Corp., No. D043779, 2005 WL 1060249, at *5 (Cal.
Ct. App. May 6, 2005) (identifying several problems with the class action lawsuits:
counsel’s inadequacy to represent the class and the lack of a predominance of common
issues among class members); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 604 N.W.2d 745, 755 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1999) (emphasizing that class certification, notice and fair representation are notorious “class-action problems” (citing Northside Realty Assocs., Inc. v. United States, 605
F.2d 1348, 1357 (5th Cir. 1979))).
217
See Hannan v. Weichert South Jersey, Inc., 2007 WL 1468643, at *10 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. May 22, 2007) (embracing the view that “special problems” prevent a party
from proving deception—based on oral and written misrepresentations and omissions of
material fact—in a class action because “there is a significant risk that individual issues
will overwhelm those common to the class” (citing Stephenson v. Bell Atl. Corp., 177
F.R.D. 279, 290 (D.N.J. 1997) (quoting Davis v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. 158 F.R.D. 173,
175 (S.D. Fla. 1994)))); see also Brooks v. Norwest Corp., 103 P.3d 39, 49–50 (N.M. Ct.
App. 2004) (confirming that “a whole range of practical problems ... may render the class
action inappropriate in any given case.... [including] class size, whether notice can reasonably be effected, and the overwhelming presence of individual issues” (citing Eisen v.
Carlisle and Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 164 (1974))).
218
See Doyle v. Fluor Corp., 199 S.W.3d 784, 790 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (embracing
the view that “[m]anageability encompasses the gamut of practical problems that could
render the class action format inappropriate for a particular matter”) (citation omitted).
219
Aljabi v. Pardee Const. Corp., No. D037746, 2002 WL 254407, at * 5 (Cal. Ct.
App. Feb. 22, 2002) (concluding that the class action representatives “did not meet their
burden of showing how subclasses could be formed to lessen the problems inherent in
class actions where some [complaining homeowners] were bound by an arbitration clause
and others were not” (citing Wash. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1085 (holding that “a class
action proponent must credibly demonstrate, through a thorough analysis of the applicable state laws, that state law variations will not swamp common issues and defeat predominance”))).
220
See, e.g., Wash. Mut. Bank, 15 P.3d at 1085 (concluding that a nationwide class action representative’s “presentation must be sufficient to permit the trial court, at the time
of certification, to make a detailed assessment of how any state law differences could be
managed fairly and efficiently at trial”).
221
See, e.g., Ex parte State Mut. Ins. Co., 715 So.2d 207, 212 (Ala. 1997) (outlining
the “claim-jumping” problem and practice in which Plaintiff A files a purported class
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Furthermore, like federal judges, state judges have broad discretion to
decide whether to certify class actions for a settlement or a trial.224 Of
course, a universal, iron-clad standard does not exist for determining
whether state judges have abused their discretion.225 However, most state
supreme courts have embraced a multipronged standard: abuse of discretion occurs when a trial judge (1) acts arbitrarily, (2) acts unreasonably,
(3) fails to apply the law properly to undisputed facts, or (4) uses insufficient evidence to fashion rulings.226

action in County Z and invests a considerable amount of time to certify a class, only to
discover that another party—Plaintiff B—made an exact copy of Plaintiff A’s complaint,
inserted the name of a different plaintiff and successfully certified a class action in a
different court in County Y).
222
See, e.g., S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 440 (Tex. 2000) (discussing a
personal-injury, class action suit and highlighting the problems of creating a class for
“general causation” issues, and another class for “specific causation” issues); Charles I.
Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 141 P.3d 824, 828 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2006) (Baker, J.,
concurring) (“[The] class counsel filed a joint application for attorneys’ fees [for] $34.8
million.... [and] provided evidence of risks that were inherent in the class action, such as
... the difficulty of certifying a class ... and causation barriers.”).
223
See Zanakis-Pico v. Cutter Dodge, Inc., 47 P.3d 1222, 1248 (Haw. 2002) (“Aggregating the damage of the class presents its own problems .... Even assuming that each
plaintiff’s ‘insubstantial loss’ may be aggregated [to meet] a substantiality threshold, an
individual plaintiff’s claim, prior to certification, remains vulnerable to dismissal. Many
class action lawsuits are initially begun by one plaintiff, who files a complaint, and ...
attempts to certify the class. A defendant may file a Rule 12(b) motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim prior to this certification.”); California v. Levi Strauss & Co., 715
P.2d 564, 570 (Cal. 1986) (stressing that “[d]amage distribution ... poses special problems
in consumer class actions. Often, proof of individual damages by competent evidence is
not feasible. Each individual’s recovery may be too small to make traditional methods of
proof worthwhile. In addition, consumers are not likely to retain records of small purchases for long periods of time.”).
224
See, e.g., Muise v. GPU, Inc., 851 A.2d 799, 810 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)
(“Class certification decisions rest in the sound discretion of the trial court.”). But see St.
Louis Sw. Ry. Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Grps, Inc., 929 S.W.2d 25, 29–30 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1996) (“[T]his [c]ourt should reverse the certification order only if the record shows
a clear abuse of discretion.”).
225
See Flagg v. Essex County Prosecutor, 796 A.2d 182, 187 (N.J. 2002) (“Although
the ordinary ‘abuse of discretion’ standard defies [a] precise definition, it arises when a
decision is ‘made without a rational explanation, inexplicably depart[s] from established
policies, or rest[s] on an impermissible basis.’” (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779
F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985))).
226
See Kondos v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 110 S.W.3d 716, 720 (Tex. Ct. App. 2003); see
also Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238, 242 (Tex. 1985) (concluding that an abuse of discretion occurs if a trial court acts without reference to any guiding
principles, arbitrarily, or unreasonably).
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Also, like their counterparts in federal courts, state court defendants
often assert that state courts are abusive and issue questionable class certifications,227 and there is evidence that verifies that such accusations are
very real and widespread.228 For example, even when a state statute clearly
notes that a class representative must file an original class certification
complaint, that rule has been ignored.229 In fact, one state court judge
allowed a representative to commence a class action after instructing the
representative to amend his personal complaint.230 The class representative
only had to insert the new class action allegations and the names of additional parties.231
Additionally, state court judges have committed major abuses by certifying class actions when there is an “insufficient [amount of] community
of interest” among class members,232 or when representatives fail to identify those who would comprise a “community of interest.”233 To illustrate,
consider the facts and the trial court’s ruling in Gardner v. South Carolina
Department of Revenue.234 In that case, the class action complaint had two
defects: (1) factual differences among class members’ individualized cases
were numerous, and (2) the named plaintiffs could not prove a common-

227

See infra notes 230–32.
See infra notes 230–32.
229
See, e.g., PA. R. OF CIV. P. 1703(a) (“A class action shall be commenced only by
the filing of a complaint with the prothonotary.” The explanatory note to Rule 1703 states
in relevant part that “[a] class action may not be commenced by ... assumpsit, trespass or
equity rules.... [Therefore,] if the complaint does not comply with Rule 1704, it will not
commence a class action.”).
230
See, e.g., Debbs v. Chrysler Corp., 810 A.2d 137, 149–50 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2002)
(“[T]he trial court abused its discretion when it permitted Debbs to amend his individual
complaint with class action allegations and new parties because such was not permitted
by Rules 1703 or 1704.”).
231
Id.
232
See City of San Jose v. Super. Ct. of Santa Clara Cnty., 525 P.2d 701, 713 (Cal.
1974) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by certifying a class action suit
against the City of San Jose on behalf of all real property owners ‘in the flight pattern’ of
the San Jose Municipal Airport, because there was an insufficient community of interest
to sustain a class action suit).
233
See Intercontinental Hotels Corp. v. Girards, No. 05-02-01604-CV, 2004 WL
423115, at *2 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 2, 2004) (“[It is impossible to identify] the class members from the voluminous list of telephone numbers .... Because there is no evidence in
the record that the telephone logs can be used to determine the names of the class members or that the class members are presently ascertainable from any other source, we
conclude the class definition fails to show the class members are presently ascertainable.
Accordingly, the trial judge abused his discretion in certifying the class.”).
234
Gardner v. S.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 577 S.E.2d 190 (S.C. 2003).
228
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ality among defendants’ class defenses.235 Yet, the trial judge inappropriately certified the class.236
Perhaps, the most frequent abuse of discretion occurs when a state
judge certifies a class without determining whether the proposed class
action will be an efficient and a superior method to resolve the conflict.237
To highlight this type of abuse, consider a few facts in Banks v. New York
Life Insurance Co.238 Plaintiffs filed a class action against the insurer,239
petitioning the lower court to certify a class because the insurance consumers did not have the financial means to file individual lawsuits to secure damages for numerous small claims.240 The trial court certified the
class,241 but the insurer appealed, asserting that the court abused its discretion.242 A sympathetic Louisiana Supreme Court agreed, concluding that
special circumstances required “a multitude of mini-trials” rather than the
more superior and efficient class action.243
4. Imaginary Risks of Litigating Class Actions in Federal and State
Courts
Even a cursory review of legal commentaries, editorials, and various
trade publications reveals an inordinate amount of discussion about the

235

Id. at 201 (“A representative class cannot exist where the court must investigate
each plaintiff’s prejudice claim where it is one of the two predominate issues in the case.
Requiring such individualized examination negates the benefits of a class action suit....
Likewise, [n]amed [p]laintiffs cannot show that commonality exists for the defendant
class. A court determines the existence of commonality among defendants by examining
the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendants’ anticipated defenses.”).
236
Id. (“[T]he trial judge erred by certifying both a plaintiff and a defendant class.”).
237
See infra note 243.
238
Banks v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 737 So.2d 1275 (La. 1999).
239
Id. at 1277 (“Major Banks and Charles Edwards, individually and on behalf of all
other persons similarly situated, filed [a] suit ... against New York Life Insurance Company ... and two Louisiana insurance agents for New York Life.... [alleging] that New
York Life used unfair and deceptive practices [when issuing and selling] insurance policies. Plaintiffs sought damages and a judgment certifying a class composed of all persons
who purchased whole or universal life policies ....”).
240
Id. at 1277–78, 1283.
241
Id. at 1277.
242
Id.
243
Id. at 1283 (“Moreover, we conclude that a class action would not be superior to
other procedural methods in this case when we balance in terms of fairness and judicial
efficiency the merits of a class action against alternative procedural methods.... Accordingly, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion in granting class certification in
this matter.”).
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widespread “evils of class actions” in both federal and state courts.244 In
fact, even otherwise intelligent and thoughtful members of Congress have
cited such allegedly “widespread” imaginary perils as reasons to move
substantially large numbers of so-called “class actions of national importance” from state to federal courts.245 Arguably, the massive removal of
state substantive law class actions from state to federal courts does not
comport with longstanding principles of judicial federalism. But even
more importantly, none of the alleged widespread evils or perils have been
substantiated, using carefully designed empirical studies and sound statistical analyses.246
Make-believe federal class action “evils” appear under two headings—
the alleged perils of class action trials and the purported ills of class action
settlements.247 Class action reformers—an assortment of commentators,
insurers, and corporate entities—argue that federal class action trials are
replete with a plethora of evils.248 The list includes allegedly “unmeritorious claimants, greedy plaintiffs’ lawyers, a destroyed corporate citizen,
and a besieged judiciary.”249 But to repeat, reformers have not cited any
carefully constructed empirical studies or sound evidence to support their
imaginations about the mass evils that are supposedly undermining federal
class action trials and procedures.250
In addition, class action reformers assert that even more pervasive,
virulent, and unrelenting evils infect federal class action settlements. Socalled “sweetheart” and “blackmail” settlements have been cited as major

244
See, e.g., Nancy T. Bowen, Restrictions on Communication by Class Action Parties and Attorneys, 1980 DUKE L.J. 360, 361 (“Attorney solicitation of clients, funds, and
fee agreements is one of the most prevalent perceived evils of the class action procedure.”).
245
See, e.g., infra notes 249–54, 386–90 and accompanying text.
246
See, e.g., infra notes 249–54.
247
Infra notes 249–54.
248
Infra notes 249–54.
249
Cf. Mary J. Davis, Toward the Proper Role for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L.
REV. 157, 188 (1998) (asserting without proof or documentation that “widespread judicial concern over the lack of concrete evidence of causation of harm paint[s] a picture
representing all of the evils of mass tort class actions”).
250
Id.; see also James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 416 (2004) (“[W]hile
little empirical research has been done fleshing out the evils of class actions or even
firmly establishing that such demons exist, a widespread perception exists among the
public, politicians, scholars and reformers, that there is a problem with class actions as
they are currently maintained in our courts.” (citation omitted)).
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examples of class action horrors.251 More specifically, reformers accuse
class counsels of fashioning self-interested “sweetheart” agreements, under which the attorneys secure favorable sums of money while compromising class members’ interests.252 Attorneys are also accused of using
blackmail to force federal defendants to settle class actions for more than
the suits are worth.253 Furthermore, without presenting a modicum of probative or statistical evidence, one reformer lengthened the list of imaginary evils by asserting that: (1) “pro-settlement incentives” cause federal
district judges to make questionable class action decisions, and (2) large
class actions impair or undermine federal district judges’ ability to discern
whether settlements are employed to bribe “abusive” class action complainants.254
Perhaps reformers, national insurers, and corporate entities have
lobbed the most abrasive and unsupported perceptions about class actions
that have been litigated in state courts. For example, from 2003 to 2006,
the American Tort Reform Foundation (ATRF)255 published documents

251

See Bruce L. Hay & David Rosenberg, “Sweetheart” and “Blackmail” Settlements
in Class Actions: Reality and Remedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377, 1378–79 (2000)
(documenting and explaining critics’ assertions that “sweetheart” and “blackmail” settlements are two dangers inherent in class actions). But see Allan Kanner and Tibor
Nagy, Exploding the Blackmail Myth: A New Perspective on Class Action Settlements, 57
BAYLOR L. REV. 681, 693–97 (2005) (“[T]he Blackmail Myth fails to comport with
factual reality.... [because] available empirical evidence and a consideration of how
federal judges typically manage class actions each suggest that the alleged ‘hydraulic
pressure on defendants to settle’ is itself more myth than reality.” (citation omitted)).
252
See Hay & Rosenberg, supra note 251, at 1377.
253
See id. at 1391. But see Arthur R. Miller, Of Frankenstein Monsters and Shining
Knights: Myth, Reality, and the “Class Action Problem”, 92 HARV. L. REV. 664, 665–66
(1979) (“[L]awyers and litigants on both sides of [class action lawsuits]” have abused
Federal Rule 23 and engaged in “unprofessional practices” involving “attorneys’ fees,
‘sweetheart’ settlement deals, dilatory motion practice, harassing discovery, and misrepresentations to judges.”).
254
See, e.g., Mark Moller, The Rule of Law Problem: Unconstitutional Class Actions
and Options for Reform, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 855, 880–81 (2005) (“[L]arge class
actions result in twin, related evils: courts make decisions under the influence of prosettlement incentives and ... are unable to accurately identify when settlements are simply
pay-offs to abusive ... litigants.”).
255
See About ATRA, AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N (ATRA), http://www.atra.org/about
(last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“[ATRA is a] nationwide network of state-based liability
reform coalitions .... [that is] dedicated exclusively to tort and liability reform .... ATRA’s
membership is diverse and includes nonprofits, small and large companies, as well as
state and national trade, business, and professional associations.... ATRA supports an
aggressive civil justice reform agenda that includes ... class action reform ....”).
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that listed and criticized so-called “judicial hellhole” jurisdictions.256 According to ATRF, certain state courts257 are “abusive,” because those tribunals allegedly decide questions of law and fact against defendants consistently—large insurers, insured corporate entities and the medical indusindustry to name a few.258
ATRF developed an extensive list of purported abuses that appear in
state courts.259 Several class action ills appeared among the purported state
court evils.260 Specifically, ATRF asserted that state court judges consistently “[join claims to form] mass actions that do not have common facts
and circumstances.”261 ATRF also maintained that state court judges constantly “certify classes that do not have sufficient commonality of facts or
law, which may confuse a jury and make the case difficult to defend.”262
Even more relevant, ATRF shared its findings with members of Congress,

256

See generally Archive, Judicial Hellholes, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., http://
www.judicialhellholes.org/archive-2005/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2012).
257
See id. (showing that ATRA identified the following jurisdictions as the 2005 “judicial hellholes”: The Rio Grande Valley and Gulf Coast in Texas; Cook County, Illinois;
the entire State of West Virginia; Madison County, Illinois; St. Clair County, Illinois; and
South Florida).
258
See generally Judicial Hellholes 2005, AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., 13–37, available at http://www.judicialhellholes.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/JH2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
259
See id. at 8–9 (“Judges in Judicial Hellholes hold considerable influence over ...
cases that appear before them.... [and] are known for being plaintiff friendly.” Therefore,
those allegedly pro-plaintiffs’ judges (1) “do not stop ... forum shopping”; (2) “allow
lawsuits to go forward that are not supported by the law”; (3) “allow unnecessarily broad,
invasive and expensive discovery requests to increase the burden on a defendant,” (4)
“schedule cases [unfairly] .... [by] giving defendants [only a week’s notice before a trial
begins],” (5) “allow plaintiffs’ lawyers to introduce highly questionable ‘expert’ testimony that purports to link the defendant to the plaintiffs’ injuries, but has no credibility in
the scientific community,” (6) “allow plaintiffs [to introduce a greater variety ] of evidence ... at trial while rejecting evidence that might be favorable to a defendant,” (7)
“[give] improper or slanted jury instructions,” (8) “[do not overturn] extraordinary punitive or pain and suffering awards,” (9) “[allow trial lawyers’ contributions to influence]
their judicial decisions,” and (10) “[develop unwarranted] cozy relations ... [with] jurists,
plaintiffs’ lawyers and government officials.”).
260
See id.
261
Id. at 9 (“In one notorious example, in 2002, West Virginia courts consolidated
more than 8,000 claims and 250 defendants in a single trial. In situations where there are
so many plaintiffs and defendants, individual parties are deprived of their rights to have
their cases fully and fairly heard by a jury.”).
262
Id.
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and the organization reported that its findings helped to enact the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005.263
Of course, using the most conservative measures and estimates,
ATRF’s “judicial hellholes” data and conclusions are highly suspect.264
Among other reasons, the organization selected just a few jurisdictions
within some states and only a few courts within those jurisdictions to examine the disposition of class actions.265 Clearly, those less-than-random
selections could easily support one’s imaginations about the prevalence of
class action evils in state courts, because arguably unscientific sampling
and methodological procedures generated ATRF’s questionable data. Even
a cursory analysis strongly suggests that “selectivity bias”266 permeates
ATRF’s findings and conclusions.267 But more importantly, those findings
deviate substantially from findings that are based on considerably more
sound empirical research.268
263

See id. at 4 (“The Judicial Hellholes report has been covered in nearly every major
U.S. newspaper since the first report published in 2002. The term ‘Judicial Hellhole’
firmly entered the American lexicon when ... President George W. Bush ... visited the
Number 1 Judicial Hellhole, Madison County, Illinois, to draw attention to the detrimental impact of litigation abuse on the local area. The Judicial Hellholes report also was
central in the debate on the Class Action Fairness Act, which was ultimately enacted after
languishing in Congress for nine years.” (footnote omitted)).
264
See Judicial Hellholes 2005, supra note 258, at 5 (“ATRF interviewed individuals
familiar with litigation in the Judicial Hellholes and verified their observations through
independent research of press accounts, studies, court dockets and judicial branch statistics, and other publicly available information. Citations for these sources can be found in
the nearly 500 endnotes following this report.”).
265
See id. at 4–5.
266
See Willy E. Rice, Judicial Bias, The Insurance Industry and Consumer Protection: An Empirical Analysis of State Supreme Courts’ Bad-Faith, Breach-of-Contract,
Breach-of-Covenant-of-Good-Faith and Excess-Judgment Decisions, 1900–1991, 41
CATH. U. L. REV. 325, 375–76 (1992) (explaining, discussing and testing for “selectivity
bias” in “choice data”—also known as “other- and self-selection data”).
267
See Judicial Hellholes 2005, supra note 258, at 4–5.
268
Cf. William S. Lerach, Securities Class Actions and Derivative Litigation Involving Public Companies: One Plaintiff’s Perspective, 670 PLI/Corp 471, *536 n.79 (1990)
(“Contrary to much of the accepted ‘lore’ about abuses of the class action procedure, one
recent empirical study has concluded ‘when shareholders press their cases, their chances
of obtaining some measure of relief are quite good; over 75% of such cases resulted in
either settlements, accommodation by the defendants, or a judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.... Shareholder litigation is an important means of oversight.... The empirical evidence also implies that in settled class actions, particularly in the securities and treble
damage antitrust contexts, the great bulk of the money received from the defendants
actually is distributed to class members, in contrast to the widely held notion that the fund
is either devoured by avaricious attorneys or consumed by administrative expenses.”
(citation omitted)); see also Miller, supra note 253, at 666–67 (“Even if the negative
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III. THE CLASS ACTION DEBATE—INSURED CORPORATE ENTITIES,
NATIONAL INSURERS AND “BRIGHT LINE” JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
Again, judicial federalism embodies “a proper respect for state functions,”269 and it is built on a liberal conviction: a national government
thrives and functions best when states and their institutions are free to
perform their respective functions in different ways.270 In addition, judicial
federalism does not draw a shimmering bright line between federal and
state courts’ respective powers.271 Yet all too many large corporations,
including national and multinational insurers, see a discernible, constitutional bright line. On one side, companies see state courts, which generate
and use fifty-one different sets of laws that are used to “regulate” commerce and resolve legal disputes within those respective jurisdictions. On
the other side, corporate defendants see twelve federal circuits, which
often employ conflicting laws of the circuits and conflicting laws of the
panels to decide disputes involving interstate commerce.
One insightful commentator has noted corporate America’s major unease about litigating in dual judiciaries generally and about litigating class
actions in particular.272 Paraphrasing, he described corporate entities’
concern this way: a fundamental conflict exists between the basic principles of federalism and the collective economic and survival interests of
insurance companies and other multinational and national corporations.273
Absent any meaningful uniform, predictable, objective or reliable rulings
within and between the two judiciaries, corporations as well as insurance
companies—on behalf of themselves and millions of insured businesses
effects of class actions were assumed, they would have to be balanced against the societal
benefits derived from deterring socially proscribed conduct and providing small claim
rectification.... The available information suggests that much of the debate has been based
on erroneous assumptions.... Although there have been instances of undesirable or unprofessional conduct, abuse does not appear to have been widespread. Stories about a few
questionable occurrences have been repeated so often at professional meetings that they
have created the impression that evils are commonplace in class action practice.” (footnotes omitted)).
269
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
270
See id.
271
See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 155 (1992) (“[W]hile the Tenth
Amendment makes explicit that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people[,]’ the task of ascertaining the constitutional line between federal and state
power has given rise to many of the Court’s most difficult and celebrated cases.”).
272
See generally Arthur Bryant, The Conflict Between Federalism and Corporate Interests, 31 SETON HALL L. REV. 734, 734–36 (2001).
273
See id. at 734–35.
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and corporate entities—must spend enormous amounts of money if they
expect to prevail in state and federal courts.274
Therefore, viewed from this perspective, one’s discovering that corporations, insurers, and their insured corporate entities campaign fervently
and spend lots of money to fashion a “more efficient” judicial federalism
should produce little surprise.
But again, corporate entities’ generalized concerns about litigating in
dual judiciaries are arguably unfounded. On the one hand, large corporate
conglomerates and insurers bellow for a set of standardized, substantive
rules that would produce more predictable, uniform, and reliable judicial
rulings—regardless of the court in which they litigate.275 Yet the same
corporate entities arguably want a set of loosely defined procedural rules
that would allow corporate defendants to move freely between state and
federal courts—always having the option to litigate in either forum to help
increase their likelihood of securing more favorable judicial hearings and
dispositions.276
Using the recently enacted Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 as a
point of reference, this Part discusses insurers and other corporate entities’
ostensible quests for more efficient judicial proceedings as well as for
more favorable and predictable judicial outcomes. The evidence, however,
reveals the following: large insurers and other corporations’ calls for class
action reforms are likely a stellar campaign to win the majority of class
actions, either in federal courts or by preventing disgruntled consumers
and third-party victims from litigating those actions in allegedly biased
and hostile state courts.277 Finally, as some commentators have observed,
274
See TOWERS PERRIN, DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS LIABILITY: 2006 SURVEY OF
INSURANCE PURCHASING AND CLAIMS TRENDS 10 (2006), available at http://www
.directorsandboards.com/DBEBRIEFING/May2007/TowersSurvey.pdf (last visited Mar.
9, 2012) (reporting that over 99% of public, private and nonprofit corporations and business purchased D&O insurance); see also Martin Boyer, Is the Demand for Corporate
Insurance a Habit? Evidence of Organizational Inertia from Directors’ and Officers’
Insurance, CENTER FOR INTERUNIVERSITY RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS ON ORGANIZATIONS
1, 3 (2004), available at http://www.cirano.qc.ca/ (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“[P]ublic
access to corporate insurance purchases and risk management strategies is limited....
[But] corporate demand for ... Directors’ and Officers’ (D&O) insurance [is available]....
[Therefore,] directors and officers’ [demand for insurance] is a proxy for the firm’s risk
management strategy.... D&O insurance is quite common amongst U.S. and Canadian
public corporations. According to Tillinghast-Towers Perrin ... the proportion of U.S
firms that had D&O insurance was 92% in 1998 and 93% in 1999, up from 81% in
1992.”).
275
Bryant, supra note 272, at 735.
276
See id. at 735–36.
277
See id. at 736.
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large corporate entities and their insurers are willing to use their individual
and combined substantial political clout to achieve that goal,278 even if
corporate defendants’ activism against class actions will ultimately undermine or destroy longstanding tenets of judicial federalism.
A. National and Multinational Insurers and Corporate Entities’ Mission:
Eradicating Allegedly “Biased” State Court Class Action Proceedings,
or “Turning 200 Years of Judicial Federalism on Its Head”?
Consider the Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. SouthEastern Underwriters Association.279 Asserting that state insurance commissioners and regulators failed to curtail insurers’ highly questionable
ratemaking activities in the early 1940s, a concerned U.S. Attorney General (AG) filed an antitrust suit in a federal district court against SouthEastern Underwriters Association (SEUA)—a conglomerate of insurers
and agents.280 According to the AG’s theory, SEUA violated the Sherman
Act by conspiring to fix and maintain arbitrary and non-competitive premium rates for fire and specified “allied lines” insurance in six southeastern states.281 The AG also alleged that SEUA tried to monopolize trade
and commerce by selling those same insurance contracts across those
southeastern states.282
278

See, e.g., William M. Welch & Jim Drinkard, ‘Patients’ Bill of Rights’ Pushes
Closer to Passage, USA TODAY, Jun. 18, 2001, available at 2001 WLNR 3764716 (“For
five years, health insurance companies have succeeded in blocking proposals to establish
broad federal rights for patients covered by managed-care plans. And they have done it
against all odds.... Fueled by millions of dollars in political contributions, fat advertising
budgets and armies of blue-chip lobbyists, the health insurance industry and its business
allies have exercised big-time political clout in spite of managed care’s image problems.”); see also Editorial, Insurance, Leader of the PACs, Ready for Capitol Hill Battles,
ATLANTA J. - CONST., May 7, 1991, available at 1991 WLNR 3587217 (“Who has the
deepest pockets on Capitol Hill? The insurance industry does. Last year its political
action committees contributed $8.7 million to congressional candidates, earning the
industry the distinction of ‘leader of the PACs.’ According to investigations by the Center
for Responsive Politics in Washington, congressional incumbents received most of the
insurance money, 13 of whom accepted more than $50,000 apiece .... With the insurance
industry spending so much money on political clout, it’s worth wondering what it wants
in return.”).
279
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
280
See id. at 534–35.
281
Id.
282
See id. at 535 (describing the Attorney General’s charges that “S. E. U. A. [companies] controlled 90 per cent of the fire insurance and ‘allied lines’ sold ... in the six
states where the conspiracies were consummated. Both conspiracies consisted of a continuing agreement and [concerted] action .... The conspirators ... fixed premium rates[,] ...
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As a defense, SEUA asserted that the Sherman Act did not apply to it,
because the business of fire insurance was neither intrastate nor interstate
commerce.283 The federal district court agreed and dismissed the case.284
The AG appealed.285 In a narrow-majority decision, the Supreme Court
determined that the district court’s analysis and conclusion were unsound.286 Reversing the lower court’s holding, the Court held that the
business of insurance involves interstate commerce; therefore, the federal
government may regulate it under the Commerce Clause.287 The Supreme
Court’s decision generated a considerable amount of anger and ill-will
among insurers and their congressional supporters,288 so in response, Congress enacted the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA)289 to affirm the principle of state control: barring a few exceptions, only state governments—

agents’ commissions, [and] employed boycotts ... to force non-member insurance companies into the conspiracies, and to compel persons who needed insurance to buy only from
S. E. U. A. ... Companies not members of S. E. U. A. were cut off from the opportunity to
reinsure their risks, and their services and facilities were disparaged ....” (footnote omitted)).
283
See id. at 536.
284
See United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 51 F. Supp. 712, 713–14
(D.C. Ga. 1943) (“The business of insurance is not interstate commerce or interstate
trade, though it might be considered a trade subject to local laws, either State or Federal,
where the commerce clause is not the authority relied upon.”).
285
See South-Eastern Underwriters, 322 U.S. at 533.
286
See id. at 537–38 (The court found the district court’s analysis lacking, stating that
“[a]ll of [the] alleged transactions ... constituted a single continuous chain of events,
many of which were multistate in character, and none of which ... could possibly have
been continued but for that part of them which moved back and forth across state lines ....
[The district court concluded that] the indictment [was] bad for the sole reason that the
entire ‘business of insurance’ ... can never under any possibly circumstances be ‘commerce’, and that therefore, even though an insurance company conducts a substantial part
of its business transactions across state lines, it is not engaged in ‘commerce among the
States’ within the meaning of ... the Commerce Clause ....”).
287
See id. at 552–53 (“[The Court’s] basic responsibility [when] interpreting the
Commerce Clause is to make certain that the power to govern intercourse among the
states remains where the Constitution placed it. That power ... is vested in the Congress,
available to be exercised for the national welfare as Congress shall deem necessary. No
commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its activities across state lines has been
held to be wholly beyond the regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
We cannot make an exception [for] the business of insurance.”).
288
See generally 90 CONG. REC. 6,526–27 (1944) (statement of Rep. Larry Miller)
(discussing a newspaper article examining the South-Eastern Underwriters’ case).
289
McCarran-Ferguson Act, ch. 20, 59 Stat. 33 (1945) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2006)).
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legislatures, regulators, and courts—have supreme authority to regulate
the business of insurance.290
Significantly, when Congress was debating whether to enact the MFA
in 1944, national insurers and some of their staunch supporters291 proclaimed loudly that the Court’s South-Eastern Underwriters ruling would
seriously undermine fundamental principles of judicial federalism.292 In
fact, insurance companies’ supporters accused the Supreme Court of
“stretching” constitutional principles to the point of undermining and
interfering with state courts’ constitutional powers to regulate and fashion
laws to decide business of insurance controversies.293 But even more importantly, if one carefully searches mid-twentieth century primary and
secondary legal sources, one would be hard pressed to find any evidence
of multinational and national insurers embracing this position: state court
judges are biased and hostile against insurance companies.
In fact, Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, in part, because
mid-twentieth century insurance companies and their congressional supporters insisted that federal courts were improper forums; thus, those tribunals should not have jurisdiction to hear and decide business of insur-

290

See, e.g., 90 CONG. REC. 6,559 (statement of Rep. Hatton Sumners) (“[T]he bill H.
R. 3270 [is designed] to affirm the intent of Congress that the regulation of the business
of insurance [shall] remain within the control of the several States and that the [antitrust]
acts of July 2, 1890 and October 15, 1914, as amended [shall not be] applicable to that
business ....”).
291
See, e.g., id. at 6,564 (statement of Rep. Vorys). Representative Vorys, one of the
insurance industry’s most vociferous and unwavering advocates, used even stronger
language. He voiced the sentiment of many members by stating, “[m]y father was chairman of a committee of the American Bar Association which drafted a model law[.] ... [It]
had a profound effect upon the insurance laws of the Nation .... [because the model
helped to fashion] local laws and regulations to meet local conditions, problems and
abuses .... The Supreme Court has power to construe the Constitution [and decide] what
is interstate commerce[.] [But the Court] does not yet possess the power to make laws.
When it attempts to exercise such power, Congress must be vigilant to nullify judicial
usurpation.” Id.
292
See, e.g., id. at 6,561.
293
See id. at 6,559–6,560 (statement of Rep. Hatton Sumners) (“[T]he Supreme
Court—and we have helped, too—has been stretching and stretching ... [Constitutional
provisions] like the interstate commerce clause, ... stretching them in order to increase
Federal power until they have been stretched absolutely beyond where common sense
and common honesty .... [I]t is time the judiciary begins to get back on its own side of the
fence .... God Almighty has imposed some natural laws that govern the business of judging .... The judges of this country have to be governed by the rules that govern the business of judging.”).
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ance lawsuits and other insurance-related disputes.294 To repeat, large
insurers attacked the South-Eastern Underwriters decision, claiming that
the ruling severely undermined fundamental principles of judicial federalism by interfering with and weakening state courts’ jurisdictional powers.295 Yet, while insisting that only state courts should resolve insurancerelated legal disputes, national and multinational insurance companies—as
plaintiffs—have not hesitated to file all sorts of actions in federal courts
against small-to-large corporations, seeking a variety of equitable and
common-law remedies 296
In truth, like disgruntled classes of consumers, insurers as plaintiffs
have a long history of filing multibillion dollar class actions against other
national and multinational corporations in state and federal courts.297 For
example, in 1995, the Federal District Court of New Jersey decided a class
action controversy in Northland Insurance Co. v. Shell Oil Co.298 Northland Insurance Company (Northland) filed a putative class action against
E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, Hoechst-Celanese Corporation,
and Shell Oil Company (Shell Oil).299 Suing on behalf of all similarly
situated insurers, Northland accused Shell Oil and others of manufacturing
defective polybutylene plumbing systems that damaged homeowners’
property.300 Citing their respective subrogation rights under the consumers’ property insurance contracts, the class of insurers sought declaratory
294

See id. at 6,563 (statement of Rep. Charles La Follette) (“Mr. Chairman, I am of
the opinion, based upon the language used in this act, that it is specially designed to
prevent any Federal court [from] having jurisdiction of pending legislation once this
becomes law”).
295
See supra notes 290–93 and accompanying text.
296
See generally Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord over
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insureds’ Allegedly Intentional and Immoral
Conduct: A Historical and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts’ Declaratory
Judgments—1900–1997, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 1131, 1194–214 (1998) (presenting a case
study of insurers, various corporate entities and insurance consumers’ litigation and
theories of recovery in state and federal courts).
297
See, e.g., Northland Ins. Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 930 F. Supp. 1069 (D. N.J. 1996).
298
Id.; see also infra note 894 and accompanying text (presenting evidence of national and multinational corporations’ filing class actions against other corporations in state
courts).
299
See Northland, 930 F. Supp. at 1070.
300
See id.; see also Rodd Zolkos, Insurers Sue Pipe Makers: Class Action Brought by
Insurers Breaks New Ground, BUS. INS., Feb. 16, 1998 (“A class-action suit by insurers
seeking to recover hundreds of millions of dollars in payment for leaking polybutylene
plumbing could have far-reaching implications for both sides.... Leading the suit, which
involves a ‘tight group of 40’ insurers and ultimately could take in hundreds ... is Northland Insurance Co.”).
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and injunctive relief.301 However, more relevant, the class of property and
casualty insurers wanted Shell Oil to reimburse millions of dollars that the
insurers spent to settle homeowners’ claims.302
Six years after Northland, a federal district judge in New York decided
In re Simon II, Litigation.303 In that case, Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
New Jersey (BCBS)—along with smokers and labor unions—filed a class
action against Philip Morris, Inc., the American Tobacco Company, and
other cigarette manufacturers.304 Actually, Simon II consolidated all the
tobacco-related lawsuits to include punitive damages claims for the various class members.305 Exercising their respective subrogation rights under
health insurance contracts, the insurers alleged that the tobacco industry
used deceptive marketing practices that caused policyholders’ tobaccorelated illnesses and addictions.306 Therefore, the health insurers sought
reimbursement from the tobacco companies to cover the insureds’ health
costs.307
Also, between 2001 and 2004, large health insurers filed three additional class actions in federal courts against large pharmaceutical companies.308 First, in Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co.,309 two large health insurance companies filed a consolidated class action in 2001 against
Warner-Lambert.310 Before the federal district judge in New York, the
insurers argued that the pharmaceutical company aggressively marketed
Rezulin, which was allegedly “the first anti-diabetes drug designed to
301

See Northland, 930 F. Supp. at 1070.
See id.
303
In re Simon II, Litig., No. 00-CV-5332, 2002 WL 32155895, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
19, 2002).
304
See id. at *1.
305
See Judge Certifies Class-Action Suit Against Tobacco Firms, RICH. TIMES
DISPATCH, Sept. 21, 2002, available at 2002 WLNR 1452025.
306
See, e.g., Blue Cross & Blue Shield of N.J., Inc. v. Philip Morris, Inc., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 357, 360, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (permitting insurer to recover extra healthcare
expenditures for smokers and to provide evidence of “pass on” premium practice).
307
See id. at 363.
308
See, e.g., Desiano v. Warner-Lambert Co., 326 F.3d 339 (2d Cir. 2003); In re
Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); Int’l Union of Operating
Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., Inc., 929 A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007); In
re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., Nos. C 04-1511 (CW), C 04-4203 (CW),
2007 WL 1689899 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
309
Desiano, 326 F.3d at 339.
310
See id. at 340–41 (“Louisiana Health Service Indemnity Company ... is a Blue
Cross/Blue Shield health benefit provider ... with headquarters in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
.... Eastern States Health and Welfare Fund ... [is an Employee Retirement Income Security Act] plan that provides benefits to members of the Needletrades, Industrial, and
Textile Employees Union [and] is based in New York.”).
302
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[improve one’s] insulin resistance”; however, the company priced the drug
“at nearly three times the cost” of other diabetic medication.311 Also, the
medication had a greater likelihood of causing liver damage than a placebo.312 Thus, the insurers sought class relief on behalf of all health benefit
providers that paid for Rezulin between 1997 and 2001.313 And the insurers wanted to recoup “approximately $1.4 billion” that they had paid for
the defective drug.314
The second case, In re Buspirone Patent Litigation,315 highlights the
class action that dozens of health insurance companies or “end payors”316
filed against Bristol-Myers Squibb pharmaceutical company.317 The class
of insurers alleged that Bristol-Myers violated federal antitrust laws by
paying Schein Pharmaceuticals Inc. $72.5 million to keep its generic version of BuSpar off the market.318 The insurance companies sought class
certification to recover large sums of money that they paid to purchase
Bristol-Myers’ brand-name drug, since the generic drug was not available.319
In re Abbott Laboratories Norvir Anti-Trust Litigation320 involved a
heated conflict between Abbott Laboratories and a group of very diverse
plaintiffs, including multiple health insurers.321 Abbott designed and produced Norvir to fight HIV.322 As a stand-alone drug, Norvir was only
minimally effective and its price was relatively low.323 However, when
administered along with a combination of other drugs, Norvir was very

311

Id. at 342 (internal quotations omitted).
See id.
313
See id. at 344.
314
See id. at 345.
315
In re Buspirone Patent Litig., 185 F. Supp. 2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
316
See id. at 365.
317
See Marie Suszynski, Health Insurers Sue Bristol-Myers Squibb, Alleging a Drug
Monopoly, BESTWIRE, Dec. 6, 2002 (“The lawsuits [named] several Blue Cross and Blue
Shield plans and other health insurers as plaintiffs .... One lawsuit, filed in the Southern
District of New York by Blue Cross of California, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Georgia, Pacific Life & Annuity Insurance Co., Blue Cross Blue Shield of Kansas City,
Unicare Life & Health Insurance Company and others, said Bristol-Myers enjoyed a
monopoly on the drug and illegally delayed the introduction of a generic drug ....”).
318
See id.
319
See In re Buspirone, 185 F. Supp. 2d at 365–66.
320
In re Abbott Labs. Norvir Anti-Trust Litig., Nos. C 04–1511 (CW), C 04-4203
(CW), 2007 WL 1689899, at *1 (N.D. Cal. June 11, 2007).
321
See id.
322
See id.
323
See id.
312
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potent and effective.324 Therefore, Abbott raised the wholesale price for
one hundred and twenty 100-milligram Norvir capsules from about $206
to $1,028.325 That was nearly a four hundred percent increase in the
wholesale price of the drug.326
Aetna Insurance Company sued Abbott in 2004.327 And that same
year, various other health insurers and health plans commenced a class
action against Abbott.328 Both complaints alleged that the pharmaceutical
company unjustly enriched itself by violating Section 2 of the Sherman
Act and the California Business and Professions Code.329 For unexplained
reasons, Aetna dropped its lawsuit.330
Finally, Merck & Company manufactured and marketed Vioxx, an anti-inflammatory arthritis and acute pain medication.331 Therefore, in International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v.
Merck & Co.,332 another diverse group of large health insurers and other
corporate entities filed a nationwide class action against Merck in 2005.333

324

See id.
See Business Digest, Aetna Sues Abbott over 400% Increase in AIDS Drug’s Cost,
BALT. SUN, May 28, 2004, available at 2004 WLNR 1483785.
326
See In re Abbott Labs., 2007 WL 1689899 at *1.
327
See Business Digest, supra note 325 (“Aetna Inc. has sued pharmaceutical maker
Abbott Laboratories Inc., accusing it of seeking a monopoly on AIDS drug by raising the
price of its popular drug Norvir by 400 percent.”).
328
See In re Abbott Labs., 2007 WL 1689899 at *1 (“Plaintiffs now seek to certify the
following class: All persons or entities ... who purchased or paid for, or who reimbursed
another person or entity who purchased or paid for, Norvir ... plan participants and beneficiaries or insureds, and who paid all or part of the cost of Norvir ... during the period
December 3, 2003 through such time in the future as the effects of Defendant’s illegal
conduct, as alleged, have ceased ....”).
329
See id.
330
See Diane Levick, Aetna Dropping Lawsuit, HARTFORD COURANT, May 28, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 19969645 (“Aetna ... abruptly moved to dismiss its own lawsuit
against Abbott Laboratories two days after filing it and alleging Abbott’s price increase
for an AIDS medicine violated federal antitrust law. Aetna wouldn’t say why it had a
sudden change of heart. But sources familiar with the case say Abbott is an Aetna health
plan customer and that certain high-ranking Aetna officials weren’t aware that the suit
had been filed.”).
331
See Alex Berenson, Plaintiffs Find Payday Elusive in Vioxx Suits, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 21, 2007, at A1 (chronicling the history of legal and medical problems that Merck
& Company have faced before and after the large pharmaceutical company withdrew
Vioxx from the market in 2004).
332
Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs Local No. 68 Welfare Fund v. Merck & Co., 929
A.2d 1076 (N.J. 2007).
333
Id. at 1078.
325
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Describing themselves as “third-party payors,”334 the large health insurers
and other entities initiated the state law class action in a New Jersey state
court rather than in federal court.335 According to their complaint, Merck
violated New Jersey’s Consumer Fraud Act.336
More specifically, the insurers asserted that Merck represented Vioxx
as a safer and more effective alternative to other pain medications.337
Therefore, from the insurers’ perspective, the large pharmaceutical company fraudulently inflated the price of Vioxx and induced all third-party
payors to provide unwarranted sums of money.338 The lower court certified the class that would have allowed the insurance companies and other
end-payors to receive reimbursements for their expenditures.339 The New
Jersey Supreme Court, however, decertified the class, finding that the
proposed class action was not superior to traditional legal methods of
securing various remedies.340
Why is the above discussion relevant? Sixty-five years after the Supreme Court’s South-Eastern Underwriters decision in the mid-twentieth
century, we find large groups of consumers and their supporters claiming
that national and multinational insurers as well as corporations are the
twenty-first century culprits who are undermining and interfering with
state courts’ constitutional powers.341 More precisely, opponents of comprehensive class action reforms assert that today’s corporations, insurers,
and their congressional supporters are “turn[ing] 200 years of federalism
on its head,” by sanctioning wholeheartedly the unwarranted removal of
arguably purely substantive state law class actions from allegedly prejudiced and hostile state courts to purportedly impartial and judicious federal
courts.342
334

Id. at 1079 (“[A] a third-party payor ... makes payments to pharmaceutical companies for prescription medications [on behalf of insured participants under] its benefit
plans ....”).
335
Id. at 1076.
336
Id. at 1079.
337
Id.
338
Int’l Union, 929 A.2d 1076 at 1079.
339
See id. at 1153–54.
340
Id. at 1089.
341
See infra notes 391"97 and accompanying text.
342
See 151 CONG. REC. 2086 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“There have
been many claims about ‘judicial hellholes’ and ‘magnet jurisdictions,’ but the evidence
shows that these claims are ... overstated, and are certainly not so widespread so as to
justify passage of this legislation .... There is also no reasonable basis for the assertion
that this legislation ‘will restore the intent of the framers’ [respecting] the role of our
federal courts.”).
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That insurers—as plaintiffs—have filed numerous class actions in federal and state courts is significant, because insurers—as defendants—have
been unable to explain their obvious conundrum. As stated earlier, on
some occasions insurers—as defendants—assert that state courts are hostile and biased against corporations generally and insurers in particular.343
However, on other occasions, insurers—as plaintiffs—insist that state
courts rather than federal courts are the only proper forums in which to
litigate business of insurance and insurance-related disputes.344
There is more. That large national insurance companies themselves
were filing massive class actions in state courts against other large corporate entities between 1998 and 2004 is highly significant. During that very
period, those insurers—as defendants—as well as their insured corporate
clients used their substantial political clout,345 and asked Congress for a
second form relief.346 In particular, insurers and other national and multinational corporations encouraged Congress to enact strong legislation that
would “rein in” or reduce altogether a wide spectrum of industries’ exposure to class action lawsuits in federal courts and in allegedly hostile and
biased state courts.347
343

See supra text accompanying notes 63–67.
See supra text accompanying notes 63–67.
345
See David R. Francis, Insurance Firms Fight New Bill, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jun. 27, 1991, at 8 (“Because the insurance industry has so many agents, agencies, and
employees scattered around the country, it has considerable political clout in Washington.”); Editorial, A Victory for Patients, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Oct. 9, 1999, at 14A
(“The House Republicans’ courageous stand to join Democrats against the HMO lobby
and Republican leaders puts health care reform back on the national agenda .... In a rare
display of bipartisan cooperation, a surprisingly large House majority bucked the political
clout of the health insurance industry and approved serious legislation to bolster the
rights of patients”); Steve Weinberg, How the Press Keeps the Lid on Itself, ST. LOUIS
POST-DISPATCH, Aug. 13, 2000, at F10 (“The failure in newsrooms to report extensively
about insurance is baffling .... The failure to investigate insurance issues is a classic case
of journalistic self-censorship .... The insurance industry carries lots of clout in the political realm.”).
346
See, e.g., Unfairness Incorporated: The Corporate Campaign Against Consumer
Class Actions, PUB. CITIZEN, 31 (June 2003), http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF2B
13.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (“No industry has thrown more manpower into federalizing class-action lawsuits than the combined efforts of insurance companies and associations, which have devoted at least 193 lobbyists to the issue from 2000 through 2002.
They have been divided among life insurance (79), property and casualty insurance (60)
and HMOs (59). Some worked for more than one segment of the industry.”).
347
See generally Joan Claybrook, The Special Interests Behind “The Class Action
Fairness Act,” PUB. CITIZEN (May 20, 2004), http://www.citizen.org/documents/Special
_Interests_Behind_Class_Action_Bill.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) (citing a 94-page
Public Citizen’s report that was released in 2003 and reporting that “[a]t least 100 major
344
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Finally, it is debatable whether insurers and corporations’ removal-ofclass actions campaign was designed to turn two centuries of judicial federalism on its head. But one point is indisputable: like their mid-twentieth
century counterparts, twenty-first century corporations and insurance
companies’ concerted efforts to implement class action reforms were extremely successful, because Congress passed the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005.348 As briefly discussed below, it is possible that CAFA will
actually create significantly more perils for multinational corporations and
national insurance companies, even though those corporate entities currently have the power to remove numerous state law class actions from
professedly prejudiced, ineffectual, and unsympathetic state courts to
allegedly fairer and more competent federal courts.

corporations and pro-business associations ... banded together to spend millions of dollars
and to employ at least 475 lobbyists from 2000 to June 2003 to make sure that classaction legislation [tilted] in their favor.” The report listed the following corporate entities
and industries as the primary instigators of major class action reforms: Insurance companies and their industry associations; credit card companies, mortgage lenders and their
trade associations; retail corporations; America’s largest pharmaceutical companies; the
gas and oil industry; and at least two major tobacco companies); Demetri Sevastopulo,
U.S. Class-Action Lawsuits Face Reform Congress, FIN. TIMES (London, England), Jun.
13, 2003, at 11 (“The U.S. House of Representatives was yesterday poised to approve [a
bill that would move] class-action lawsuits from state to federal courts, where awards
tend to be smaller. It has been widely welcomed by industry groups, which claim that
class-action suits harm commerce and benefit lawyers more than their clients .... ‘It is a
very encouraging step that the Senate judiciary committee has already approved a bill,’
said Joe Manero of the Alliance of American Insurers, which represents 340 insurance
companies.”); Jonathan Weisman, Lawsuit Reform a Bush Priority: President Seeks to
Limit Class-Action, Malpractice Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A6 (reporting that
“President Bush ... demanded congressional action on legislation to rein in class-action ...
lawsuits”). See infra note 894 and accompanying text (presenting evidence of national
and multinational corporations’ filing class actions against other corporations in state
courts between 1998 and 2004).
348
See Industry Basks in Class-Action Victory: Congress Finally Limits VenueShopping, but Frivolous Suit Bill Hits Dead End, National Underwriter, PROP. &
CAS./RISK & BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION, Dec. 3, 2005, at 24 (“For eight long years, the
insurance industry battled on Capitol Hill to put a lid on what they considered to be an
out-of-control tort system. With Republicans firmly in control of both houses of Congress
and the White House ... [i]nsurers were positively giddy when President George W. Bush
signed the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 into law. After all, the law moves a lot
more cases into the more predictable federal courts ....”).
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B. Brief Overview—The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
1. Findings and Purpose of CAFA
To justify CAFA’s enactment, the majority of Congress made an arguably highly questionable and contentious finding, which has no support in
fact or in law. The finding stated in relevant part: during the decade before
February 19, 2005, states’ class action practices, procedures, and lawsuits
eroded significantly fundamental principles of judicial federalism.349 More
specifically, the majority of the 109th Congress concluded that state
courts’ class action “abuses” had undermined “the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity
jurisdiction” as the framers of the Constitution had intended.350
Furthermore, the congressional majority found that state courts’ class
action “abuses” keep “cases of national importance out of federal
court,”351 and allow state courts to issue biased rulings against out-of-state
defendants,352 allow certain state courts to impose their judgments and
“view of the law” on other states,353 and permit certain state tribunals to
make declarations that “bind the rights” of out-of-state defendants.354
Therefore, Congress enacted CAFA to restore the Framers of the Constitution’s original intent—to give federal courts the sole jurisdiction to hear
and decide class action “cases of national importance” between diverse
citizens and persons.355
2. The Scope of Federal Courts’ Diversity Jurisdiction to Certify and
Decide Class Actions of “National Importance”
Depending on the circumstances, CAFA requires federal courts to exercise jurisdiction over certain class action lawsuits,356 and it is immaterial
if plaintiffs’ file those actions in federal court initially, or defendants remove the actions from state to federal courts.357 On the other hand, federal
349

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 4.
Id.
351
Id.
352
Id.
353
Id.
354
Id.
355
28 U.S.C. § 1332.
356
Id.
357
See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (“A class action may be removed to a district court of the
United States in accordance with section 1446 (except that the 1-year limitation under
section 1446(b) shall not apply), without regard to whether any defendant is a citizen of
350
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district courts have no authority to hear and decide those controversies if
class members qualify for a local-controversy exception under several
multipronged and complicated tests.358 However, if a proper set of conditions present themselves, a federal court may refuse to exercise jurisdiction over class actions of “national ... interest.”359
More precisely, under CAFA, federal courts must exercise original jurisdiction over class actions in which the amount in controversy exceeds
$5,000,000.360 In addition, CAFA requires only minimal diversity between
class action litigants, which can be established relatively easily.361 One
only needs to show that: (1) at least one class member and one defendant
are citizens of different states,362 (2) at least one foreign class member—a
state, citizen or subject—and one defendant have different citizenship,363
or (3) at least one state class member and one foreign defendant—a state,
citizen or subject—are among the litigants.364
But again, CAFA creates an exception that prevents federal district
courts from certifying and adjudicating class actions that involve “truly
local controversies.”365 However, to qualify for the “local controversy exception” and keep class actions in state courts, in-state complainants must
satisfy five hierarchical and nearly insurmountable tests.366
First, the “two-thirds citizenship” test requires the class representative
to prove that more than two-thirds of all proposed class members are citizens of the state in which the action originated.367 Next, the “significant
relief” test requires class members to prove that at least one defendant is a
citizen of the state in which the class action originated,368 and that the
defendant can provide significant relief.369 The third standard—the “significant basis” test—requires complainants to prove that at least one defendant’s conduct “forms a significant basis” for class members’ claims,370
the State in which the action is brought, except that such action may be removed by any
defendant without the consent of all defendants.”).
358
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
359
Id. at § 1332(d)(3).
360
Id. at § 1332(d)(2).
361
Id. at § 1332(d)(2)(A"C).
362
Id. at § 1332(d)(2)(A).
363
Id. at § 1332(d)(2)(B).
364
28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(2)(C).
365
Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A).
366
Id.
367
Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(I).
368
Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(cc).
369
Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(aa).
370
28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(II)(bb).
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and the “principle injuries” test requires members to prove that their
“principle injuries” occurred in the state where they filed the class action
initially.371 Finally, to invoke the “local-controversy exception,” class
members must also establish that a prior class action—asserting identical
or similar allegations against any of the defendants—was not filed during
the 3-year period before the “current” class action.372
Again, after considering “the totality of the circumstances” and “the
interests of justice,” federal district courts may decline to exercise jurisdiction over class actions.373 But before exercising that discretion, federal
judges must consider a number of extremely complicated factors to prevent an abuse of judicial discretion.374 Those factors appear under three
headings or tests that may be described loosely as “federalism,”
“numerosity,” and “commonality.” Under the first heading, district judges
must determine whether plaintiffs fashioned the class action complaint to
avoid federal jurisdiction,375 and whether their claims concern issues of
national importance or an interstate conflict.376 In addition, federal courts
must uncover whether the laws of the state in which the action originated
or the laws of other states will govern the disposition of the class action.377
The “numerosity” test requires federal district judges to determine
whether the primary defendant and one- to two-thirds of the proposed
class members are citizens of the state in which the action originated.378 It
also mandates a determination of: (1) whether the proposed class comprises substantially larger numbers of citizens from the state in which the class
action originates or larger numbers of out-of-state citizens,379 and (2)
whether substantial diversity in state citizenship exists among other members in the proposed class.380
Finally, federal district judges must apply a “commonality” test and
assess whether the proposed class commenced the lawsuit in a forum that
has “a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged harm, or the
defendants.”381 Also, to avoid an abuse-of-discretion charge, the judges
must determine whether plaintiffs filed at least one class action—asserting
371

Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(III).
Id. at § 1332(d)(4)(A)(ii).
373
Id. at § 1332(d)(3).
374
Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(A"F).
375
Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(C).
376
28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(3)(A).
377
Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(B).
378
Id. at § 1332(d)(3).
379
Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(E).
380
Id.
381
Id. at § 1332(d)(3)(D).
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identical or similar claims on behalf of the same or similarly situated persons—anytime during the preceding three years.382 And once more, depending on the judges’ findings, they may decline to exercise federal jurisdiction over the proposed class action.383
IV. CLASS ACTION REMOVALS FROM ALLEGEDLY “BIASED” STATE COURTS
TO FEDERAL COURTS—ARGUABLY NEWLY CREATED PERILS UNDER
CAFA FOR CORPORATIONS AND INSURERS AS PLAINTIFFS AND
DEFENDANTS
During the House and Senate’s debates on whether to enact CAFA’s
potentially “radical” class action reforms, members on both sides of the
political divide cited numerous reasons to embrace or reject the proposed
legislation.384 Among those supporting the legislation, class action reformers stressed that CAFA would strengthen fundamental principles of judicial federalism.385 How? The proponents asserted: (1) CAFA would allow
corporate defendants to remove “copycat”386 and very large “national”
382

28 U.S.C. at § 1332(d)(3)(F).
Id. at § 1332(d)(3).
384
Depending on a congressional member’s political leanings or biases, the following
reasons were listed frequently as the “true” justifications for CAFA’s enactment: 151
CONG. REC. 2653 (2005) (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) (“[This Act is] going to significantly harm small consumers who want to hold large companies accountable for defrauding them.”); id. at 2645 (statement of Rep. Linda Sanchez) (“[T]his bill really is about ....
doing a favor for unscrupulous, negligent corporations by making it harder for their
victims to sue them.”); id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“[Regarding
CAFA’s purported goal to assure] ‘fair and prompt recoveries’ hundreds of consumer
rights, labor, civil rights, senior, and environmental organizations, esteemed legal experts,
and many State Attorneys General believe as I do that this legislation will do just the
opposite.”); id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[O]ur class action system is
rife with abuses. It is gamed. It is broken. We need to fix it .... [W]e need to fix it for the
consumers who are hurt by alleged abuses.”); id. at 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“[M]oving more class actions to federal court would actually reduce the burden
for everyone. Ultimately, this bill will allow claims with merit to go forward while preventing judicial blackmail.”); id. at 1664 (statement of Sen. Grassley) (“We heard about
class action lawyers entering into collusive settlements with defendant attorneys which
were not in the best interest of class members. These are only a few of the gamesmanship
tactics lawyers like to utilize to bring down the entire class action legal system.”); id. at
1650 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“This bill is [fashioned] to ... stop the forum shopping, [a practice of] finding jurisdictions that will render outrageous verdicts that basically benefit the attorneys [rather than] the people for whom they are suing.”).
385
See infra notes 386"90.
386
See 151 CONG. REC. 2645 (statement of Rep. Christopher Cannon) (“[W]e need to
understand the game the class action lawyers play ... and how they [abuse] the court
systems. I call it Class Action Monopoly .... Rule 23 is the rule that would apply in Fed383
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class actions to federal courts—the allegedly intended and proper forums
for litigating such lawsuits,387 (2) CAFA’s liberal removal provision will
help to foster a more efficient form of judicial federalism,388 (3) the new
statute would prevent supposedly biased state court judges—in “magic
jurisdictions”389—from employing unprincipled procedures to decrease
corporate defendants’ likelihoods of winning, and, (4) the new law would
prevent class members from undermining federalism by taking away their
“home-court” advantage in state courts.390
Generally, opponents of class action reforms argued that CAFA
“[would turn] 200 years of federalism on its head.”391 More explicitly,
they insisted that CAFA would severely undermine judicial federalism by:
(1) blocking or limiting state courts’ right392 and competence to enforce
eral courts that defines when a class action can be certified consistent with fundamental
fairness and due process considerations. But in this game, there is no fairness. There is no
due process. So they easily convince their magnet State to certify ... a class and at the
same time they file copycat lawsuits in State courts all over the country. These are the
same class actions asserting the same claims on behalf of the same people. These copycat
lawsuits clog the State courts.”).
387
See id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
388
See id. at 2092 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“[C]urrent pleading practice
by the class action plaintiffs bar has very effectively denied Federal jurisdiction over
cases that are predominantly interstate in nature. These are precisely the kinds of cases
the Framers thought deserve to be heard in Federal courts .... [This Act only brings]
pleading practice more into line with constitutional requirements. Cases that are primarily
intrastate rather than interstate in nature may continue to be heard in State courts. But ...
clearly interstate [cases] will now be more likely to be heard in Federal court, where they
belong.”).
389
See id. at 1828 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch, quoting Plaintiffs’ Attorney Richard Scruggs) (“[In] ‘Magic Jurisdictions,’ trial lawyers have established relationships
with [elected, populists] ... State court judges .... [Given that political force], it’s almost
impossible to get a fair trial if you’re a defendant in some of these places.”).
390
See, e.g., id. at 2084 (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi) (“The class action system in
our country is broken .... The U.S. Constitution gives jurisdiction to the Federal Government when cases involve citizens of differing states. It makes sense ... that no party
[should have] the inevitable ‘home-court’ advantage ... when a case is tried in [one’s]
backyard.”).
391
See id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“There have been many claims
about ‘judicial hellholes’ and ‘magnet jurisdictions,’ but the evidence shows that these
claims are ... overstated, and are certainly not so widespread so as to justify passage of
this legislation .... There is also no reasonable basis for the assertion that this legislation
‘will restore the intent of the framers’ [respecting] the role of our federal courts.”).
392
151 CONG. REC. 1647 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“When States act ahead
of the Federal Government to provide greater rights for their citizens, State courts should
be allowed to interpret their own laws. State courts, not Federal courts, have the expertise
in exerting the will of the State legislature and they should have the right to do so. ... We
should call this bill the ‘Class Action Hypocrisy Act of 2005.’ Our colleagues love to
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state and local laws,393 (2) allowing federal laws to preempt additional
state court procedures and rulings,394 (3) reducing aggrieved citizens’
constitutional right to secure remedies in both state and federal courts,395
(4) clogging federal courts with substantially more class actions—which
will reduce speedy trials and the effective administration of justice,396 and
(5) allowing an out-of-state or a foreign corporate defendant to move a
truly local, massive class action “into [a federal court] even if all ... underlying facts in the case happened in a single state.”397
In light of the pre-CAFA federalism debate, this Part presents an analysis of whether CAFA’s newly minted procedural requirements are more
likely to restore, support or undermine fundamental principles of judicial
federalism. Furthermore, as reported above, CAFA created many new
tests.398 It leaves, however, the burden of defining and explaining the parameters of those tests for federal courts of appeals or for various panels
within those circuits. Therefore, a discussion of some newly generated
substantive questions and conflicts—involving the Erie doctrine, choice of

proclaim States rights when Congress tries to expand the rights of law in all 50 States, but
they do not hesitate to override States rights to help their business friends. This bill is a
windfall for guilty corporate offenders.”).
393
See id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton, quoting Arthur Miller) (“[The
Act is] a radical departure from one of the most basic, longstanding principles of federalism [and] is a particular affront to state judges when we consider the unquestioned vitality and competence of state courts to which we have historically and frequently entrusted
the enforcement of state-created rights and remedies”).
394
See id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“I would hate to see this
bill which already turns the idea of federalism on its head preempt any more State
rules and procedures than it already does with the diversity provisions.”).
395
See id. at 2647 (statement of Rep. Jay Inslee) (“[Presently, there are] two arms to
protect Americans, the State judicial system and the Federal judicial system. This [bill]
reduces by half the resources that are available to Americans to get redress when Enron
steals from them or when Vioxx kills them.... [I]n our system of federalism, Americans
deserve the full protection, not just half the protection. This [bill] cuts the available
judicial resources in half.”).
396
See id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (“[H]aving practiced law for over
20 years, [I’m certain] the core provisions of this bill will invite prolonged satellite litigation into ill-defined or undefined terms in this bill, clogging the Federal courts and denying prompt justice to worthy claimants.”); id. at 1657 (statement of Sen. Russell
Feingold) (“Criminal cases ... take precedence in the federal courts, because of the
Speedy Trial Act. So if you look at this [Act] in ... context, the net result of removing
virtually all class actions, civil cases, of course, to federal court will be to delay those
cases.”).
397
151 CONG. REC. at 1646 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy).
398
28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(A) (2006).
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law rules, and the applicability of the McCarran-Ferguson Act—appear
here as well.
A. Allegedly “Biased” State Courts, Class Action Removals Under CAFA
and the Erie Doctrine—Arguably a Catch-22 for Corporations and Insurers Who Are Plaintiffs in Federal Courts
Writing for the majority in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,399 Associate
Justice Brennan used Catch-22—a widely used idiom—to describe persons who found themselves in a “no-win situation” or in a “double
bind.”400 He wrote: “An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose positions require this trait places women in an intolerable
and impermissible Catch-22: [Women are] out of a job if they behave
aggressively and [they are] out of a job if they do not. Title VII [of the
Civil Rights Act] lifts women out of this bind.”401 On another occasion,
then Associate Justice Rehnquist used the idiom to illustrate the majority’s
arguably absurd holding in Aguilar v. Felton.402 He wrote: “[Today,] the
Court takes advantage of the ‘Catch-22’ paradox of its own creation.... [It
declares that] aid must be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the
supervision itself is held to cause an entanglement. The Court ... strikes
down nondiscriminatory nonsectarian aid to educationally deprived children from low-income families. [However, the] Establishment Clause does
not prohibit such sorely needed assistance ....”403
CAFA creates a Catch-22 for a proposed class of complainants in a diversity lawsuit. Consider the evidence and settled law. Rule 23(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a federal district court to certify
a class action.404 To achieve that end, the district court must determine
whether a certification would satisfy four requirements under Rule
23(a)—numerosity, commonality, typicality, and representativeness.405 In
399

Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
See id. at 251.
401
Id.
402
Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 420–21 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
403
See id.; see also Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 109 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“Interferences with religion should arguably be dealt with under the Free Exercise Clause .... [However, we] have not always followed Walz’s reflective inquiry into
entanglement. ... One of the difficulties with the entanglement prong is that, when divorced from the logic of Walz, it creates an ‘insoluable paradox’ in school aid cases: we
have required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use,
yet this close supervision itself will create an entanglement.”).
404
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
405
Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 320 (5th Cir. 2005).
400
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addition, if the proposed class wants damages, Rule 23(b)(3) requires the
district court to determine whether the class representative has satisfied the
predominance and superiority requirements.406 Again, the predominance
element requires a court to find that common issues of law or fact “predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.”407
In Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., the Supreme
Court declared that when a federal district court exercises diversity or
supplemental jurisdiction over a controversy, the Erie doctrine408 requires
that court to apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits.409 In
light of Klaxon’s ruling, federal district courts have grappled with the
predominance requirement for at least thirty-five years.410 The reason for
this is not complex. Fairly often, a Rule 23(b)(3) class action includes
extremely large numbers of complainants who reside in every state.411
Consequently, as the variability among proposed class members’ domiciliary states increases, variances among those states’ laws also increases.412
Under our system of federalism, each state wants its citizens to be
treated fairly and receive adequate damages in a federal diversity trial.
Thus, to address each class member’s individual claims and causes of
action, a federal district court must perform a thorough choice of law
analysis.413 In the process the district judge might feel compelled to apply
the laws of fifty states and the District of Columbia, a conclusion that
certainly conflicts with Klaxon.414 At that point the court could deny class

406

See In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004).
Id. at 52.
408
See Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir.
1992) (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine as best it can, what the highest
court of the state would decide.”).
409
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that the
federal court sitting in Delaware must apply conflict of law rules in conformity with those
applied in Delaware state courts).
410
See Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., Inc., 326 F. Supp. 98, 104 (D.C. Colo.
1971) (certifying a class after determining that common issues were predominant).
411
See, e.g., Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 724 (5th Cir. 2007) (accepting
the district court’s finding that the laws of all fifty-one jurisdictions applied to the class
action); Marino v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 245 F.R.D. 729, 734 (S.D. Fla. 2007) (certifying a class that would involve a breach-of-contract claim for all fifty states).
412
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1302 (7th Cir. 1995).
413
Berg Chilling Sys., Inc. v. Hull Corp., 435 F.3d 455, 462 (3d Cir. 2006).
414
See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496 (stating that a state has the right to pursue local policies that the federal courts cannot thwart by enforcing other general laws).
407
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certification,415 concluding that the variations among states’ laws “swamp
any common issues and defeat predominance.”416
In view of the Erie-Klaxon requirements, choice of law problems generally, and the predominance requirement in particular, CAFA creates an
indefensible Catch-22 for persons who ask federal courts to certify a Rule
23(b)(3) class action.417 The paradox is this: a stated purpose of CAFA is
to ensure that class actions of national importance are certified and litigated in federal courts,418 given state courts’ alleged incompetency and the
wide variances among state laws.419 But federal courts may not certify
class actions of national importance given the predominance requirement
and wide variances among state laws.420
Undeniably, during the Senate and House’s debates CAFA’s supporters and opponents were very cognizant of federal district courts’ immense
propensity to deny Rule 23(b)(3) certification motions when wide variances appear in the proposed class members’ state laws.421 To correct that
perceived injustice, Senators Feinstein and Bingaman offered an amendment.422 It read in the pertinent part, “the district judge shall not deny class
certification, in whole or in part, on the ground that the law of more than
one State will be applied.”423 The Senate majority, however, rejected the
Feinstein-Bingaman amendment.424
Essentially, the majority of CAFA’s supporters concluded that adopting the amendment would undermine fundamental principles of federalism
415

See, e.g., In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004)
(“Appellants argue that the Rule 23(a) commonality and Rule 23(b)(3) predominance
requirements were not satisfied in this case because of variations in the claims and injuries of the plaintiffs ... as well as differences in the laws of the 50 states which form the
basis of several of the class’ claims.”).
416
See Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (citing Georgine v. Amchem
Prods., 83 F.3d 610, 618 (3d Cir. 1996)).
417
Compare id. (stating that a court must consider the variations in state law across
multiple jurisdictions when considering class certifications), with Class Action Fairness
Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (establishing that CAFA’s intent is to
ensure interstate cases of national importance are considered under diversity jurisdiction).
418
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 119 Stat. at 5.
419
See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995).
420
See Castano, 84 F.3d at 752.
421
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2083 (2005) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); id. at 2657
(statement of Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner).
422
See id. at 1832 (statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein) (offering an amendment to
address federal judges’ ability to deny class certifications due to immense variance across
state law).
423
Id. at 1814.
424
Id. at 1832.
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because it would have allowed federal courts to apply a single state’s law
in a nationwide class action.425 But was CAFA’s supporters’ concern justified? Arguably it was not, serving only as a specious reason to reject the
Feinstein-Bingaman amendment.426 If CAFA’s supporters had carefully
reviewed the Supreme Court’s choice of law ruling in Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts,427 they would have discovered that the Feinstein-Bingaman
amendment simply embraced that ruling.428
In Shutts at least 28,000 aggrieved royalty owners filed a class action
against Phillips Petroleum to secure interest payments on the owners’
suspended royalties.429 Although the complainants resided “in all 50
States, the District of Columbia, and several foreign countries,” the class
representatives filed the nationwide class action in a Kansas state court.430
The judge certified the class and ruled in favor of the class on the merits.431 The Kansas Supreme Court affirmed the decision,432 concluding that
“the law of the forum control[s] all claims unless ‘compelling reasons’
existed to apply a different law.”433 Failing to find a compelling reason to
apply the substantive law of another state, the Kansas Supreme Court
concluded that the entire cause of action had to proceed under Kansas’s
class action statute.434 Phillips petitioned the Supreme Court for review.435
Before the Court, Phillips argued that “Kansas courts could not apply
Kansas law to every claim in the dispute.”436 According to the company,
“total application of Kansas substantive law violated the constitutional
limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article IV,
§ 1.”437 Phillips also stressed that Kansas’s trial court “should have looked
to the laws of each State where the leases were located to determine ...
425

See id. at 1820 (Letter submitted by Mr. Walter E. Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers, LLP).
426
See Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 822–23 (1985) (providing support
for the amendment’s goals in its conclusion that the application of Kansas law to every
claim was arbitrary and unfair to substantive conflicts with other applicable jurisdictions).
427
Id. at 823.
428
See id. at 822–23 (concluding that applying Kansas law to every claim was arbitrary and unfair due to substantive conflicts with the law of other jurisdictions).
429
Id. at 799.
430
Id. at 803.
431
Id.
432
Shutts, 472 U.S. at 799.
433
Id. at 803.
434
See id.
435
Id. at 799.
436
Id. at 802.
437
Id. at 816.
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whether interest on the suspended royalties was recoverable, and at what
rate.”438
To determine whether Kansas’s court exceeded constitutional, choiceof-substantive-law limits, the Shutts Court applied a two-part test. First, a
court must find that “common issues of law or fact” predominate among
class members before certifying a class action.439 Second, a state “must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, [with
class members] creating state interests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.”440 In the end, the Supreme Court
concluded that the courts in Kansas failed to satisfy the second element. 441
Before the enactment of CAFA, the significant-contact, choice of law
principle in Shutts was clear: when adjudicating a nationwide class action,
“a state court may be free to apply one of several choices of law,” as long
as there are significant contacts and the choice of law is not arbitrary or
fundamentally unfair.442 Simply put, the pre-CAFA Feinstein-Bingaman
amendment would have codified Shutts’s choice of law ruling and instructed federal district courts to apply that rule and certify a class action
even if multiple states’ laws were applicable in a certain controversy.443
So, what would be an unintended adverse consequence for corporations as plaintiffs in class actions? Like complaining consumers, multinational corporations and insurance companies may also file class actions,
often citing numerous violations and claims under various state laws. In
light of Rule 23(c)(4)’s predominance requirement and Congress’s refusal
to insert the Feinstein-Bingaman language into CAFA, disgruntled corporate entities will also probably have more difficulty certifying their classes. At this point, one congressman’s insightful observation and conclusions in speaking against CAFA are worth repeating:

438

Shutts, 472 U.S. at 802–03.
Id. at 821.
440
Id. at 818 (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981)).
441
See id. at 822 (citing Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S.
493, 502 (1939); Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 410 (1930)).
442
See id. at 823 (stating that the state court is free to apply a choice of law as long as
the requirements of Allstate and Home Insurance Co. are met).
443
See 151 CONG. REC. 1813 (2005).
439
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Do you want to know why the Chamber of Commerce is spending $1
billion to lobby on what seems to be a procedural issue? Because they
throw out class actions where there is any difference in States[’ substantive laws], meaning you will not be able to have a class action anywhere, anywhere, Federal or State.444

Arguably, this conclusion applies to corporate complainants who
commence class actions against corporations generally and insurance
companies in particular.445
B. CAFA’s “Minimal Diversity” and “Cases of National Importance”
Rules—“Trojan Horses” for Insurers as Defendants in Federal Courts?
Once more, it is important to distinguish national insurance companies
as plaintiffs from national insurers as defendants in class actions as well as
in other consumer-initiated lawsuits. As corporate defendants, national
insurers face a conundrum—determining whether federal or state courts
should have greater power to “regulate” insurers’ business practices generally or to hear and decide consumers’ insurance-related claims and causes in particular. As discussed in Part III.A, insurers as defendants have
campaigned long and aggressively to ensure that state courts rather than
federal courts hear and resolve most “business of insurance” disputes as
well as consumers’ complaints against insurers.446 In fact, by embracing a
444

Id. at 2647 (statements of Rep. Jay Inslee); see also id. at H742 (statements of Rep.
William Delahunt) (“[W]e have before us a bill that would sweep aside generations of
State laws that protect consumers. Citizens will be denied their basic right to use their
own State courts to file class action lawsuits against companies.”). But see Gunnells v.
Healthplan Servs., Inc., 348 F.3d 417, 424 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[S]uperiority requirements in
Rule 23(b)(3) do not foreclose the possibility of mass tort class actions, but merely ensure
that class certification in such cases ‘achieve economies of time, effort, and expense, and
promote ... uniformity of decision ... without sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing
about other undesirable results.’” (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591,
615 (1997))). It is worth stressing, however, that federal courts have “relaxed” the predominance requirement when class representatives’ federal-statutory rather than state law
claims formed the basis of the class action complaints. See, e.g., Kohen v. Pac. Inv.
Mgmt. Co. LLC, 244 F.R.D. 469, 480 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (finding predominance, certifying
a class, and allowing the action to proceed under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C.
§ 25(a)(1)(D)); New England Carpenters Health Benefits Fund v. First Databank Inc.,
244 F.R.D. 79, 89 (D. Mass. 2007) (finding predominance, certifying a class, and allowing the action to proceed under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act,
18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
445
See, e.g., J.B.D.L. Corp. v. Wyeth-Ayerst Labs., Inc., 225 F.R.D. 208, 210 (S.D.
Ohio 2003) (deciding class certification for corporate complainant attempting class action
against corporation).
446
See supra notes 279–94 and accompanying text.
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states’ rights argument and insisting that state courts are more likely to
issue fairer and more favorable equitable rulings, insurers as defendants
have a rich history of removing, or trying to remove, declaratory judgment
and subrogation actions from federal courts to state courts.447
Yet, insurers as defendants lobbied passionately for CAFA’s enactment and embrace wholeheartedly that statute’s class action reforms that
allow insurers-defendants to remove large blocks of class actions and,
indirectly, business of insurance controversies from state courts to federal
courts.448 So it is worth asking why insurers as defendants would endorse
CAFA’s removal rule in one instance, and, in another instance, campaign
to keep business of insurance and insurance-related lawsuits in state
courts. Apparently, when it is fitting, multinational insurers will argue that
federal courts are “highly principled,” “unbiased,” and exceedingly more
competent to hear and decide business of insurance and class action lawsuits.449 On other occasions, when procedural and substantive hurdles are
perceived as being too onerous in federal courts, insurers as defendants are
likely to embrace a contradictory position and assert that only state courts
should have the sole authority to hear and decide insurance-related controversies.450
However, in light of CAFA’s questionable findings, one may assume
that federal courts are indeed significantly less likely to be biased against
multinational insurers who are defendants in class actions. Still, insurersdefendants as well as plaintiffs’ lawyers and defense counsels should ask
whether CAFA’s newly enacted reforms contain any hidden procedural
perils for insurers who decide to remove class actions from allegedly biased and unsympathetic state courts to professedly impartial and more
proficient federal courts. Without a doubt, the legal literature and federal

447

See, e.g., Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. ABB Lummus Global, Inc.,
2004 WL 224505, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2004) (petitioning district court to remove the
action to a New York state court to declare whether the underwriters had a contractual
obligation to indemnify their insured’s for settling third-party claims); La. Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Michelin Tire Corp., 207 F. Supp. 2d 524, 526–27 (M.D. La. 2002)
(granting insurer’s request to remand the subrogation action to state court because the
removal to federal court was untimely); see also Lexington Ins. Co. v. Daybreak Express,
Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 538, 539 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing insurers’ petitioning to
remove the controversy to state court given the district court’s lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction).
448
See Claybrook, supra note 347 (stating that the insurance industry provided significant support to CAFA due to the industry’s tendency to federalize class action lawsuits).
449
See infra notes 491–97 and accompanying text.
450
See Certain Underwriters, 2004 WL 224505, at *3.
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cases are replete with examples of modern-day “Trojan horses”451—newly
enacted statutes which contain unanticipated and effective stratagems or
weapons for one’s legal adversaries.452 CAFA embraces the “minimal
diversity rule”453 and allows “cases of national importance” to be removed
from state to federal courts.454 Even more importantly, the insurance industry lobbied effectively for those two provisions to help increase corporate defendants’ likelihood of litigating and winning most class actions in
federal courts.455
However, as discussed below, CAFA’s procedural hurdles, the minimal diversity and cases of national importance rules, are likely to become
“Trojan horses” for defendant insurance companies.456 Put simply, classes
of aggrieving consumers may cite those rules and force reticent corporate
defendants to litigate ancillary state law controversies in federal courts
rather than in state courts. But even more importantly, CAFA’s “cases of
national importance” rule is likely to enhance federal courts’ ability to
accomplish what the Supreme Court’s decision in South-Eastern Underwriters Association could not accomplish and undo what the McCarranFerguson Act has tried to prevent.457 Debatably, CAFA’s “cases of national importance” provision gives federal courts greater powers to regulate
more extensively the “business of insurance” generally, as well as the
business affairs and conduct of individual insurers in particular.458
1. Class Action Lawsuits, CAFA’s “Minimal Diversity Rule” and Potential Unintended Consequences for Corporate Defendants
How might CAFA’s “minimal diversity rule” adversely affect insurers
as defendants? More than a century ago, the Supreme Court decided
Strawbridge v. Curtiss and restricted inferior federal courts from exercis451

A search of Westlaw’s JLR database using the query ti(“Trojan horse”) generated
fifty-one articles (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).
452
See Ian D. Prior & Lisa Skehill, Beware the Federal Government Bearing Gifts:
How the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Could Become a Whistleblowing Trojan Horse, 43 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 565, 565–66 (2010) (discussing how the
statute’s Trojan horse properties stem from an apparent windfall for plaintiff attorney’s
while containing the many hidden downfalls).
453
See infra notes 459–90 and accompanying text.
454
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5.
455
See Claybrook, supra note 347 (stating that the insurance industry provided significant support to CAFA due to the Act’s various provisions that would send more suits to
federal court).
456
See discussion infra Parts IV.B.1–B.2.
457
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
458
See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
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ing jurisdiction over certain legal controversies.459 More specifically, the
Court fashioned the “complete diversity” rule and declared that federal
district courts may have original jurisdiction over diversity cases only if
the aggregate of plaintiffs and the aggregate of defendants were citizens of
different states.460 In 1967, the Court decided State Farm Fire & Casualty
Co. v. Tashire, explaining its decision in Strawbridge and declaring that
the “complete diversity” rule is a statutory rather than a constitutional
requirement.461
The Tashire Court also held that Article III of the Constitution allows
federal courts to decide diversity cases when one establishes only “minimal” diversity—a standard requiring a movant to prove that at least one
plaintiff and one defendant are citizens of different states.462 Two years
later, the Supreme Court decided Snyder v. Harris and reduced the movant’s burden even further.463 In Harris the Court held that federal district
courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over class actions by determining only the citizenship of the plaintiffs named in the complaint.464
CAFA adopts the minimal diversity rule.465 Therefore, looking prospectively, insurers as defendants—on behalf of themselves and their
insured corporate entities—will possibly have less difficulty removing
allegedly “frivolous” state law class actions from purportedly hostile state
courts to federal courts.466 It is also important to stress that on numerous
occasions before class action reforms, insurers as defendants praised state
court judges and fought vigorously to remove “business of insurance” as
well as state law class actions from federal to state courts, insisting emphatically that federal courts did not have jurisdiction.467
The next point, however, is even more important. Before CAFA, some
insurers-defendants argued in federal courts that complete diversity was

459
See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267–68 (1806) (stating that
where there is a joint interest, each individual concerned in that interest must be liable to
sue or be sued in that court).
460
Id.
461
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967).
462
See id. at 531.
463
See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).
464
Id.
465
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 9.
466
See Harris, 394 U.S. at 340 (permitting a showing of diversity of citizenship when
any one member of a class of plaintiffs and any one member of a class of defendants are
citizens of different states).
467
See supra note 450.
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absent between themselves and their insured customers.468 Thus, according to the insurers, federal district court judges had a constitutional duty to
remove the insurance litigation from federal to state courts, since most of
the consumers and insurers were citizens of the same state.469 To illustrate,
consider a few pertinent facts in Schlumberger Industries, Inc. v. National
Surety Corp.470 Schlumberger and its predecessor in interest purchased
comprehensive general liability (CGL) insurance contracts from numerous
insurance companies.471 In the course of events Schlumberger released
hazardous substances contaminating the soil and water at certain sites in
South Carolina.472 State and federal environmental-protection agencies
ordered Schlumberger to decontaminate the areas.473
After Schlumberger complied, its two liability insurers, National Surety Corporation and American Insurance Company, commenced a declaratory judgment action in a federal district court in South Carolina.474 The
insurers asked the district court to determine their rights and responsibilities under the CGL insurance contracts (Anderson suit).475 Schlumberger
filed a similar declaratory judgment suit in a South Carolina court in
Greenville County (Greenville suit) about a month after the two insurers
filed the Anderson suit.476 The Greenville complaint listed numerous insurers, including National and American, as defendants and petitioned the
state court to determine whether each CGL insurer had a contractual duty
to reimburse Schlumberger’s expenditures for decontaminating the polluted sites.477
After some complicated procedural maneuvers, the cases were consolidated in the federal district court.478 The insurance companies moved to
dismiss and remand the Greenville suit to state court,479 insisting that
complete diversity among the Greenville litigants was absent.480 The dis468

See, e.g., Schlumberger Indus., Inc. v. Nat’l Surety Corp., 36 F.3d 1274, 1277 (4th
Cir. 1994).
469
See id. at 1284 (mentioning insurers’ assertion that the insured argue in favor of jurisdictional manipulation and overrode interests of domestic insurers to remain in federal
court).
470
Id. at 1274–75.
471
Id. at 1277.
472
Id. at 1276–77.
473
Id. at 1277.
474
Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1277.
475
Id.
476
Id.
477
Id.
478
Id. at 1277–78.
479
See id. at 1277.
480
Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1277.
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trict court refused to remand the Greenville suit.481 On appeal, the Fourth
Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling.482
The Fourth Circuit reiterated that “removal jurisdiction raises significant federalism concerns.”483 Citing Strawbridge and 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1),
the Court of Appeals stressed that federal courts may not exercise diversity jurisdiction unless the plaintiff establishes complete diversity among the
parties.484 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit found “only minimal diversity”
after the federal district court dismissed a key insurer from the Greenville
suit. 485 Therefore, the appellate court remanded the case to the state court,
declaring that the federal district court did not have jurisdiction over the
Greenville suit.486
Again, satisfying corporate defendants’ wishes, CAFA clearly embraces the “minimal diversity” rather than “complete diversity” rule.487
But note: in Schlumberger, the insurers as defendants unmistakably did
not want the federal district court judge to decide the case.488 However, in
a post-CAFA era, disgruntled consumers, like the insured-companyconsumer in Schlumberger, may prefer to litigate mixed federal and state
law class actions in federal courts rather than in state courts. Before
CAFA, such an effort would have been thwarted if the consumers did not
satisfy Strawbridge’s “complete diversity” rule.489 Arguably, in a postCAFA era, the minimal diversity rule will allow corporate defendants as
well as allegedly injured consumers to remove certain state law class actions to federal courts, even if the aggregates of aggrieved consumers and
corporate defendants are not completely diverse.490

481

Id.
Id. at 1288.
483
Id. at 1284 (“[W]here federal [removal] jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand is necessary.” (quoting Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.
1994))).
484
See id. (citing Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806)).
485
Id.
486
Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1284.
487
See Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5.
488
See Schlumberger, 36 F.3d at 1284 (mentioning insurers’ assertion that the insured
argue in favor of jurisdictional manipulation and overrode interests of domestic insurers
to remain in federal court).
489
See Strawbridge, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) at 267–68.
490
See, e.g., Robert Pear, Class-Action Bill Favorable to Business Passes House,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2002, at A5 (“[CAFA] give[s] federal courts jurisdiction over any
class action lawsuit with claims totaling more than $2 million if at least one plaintiff and
one defendant were from different states.”).
482
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2. CAFA’s “Cases of National Importance” Rule and Some Potential
Unintended Consequences for Insurers as Defendants in Class Actions
To reiterate, a major purpose of CAFA is to restore the framers’ intent
by allowing federal rather than state courts to hear and decide “interstate
cases of national importance.”491 According to class action reformers,
plaintiffs’ lawyers often abuse class action procedures by filing “nationwide class actions” in state courts that have a history of favoring plaintiffs.492 Therefore, as reported earlier, CAFA makes it easier for corporate
defendants to remove such actions “from state courts to federal courts,
where rules of evidence and procedure are often viewed as more favorable
to defendants.”493
Possibly the “cases of national importance” rule will present unintended risks and complications for insurers.494 Again, in South-Eastern Underwriters Association, the Supreme Courts gave federal courts expansive
powers to regulate the “business of insurance” under the Commerce
Clause and, by implication, the business activities of insurance companies,495 but large insurance conglomerates vigorously attacked the Court’s
allegedly “hostile” decision in that monumental case.496 However, as of
this writing and in the wake of CAFA, large insurance conglomerates are
celebrating their statutory right to remove so-called “cases of national
importance” from supposedly unprincipled, unfriendly, and biased state
courts.497 Thus, it is warranted to ask: will CAFA’s “cases of national
importance rule” adversely affect insurers—class action defendants who
might prefer to litigate certain insurance-related disputes in state courts
491

Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. at 5.
Pear, supra note 490.
493
Id.
494
See, e.g., Blackfeet Nat’l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1244 n. 10 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[F]ederal laws involving issues of paramount national concern ... have been held
to be exempt from the reverse preemption provisions of McCarran-Ferguson” (citing
Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1231 (2d Cir. 1995))).
495
See Margo Beller, History Repeats Insurance Debate Before US Courts, J. OF
COM., June 9, 1994, at 9A (“The decision in United States vs. South-Eastern Underwriters Association had two immediate consequences. One was to overturn its own previous
case law that had given states the power to regulate insurance transactions within their
borders. The other was to provoke Congress into passing legislation that amended the
Sherman Act and others so that federal antitrust law would not apply to ‘the business of
insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by state law’ except for incidents of coercion, intimidation or boycott.”).
496
See supra notes 279–96 and accompanying text.
497
See id.
492

498

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:419

rather than in federal courts? Debatably, CAFA’s rule will undermine the
very purpose of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, by decreasing state courts’
powers and increasing federal courts’ powers to “regulate” the insurance
industry.498 As support for this point of view, consider the following discussion.
The United States Constitution, federal laws, and treaties create various rights and obligations,499 and Congress has given federal district
courts original jurisdiction over civil actions when those rights and obligations generate federal questions of law and fact.500 The “well-pleaded
complaint” rule, however, is strict: federal district courts may not exercise
federal question jurisdiction unless a “substantial question of federal law”
appears on the face of a plaintiff’s complaint.501 Stated slightly differently,
a plaintiff must prove that he has a right to be in federal court and a federal
right has been violated.502
Certainly, aggrieving insurance consumers’ ability to file class actions
against insurers in federal courts would be challenging if those plaintiffs
498

See Beller supra note 495 (“[E]ven after McCarran became law, questions over
what parts of the insurance business are state-regulated have continued to bedevil insurers, legislators and regulators alike. Or as one legal scholar, Robert E. Keeton, a professor
and associate dean at Harvard University Law School ... put it in his write-up of the
South-Eastern case ... ‘Underlying this continuing controversy over federal-state allocation of regulatory responsibility is a set of unanswered questions about the relative effectiveness of state and federal agencies. The answers to these questions may differ from
generation to generation, and they are likely to be debatable in every generation.’”); see
also Robert L. Redding, Will 110th Congress Open the Door on the McCarran-Ferguson
Act?, AUTOINC. (Feb. 2, 2007), http://www.autoinc.org/archives/2007/feb2007/legis.htm
(“The 110th Congress has an opportunity to revisit repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
It is encouraged by the last Congress’s interest in insurance reform, life insurance companies’ desire for federal regulation of their industry and consumers and small business’
longing for the regulation of an industry that could create a more level playing field. Fear
in the insurance industry [of] strong federal regulation ... led to Congress passing the
McCarran-Ferguson Act in 1945.... Interest in repealing McCarran-Ferguson is not
new.”).
499
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545
U.S. 546, 552 (2005).
500
See 28 U.S.C. § 1331; Exxon, 545 U.S. at 552.
501
See Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 27–28
(1983) (“Congress has given the lower federal courts jurisdiction to hear, originally or by
removal from a state court, only those cases in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to relief
necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law.”); Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 153 (1908).
502
See, e.g., Oneida Indian Nation of N.Y. v. Oneida Cnty., 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)
(“The threshold allegation required of such a well-pleaded complaint—the right to possession—was plainly enough alleged to be based on federal law.”).
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could not identify specific rights and remedies under federal statutes. And,
without a doubt, CAFA’s “cases of national importance” rule is a procedural rather than a substantive rule.503 But a fairly liberal reading of
CAFA’s procedural rule is arguably ambiguous. Thus, that ambiguity
could create an opening for class action complainants to remove purely
substantive state law, business of insurance disputes from state courts to
federal district courts. Quite simply, aggrieved consumers could assert that
their substantive, “business of insurance” claim involves an issue of “national importance.” Would that argument work? The aggrieved insurance
consumers probably would prevail, because federal courts have a long
history of ignoring insurers/defendants’ numerous protestations and concluding that clearly substantive state law, business of insurance disputes
were “matters of national concern.”504
503

Freeman v. Blue Ridge Paper Prods., Inc., 551 F.3d 405, 407–08 (6th Cir. 2008)
(“CAFA was clearly designed to prevent plaintiffs from artificially structuring their suits
to avoid federal jurisdiction. The statutory language notes that ‘[c]lass action lawsuits are
an important and valuable part of the legal system’ because they allow aggregation of
claims so that a defendant faces only a single action. Furthermore, CAFA states that
‘there have been abuses of the class action device,’ including that ‘[s]tate and local courts
are ... keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court.’ According to the relevant Senate Report, CAFA was necessary because the previous law ‘enable[d] lawyers to
‘game’ the procedural rules and keep nationwide or multi-state class actions in state
courts whose judges have reputations for readily certifying classes and approving settlements without regard to class member interests. CAFA provides defendants with access
to the federal courts, ‘mak[ing] it harder for plaintiffs’ counsel to game the system by
trying to defeat diversity jurisdiction, creat[ing] efficiencies in the judicial system by
allowing overlapping and copycat cases to be consolidated in a single federal court, [and]
plac[ing] the determination of more interstate class action lawsuits in the proper forumthe federal courts.’ ... CAFA [does] not to permit the splintering of lawsuits solely to
avoid federal jurisdiction in the fashion done in this case.” (citing CAFA § 2(a)(1),
(4)(A); 28 U.S.C. § 1711; S. Rep. No. 109-14, at 4–5; U.S. Code Cong & Admin. News
2005 at 3 (2005)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
504
See, e.g., Blackfeet Nat’l Bank v. Nelson, 171 F.3d 1237, 1244 n.10 (11th Cir.
1999) (“[F]ederal laws involving issues of paramount national concern—such as the
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)—
have been held to be exempt from the reverse preemption provisions of McCarranFerguson.”); Stephens v. Nat’l Distillers and Chem. Corp., 69 F.3d 1226, 1232–33 (2d
Cir. 1995) (citing the “national concern” ruling in Spirt, reiterating that it would defy
common sense and congressional policy to exempt the insurance industry from the reach
of federal anti-discrimination and labor-relations laws, stressing that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act reflects an equally important national concern—foreign policy, and
concluding that “[o]ur precedent in Spirt requires us to apply federal law to the insurance
industry, in spite of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, whenever federal law clearly intends to
displace all state laws to the contrary”); Klosterman v. W. Gen. Mgmt., Inc., 32 F.3d
1119, 1120 (7th Cir. 1994) (“[T]he state of health care insurance in our country” is a
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Furthermore, citing the “national importance” language in CAFA’s
class action removal rule, disgruntled insurance consumers might be able
to commence purely substantive state law disputes against insurers in
federal courts for another reason.505 First, insurers as well as corporate
defendants generally have asserted unambiguously that the CAFA creates
various substantive and procedural “rights” for corporations as well as for
those litigants who would sue corporations.506 But even more importantly,
federal courts could possibly: (1) cite CAFA’s “national importance”
language, (2) create substantive rights “out of thin air,” and (3) declare
that federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over purely state law,
business of insurance controversies.507 Most assuredly, such judicial creativity has happened before.508
“national concern”); Metrolina Family Practice Grp., P.A. v. Sullivan, 767 F. Supp. 1314,
1321 (W.D.N.C. 1989) (“The mere fact that an activity has been considered to be a ‘local
interest’ in the past does not invalidate Congressional legislation: ‘Needs that were narrow or parochial a century ago may be interwoven in our day with the well-being of the
Nation.’ The problem of limiting physicians’ fees in the federal health insurance program
is indisputably of national concern.” (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 641
(1936)); Spirt v. Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass’n, 691 F.2d 1054, 1065–66 (2d Cir. 1982)
(“The McCarran Act was never meant to prevent, and could not prevent, Congress from
explicitly imposing requirements on employers and their agents under [federal] civil
rights statutes, the National Labor Relations Act, or any other [federal] statute” designed
to secure compliance with federal civil-rights and labor-relations policies as well as with
other areas of national concern); Dornberger v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 961 F. Supp. 506,
521 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (refusing to dismiss insureds’ putative class action against a life
insurer who allegedly violated the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO), reiterating that RICO’s purpose involves matters of “national concern,” and
concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse-preemption doctrine did not bar
the insureds’ RICO claims); In re Laitasalo, 193 B.R. 187, 192 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996)
(finding that federal bankruptcy laws recognize and embrace “important national concerns” involving “the treatment of foreign debtors, U.S. and foreign creditors and international commerce” and concluding that the McCarran-Ferguson Act’s reverse-preemption
doctrine did not bar the bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction).
505
See infra note 506.
506
See, e.g., Progressive W. Ins. Co. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1017 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“[G]iven CAFA’s purpose to increase class action litigants’ access to federal courts,”
Progressive argued that federal courts “should interpret CAFA as allowing a plaintiff
forced to defend a class action on the basis of a cross-complaint to have the same right to
remove the class action as a defendant.”); Plubell v. Merck & Co., 434 F.3d 1070, 1073–
74 (8th Cir. 2006) (considering Merck’s argument that “CAFA confers a right to be in
federal court” and concluding that “nothing in CAFA grants such a right”—but noting
that CAFA’s emphasis on litigating “interstate cases of national importance” in federal
courts was inserted for the benefits of society-at-large).
507
See infra note 508.
508
See, e.g., BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. v. MCImetro Access Transmission Servs.,
Inc., 317 F.3d 1270, 1302 & n.32 (11th Cir. 2003) (Tjoflat, J., and Birch, J., dissenting)
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Furthermore, a very liberal interpretation of the phrase “national importance” could encourage dissatisfied insurance consumers to file more
class actions against insurers in federal courts. And if consumers prevailed, each successful lawsuit could allow federal judges to micromanage
insurers’ business activities incrementally, state by state. To be sure, in
recent years, federal courts have issued fairly far-reaching rulings that
interfered with insurers’ ability to manage their core activities of assessing
risks, setting and adjusting rates, setting premiums, and developing underwriting standards.509 Dehoyos v. Allstate Corporation presents an excellent illustration of how federal courts could interfere effectively and
increasingly with otherwise federally unregulated insurers’ freedom to
manage their corporate activities and practice the business of insurance in
a post-CAFA era.510
In Dehoyos, subsidiaries of Allstate Corporation (Allstate), the second
largest liability insurer in the nation,511 insured six racial minorities under

(“After incorrectly asserting jurisdiction, I can hardly fault the district court for pulling
the arbitrary-and-capricious standard out of thin air, giving only a ‘Cf.’ citation to a
Supreme Court case ....”); In re U.S. Catholic Conference, 824 F.2d 156, 174 (2d Cir.
1987) (Cardamone, J., dissenting) (“There are only three instances when a district court’s
action is not limited by its jurisdictional power .... From these three precisely defined
rules the majority creates out of thin air an unprecedented fourth ....”); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. F.E.R.C., 768 F.2d 1500, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Mikva, J., dissenting)
(“What is most startling is that the court’s opinion produces this new substantive right
virtually out of thin air; the majority just makes it up. It is apparently of no concern to the
majority that the Supreme Court has never suggested such a limit ....”).
509
See, e.g., Nat’l Distillers, 69 F.3d at 1231 (“[T]he McCarran-Ferguson Act [did]
not preclude the preempting of New York’s pre-judgment security requirement.”); Spirt,
691 F.2d at 1069–70 (concluding that the insurer’s use of sex-distinct mortality tables
constituted unequal treatment and that the McCarran-Ferguson Act did not exempt the
insurer’s business of insurance activities from complying with Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act); Cochran v. Paco, Inc., 606 F.2d 460, 467 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding that an
insurer’s premium financing does not constitute the “business of insurance,” and therefore the McCarran-Ferguson Act does not preclude the application of the Truth in Lending Act’s disclosure requirements of the transactions since the McCarran Act must be
“narrowly construed in the face of valid federal regulatory interests”).
510
Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2003).
511
See Michael Schroeder, Insurers Fight to Save Terrorism Safety Net—Opponents
Say Taxpayers Shouldn’t Underwrite Industry’s Exposure to Losses from Attacks, WALL
ST. J., May 5, 2005, at A4 (“The 2002 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, which is set to
expire at the end of the year, requires insurers to offer terrorism insurance to businesses
and in return limits the industry’s losses in the case of attacks by foreign terrorists....
[The] chairman of Allstate Corp., of Northbrook, Ill., the second-largest home and auto
insurer ... called on Congress to ... apply the backstop to losses of cars and homes due to
terrorism.”).
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various automobile and homeowners’ insurance contracts.512 The minorities accused Allstate of employing an impermissible discriminatory creditscoring system.513 More specifically, the racial minorities alleged that
Allstate sold identical insurance contracts to all persons regardless of their
racial or ethnic identities.514 However, using an allegedly discriminatory
credit-scoring system, Allstate required non-Caucasian applicants to pay
substantially more for the same coverage.515
The racial minorities filed a class action.516 The complaint alleged that
Allstate violated sections 1981517 and 1982518 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866.519 The complainants also alleged that Allstate violated the Fair
Housing Act of 1968 (FHA).520 Allstate filed a Rule 12(b)(6)521 motion to
dismiss, arguing that the McCarran-Ferguson Act (MFA)522 preempted the
application of the federal anti-discrimination statutes to the controversy.523
The district court denied the motion, finding that the McCarran-Ferguson
Act did not preclude the application of the civil rights statutes.524 The
lower court, however, granted a leave for an interlocutory appeal.525

512

Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293, 303.
Id. at 300 (“[T]his nationwide class action challeng[es] insurers’ use of credit scoring in the pricing of automobile and home owners’ policies.”).
514
Id. at 301.
515
Id. at 290.
516
Id.
517
42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2006) (“All persons within the jurisdiction of the United
States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and
proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and
shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.”).
518
Id. § 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.”).
519
Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293.
520
42 U.S.C. §§ 3601–3619. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) states: “[I]t shall be
unlawful ... [t]o discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of
sale or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.” Id.
§ 3604(b).
521
FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a party may assert a defense by motion of
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted”).
522
15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1999).
523
Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 293–94.
524
Id. at 294.
525
Id.
513
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Before the Fifth Circuit, Allstate argued again that that the McCarranFerguson Act barred the nationwide class action.526 As discussed earlier,
the McCarran-Ferguson Act provides in pertinent part: “No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance ...
unless such Act specifically relates to the business of insurance.”527 In
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth,528 the Supreme Court outlined the methodology
that courts must apply when deciding preemption questions under the
MFA.529
First, the Court expressly rejected the assumption that the MFA authorized a state supremacy “field preemption” approach to the application
of federal law to the insurance industry.530 Instead, the Court emphasized
that courts must employ a “direct conflict” analysis to determine whether
federal laws impair states’ authority and ability to regulate the business of
insurance.531 And the Supreme Court stated that the following formulation
captures the meaning of impairment under 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b): “When
federal law does not directly conflict with state regulation, and when application of the federal law would not frustrate any declared state policy or
interfere with a State’s administrative regime, the McCarran-Ferguson Act
does not preclude its application.”532
However, to actually decide whether the MFA prevents federal laws
from impairing state agencies’ ability to regulate the business of insurance, the Court ordered federal courts to consider and satisfy three criteria:

526

Id. at 296.
15 U.S.C. § 1012(b); see also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cisneros, 52 F.3d 1351,
1363 (6th Cir. 1995) (“The McCarran-Ferguson Act is a form of inverse preemption, so
principles defining when state remedies conflict (and so are preempted by) federal law
are pertinent in deciding when federal rules ‘invalidate, impair, or supersede’ state rules.”
(citation omitted)).
528
Humana Inc. v. Forsyth, 525 U.S. 299 (1999).
529
See id. at 301.
530
Id. at 300 (“The Court rejects the Humana petitioners’ suggestion that the word
‘impair,’ in the McCarran-Ferguson Act context, signals Congress’s intent to cede the
field of insurance regulation to the States, saving only instances in which Congress expressly orders otherwise. If Congress had meant generally to preempt the field for the
States, Congress could have said either that ‘no federal statute [that does not say so
explicitly] shall be construed to apply to the business of insurance’ or that federal legislation generally ... would be ‘applicable to the business of insurance [only] to the extent
that such business is not regulated by state law.’”).
531
Id. at 305.
532
Id. at 310.
527

504

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:419

(1) [T]he federal law in question must not be specifically directed at insurance regulation; (2) there must exist a particular state law (or declared regulatory policy) enacted for the purpose of regulating insurance; and (3) application of the federal law to the controversy in
question must invalidate, impair or supersede that state law.533

Applying Humana’s preemption standard, the Fifth Circuit declared
that MFA did not bar the racial minorities in Dehoyos from suing Allstate
under federal civil-rights statutes.534 The Court of Appeals found that the
federal anti-discrimination laws did not interfere with Florida’s and Texas’s insurance statutes or regulations, and did not undermine those states’
ability to regulate the business of insurance.535 Justice Edith Jones, however, wrote a compelling dissent, which describes and discusses the types
of interferences that insurers are likely to encounter increasingly from
federal courts in a post-CAFA era.536 She wrote:

533

Dehoyos v. Allstate Corp., 345 F.3d 290, 294–95 (5th Cir. 2003) (citing Humana
Inc., 525 U.S. at 307, 310); see also Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Orr, 294 F.3d 702, 708
(5th Cir. 2002) (declaring that “[t]he test under McCarran-Ferguson is not whether a state
has enacted statutes regulating the business of insurance, but whether such state statutes
will be invalidated, impaired, or superseded by the application of federal law,” and concluding that MFA preemption would not be found merely because a state has a mechanism in place for regulating insurance contracts (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Fidelity Life Ins.
Co., 588 F. 2d 185, 187 (5th Cir. 1979))).
534
Dehoyos, 345 F.3d at 299.
535
Id. at 298 (“Appellants argue that the application of the civil rights statutes at issue
here would frustrate Texas and Florida state insurance policy by frustrating the ability of
those states to regulate insurance pricing policies.... Obviously this assertion is not nearly
enough to withstand Humana scrutiny. Appellants cannot demonstrate that the federal
law in question frustrates a policy associated with the regulation of insurance pricing
without identifying an actual policy.”).
536
Id. at 300–01.
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The majority ... fails to recognize that a disparate impact claim goes to
the heart of the risk adjustment that underlies the insurance business ....
“Risk discrimination is not race discrimination.” Every insurer sets ...
prices according to the risk [associated with] particular categories of
customers.... Since risk determinations are mathematically complex and
multi-faceted, unraveling a single thread, like credit scoring ... necessarily affects the entire fabric.... [T]he instant class action inevitably
draws federal courts into the mechanics of insurance pricing .... The
McCarran-Ferguson Act was designed precisely to prevent this type of
federal interference .... [because] federal courts are not competent to
tread in the essential domain reserved to state regulators. [Today], credit scoring is alleged to have a disparate impact. Tomorrow, some other
facially neutral criterion ... may fall under legal attack.537

Quite interestingly, around the time Justice Jones was writing her fairly prescience dissent in 2003, lobbyists for the largest alliance of insurance
associations and companies were gathering frequently in the halls of Congress.538 They were encouraging legislators to allow corporate defendants
537

Id. (Jones, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
Cf. Editorial, Stop Class-Action Abuses, HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 22, 2003, at
A10 (“Class-action lawsuits sometimes serve a useful purpose by combining the complaints of many people into a single action. But abuses such as venue shopping are legion. After five years of trying, Congress appears ready to curtail the worst abuses. The
Class Action Fairness Act was approved 253-170 in the House and waits Senate action....
No one in Congress is proposing doing away with class-action lawsuits. Rather, this
overdue legislation would curtail some of the worst abuses. Legislators have debated the
issue long enough. There’s no good reason to wait another year to adopt this important
reform.”); Steven Brostoff, Congressional Motion Can Be Deceiving, PROP. & CAS./RISK
& BENEFITS MGMT. EDITION (Oct. 1, 2003), http://web3.propertycasualty360.com/2003
/10/01/congressional-motion-can-be-deceiving (“Periodically, I like to review some of
the Congressional issues facing the insurance industry based on two dimensions—the
probability of motion and the probability of movement. Motion means all the procedural
doings on Capitol Hill relating to legislation, such as hearings, markups, negotiations, etc.
Think of it in terms of the phrase ‘going through the motions.’ Movement is much more
serious. It means that at least one branch of Congress, either the House or the Senate,
actually passes a bill.... By civil justice reform, I mean everything other than asbestos,
including class action ... When the 108th Congress convened, I thought civil justice
reform would be one of the defining issues of the new Republican-led government. Not
only were the primary advocates of civil justice reform in charge of the agendas in both
the House and the Senate, but President Bush was committed to signing any reform bill
that crossed his desk.... I really expected insurance regulatory reform to exhibit a little
more life than it has so far. After all, there is a surprising amount of support for some
type of federal action, even if there is no consensus. Within the insurance industry, the
American Insurance Association, the American Council of Life Insurers, and the Council
of Insurance Agents and Brokers back optional federal chartering. The Independent
Insurance Agents & Brokers of America, which is still fleshing out its proposal, supports
federal legislation maintaining state regulation....”).
538
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to remove so-called “class actions of national importance” from allegedly
biased and intimidating state courts to professedly more judicious and
proficient federal courts.539 But, that same year, attorneys for that same
alliance filed an extremely telling and ostensibly “pro-federalism” amici
curia brief in the Eleventh Circuit.540 In that brief, the alliance of insurance
conglomerates encouraged the appellate court to preserve fundamental
principles of federalism by dismissing a class action of national importance, and reversing the district court’s ruling in Gilchrist v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.541
In Gilchrist, aggrieved consumers complained about insurers’ alleged
violation of federal antitrust laws, an issue of unquestionable “national
importance.”542 Therefore, the consumers filed a nationwide class action
asserting that various automobile insurers conspired and prevented
insureds from purchasing automotive replacement parts from the “original
equipment manufacturer.”543 According to plaintiffs, the automobile insurers violated federal antitrust laws by causing the insureds to pay anticompetitive insurance premiums for expensive and inferior insurance
contracts.544 The federal district court certified a nationwide class, comprising of approximately 70 million insured consumers.545 The property
and casualty insurers appealed the decision.
Before the Eleventh Circuit, the defending insurers and those who
filed the amici curia brief argued that when federal judges certify class
actions like the one in Gilchrist and issue pro-consumer rulings, those
judges effectively: (1) seize state insurance regulators’ authority to set
rates,546 (2) “impair [state regulators’] statutory authority” generally to
539

See supra note 538.
See Brief of Amici Curiae in Support of Appellants at iii, Gilchrist v. State Farm
Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 390 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2004) [hereinafter Gilchrist Brief]
(“Amici Curiae Alliance of American Insurers, American Insurance Association, National Association of Independent Insurers, and National Association of Mutual Insurance
Companies are among the largest national trade associations of property and casualty
insurance in the United States.”).
541
Id. at 21.
542
See, e.g., Martin-Trigona v. Fed. Reserve Bd., 509 F.2d 363, 367 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(stressing that anti-competitive considerations and antitrust policy are issues of national
importance).
543
Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1329.
544
Id.
545
Id.
546
See id. at 1331 (insurers’ arguing that the class members’ claim is “clearly about
rate-making and performance of the insurance contract”); Gilchrist Brief at 1 (“The
District Court’s certification ruling arrogates to a single jury the power to set rates for
auto insurance across the country—an essentially regulatory function that juries are ill540

2012]

ALLEGEDLY “BIASED,” “INTIMIDATING”

507

regulate the business of insurance,547 and (3) violate principles of federalism.548 Ultimately, citing prior rulings, the Eleventh Circuit embraced the
insurers’ defense, remanded the class action, and ordered the district court
to dismiss it.549 Nevertheless, we should not miss the important point: in
Gilchrist, the insurers did not want the consumers’ class action to be litigated in federal court. Like the insurers-defendants in Gilchrist, insurance
companies generally do not want to be the “named defendants” in federal
class action lawsuits, when the complaint concerns insurers’ alleged business of insurance irregularities or violations under state or federal antidiscrimination, antitrust, and consumer-protection statutes.550
Again, consumers citing the “class actions of national importance” rule
and filing an ever-increasing number of “business of insurance” disputes
in federal court could arguably undermine state regulators’ and courts’
authority to regulate the business of insurance and increase federal judges’
authority to micromanage the affairs of insurance companies. If a critical
mass of federal district judges issued rulings like the one in Gilchrist,
CAFA’s removal provisions and its emphasis on litigating “cases of national importance” in federal courts would arguably accomplish effectively and inadvertently what many have advocated: more federal regulation
of the insurance industry and a repeal of insurers’ “scarecrow”—the
McCarran-Ferguson Act and its “reverse pre-emption doctrine.”551
equipped to discharge.... [B]y centralizing the resolution of a rate dispute instead of
deferring to state regulators, the District Court’s decision subverts the delicate federalstate balance that has long governed insurance regulation across the nation.”).
547
Gilchrist Brief at 21.
548
Id. (“When the policy considerations underlying the filed rate doctrine are considered together with the federalism principles codified in the McCarran-Ferguson Act, it is
clear that class treatment of Plaintiffs’ claims illegitimately ousts the rate-setting prerogatives of state legislatures and therefore cannot be a method of resolving this case that is
‘superior to other available methods.” (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3))).
549
Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1335 (“As Gilchrist’s claim attacks rate-making and the performance of the insurance contract, both the business of insurance, and does not allege a
cognizable antitrust boycott, the McCarran-Ferguson Act removes her claim from our
jurisdiction.”); see also Slagle v. ITT Hartford, 102 F.3d 494, 498 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that allegations of premium stabilization—through horizontal market allocation of the
windstorm insurance market—was an attack on insurance rate-making); Uniforce Temp.
Pers., Inc. v. Nat’l Council on Comp. Ins., Inc., 87 F.3d 1296, 1299 (11th Cir. 1996)
(awarding no relief and dismissing plaintiff’s antitrust claims because they centered on
premiums and the insurers’ rate-making activity).
550
See Gilchrist, 390 F.3d at 1335; see also Slagle, 102 F.3d 494; Uniforce, 87 F.3d
1296.
551
Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla. v. Inman, 436 F.3d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting
that the reverse preemption doctrine permits a state law to reverse preempt a federal
statute if “(1) the federal statute does not specifically relate to the ‘business of insurance’,
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V. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY: THE DISPOSITION OF CONSUMERS’ CLASS
ACTION AGAINST MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INSURANCE
COMPANIES IN PURPORTEDLY “BIASED” AND “HOSTILE” STATE COURTS
AND IN ALLEGEDLY “UNBIASED” AND “MORE COMPETENT” FEDERAL
COURTS, 1925–2011
Again, CAFA allows class actions of “national importance” to be removed from state to federal courts.552 To justify that policy, a majority in
Congress concluded that “[s]tate and local courts ... sometimes [act] in
ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants.”553 To help
prove that state courts are biased against “foreign” class action defendants,
CAFA’s supporters cited a purportedly substantial body of statistical evidence; for example, to justify their votes for class action reforms, several
senators cited a RAND Corporation’s study554 and a Manhattan Institute’s
(2) the state law was enacted for the ‘purpose of regulating the business of insurance;’
and (3) the federal statute operates to ‘invalidate, impair, or supercede’ the state law”
(quoting Munich Am. Reinsurance Co. v. Crawford, 141 F.3d 585, 590 (5th Cir. 1998))).
552
See, e.g., Pear, supra note 490 (“The bill [makes] it easier for defendants to shift
such lawsuits from state courts to federal courts, where rules of evidence and procedure
are often viewed as more favorable to defendants.... [T]he author of the bill, said, ‘Class
actions of national importance should be heard in federal court by a federal judge, not by
a state or county court judge in one region of the country.’”).
553
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5.
554
See 151 CONG. REC. 2085–86 (2005) (statement of Sen. George Allen) (“[S]ome
opponents of the Class Action Fairness Act are still urging that the current class action
system works well and that class action reform is unnecessary.... [However], numerous
studies have documented class action abuses taking place in a small number of ‘magnet’
State courts, and by now, it is beyond legitimate debate that our class action system is in
shambles.... A RAND Institute for Civil Justice (ICJ) Study on U.S. class actions released
at the end of 1999 empirically confirms what has long been widely believed—State court
consumer class actions primarily benefit lawyers .... The ICJ Study contains no data
indicating that this problem exists in Federal court class actions.”); id. at 1825–26 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Abuse of the class action system has reached a critical point,
and it is time that we as a legislative body address the problem. The public is increasingly
aware of the system’s unfairness. News programs ... have covered the rise in class action
jurisdictions in certain magnet jurisdictions, magnet meaning jurisdictions where these
extortionate suits are brought because they can get a tremendous advantage regardless of
whether they are right or wrong.... It is evident that a few key courts have been singled
out by a small group of legal players in the class action world. This point is reinforced by
a 2003 study conducted by the Institute for Civil Justice/RAND and funded jointly by the
plaintiffs and defense bar to determine who gets the money in class action settlements.”);
id. at 1659 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) (“A RAND study offered three primary explanations for why national class action cases should be in federal court. First, Federal
judges scrutinize class action allegations more strictly than State judges.... Second, State
judges may not have adequate resources to oversee and manage class actions with a
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report to prove that a “class action problem” existed and that class action
reforms were necessary.555
However, after carefully weighing the allegedly sound statistical evidence, anti-reformers correctly noted that no one had presented any compelling empirical evidence to justify Congress changing the practice of
letting state courts adjudicate class actions that involve primarily state law
issues.556 In fact, after reviewing all proffered data and statistics, the Board
of Directors for the Conference of Chief Justices concluded that CAFA is
simply unwarranted, because state judiciaries are fair and competent to
“hear and decide fairly class actions brought in state courts.”557
In addition, opponents of class action reforms argued that documented
“judicial bias” was not rampant in federal courts; therefore, they argued
that forcing aggrieved class members to litigate clearly substantive state
law claims in federal courts unjustifiably victimizes those complainants
and undermines the principle of judicial federalism.558 To illustrate the
tenor of the argument and consumer advocates’ concerns, consider one
senator’s observations during the CAFA debate. He stated: “Federal courts
are not friendly to class actions. They are very strict [about selecting cases
to] consider, and [federal courts severely limit the] scope of liabilities. The
business interests that are pushing [CAFA] know ... if they can get these
lawsuits into a federal court, they are less likely to be found liable.”559
national scope. Finally, if a single judge [will decide] what law will apply in a multistate
class action, it is more appropriate that this take place in Federal court than in State
court”).
555
See id. at 1659 (statement of Sen. Herb Kohl) (“The class action process is clearly
in serious need of reform. Comprehensive studies support this position. For example, a
study on the class action problem by the Manhattan Institute finds that class action cases
are being brought disproportionately in a few State courts so that the plaintiffs’ lawyers
may take advantage of those specific courts that have relaxed class action rules”).
556
See id. at 1649 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen State Attorneys General) (“There is no compelling need or empirical support for such a sweeping
change in our long-established system for adjudicating state law issues.”).
557
See id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“That evidence simply does not
exist.”); id. at 1658 (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) (“One frequent argument is that
businesses cannot get a fair day in court because of renegade State court judges. Yet,
there really is no evidence to back up these claims. Of the 3,141 counties, parishes, and
boroughs in the State court systems of the United States, the so-called American Tort
Reform Association could only identify nine jurisdictions that they consider ‘unfair’ to
defendants. Four other jurisdictions were declared as ‘dishonorable mentions.’ But, the
association only provided data on two of these jurisdictions Madison County, Illinois ...
and St. Clair County, Illinois.”).
558
See 151 CONG. REC. 1645 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin).
559
Id. at 1660.
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During those same debates, another legislator embraced those remarks
and added the following: “[CAFA] reduces each state’s power to protect
its own citizens and enforce its own laws. Moving these cases to federal
court will often end them for all practical purposes. Federal courts may
decide [that such cases] do not meet the federal rules for class certification. Even if the cases are not dismissed, plaintiffs [who are] forced into
federal court on state law claims have the decks stacked against them ...
because [f]ederal [judges] take the narrowest possible view [when] interpreting state laws.”560
Without a doubt, it is a serious charge when one asserts or even suggests that state or federal judges are prejudiced and have hostilities against
certain classes of litigants. But that charge is even more severe and troublesome when: (1) out-of-state defendants claim that elected state court
judges allow personal and local prejudices to adversely affect judicial
proceedings and outcomes, or (2) federal diversity litigants believe that
politically appointed federal judges wittingly or unwittingly allow regional, racial or political biases to determine the disposition of cases.
Thus, at this point, it is appropriate to ask: do state court and federal
judges allow their alleged biases, as well as irrelevant factors, affect the
administration of justice and the disposition of class actions? At another
time, and after carefully examining a large number of reported cases, the
author gathered empirical evidence to determine whether “judicial bias”
was present in state and federal courts, and, if so, whether such bias colored judges’ substantive and procedural rulings.561 In a series of published
law review articles, the author documented and reported that state and
federal judges allow immaterial or extralegal variables to significantly
influence plaintiffs and defendants’ likelihoods of winning procedurally
and on the merits in a variety of lawsuits.562
Therefore, considering the continuing and heated class action debates
and litigation, the author decided to conduct an empirical study to determine whether irrelevant or prejudicial factors were systematically affect560

See id. at 1646 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy). But see id. at 1821 (quotes from a
letter submitted by Walter E. Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers, LLP) (“To the contrary,
federal ‘[c]ourts have expressed a willingness to certify nationwide classes on the ground
that relatively minor differences in state law could be overcome at trial by grouping
similar state laws together and applying them as a unit,’” (citing Prudential Ins. Co. of
Am. Sales Practices Litig., 148 F.3d 283, 315 (3d Cir. 1998))).
561
See Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial
Opinions, 96 CAL. L. REV. 63, 77, 88, 90–91 nn.58, 103 & 111–12 (2008) (presenting a
fairly comprehensive history and description of Professor Rice’s published contentanalysis studies and theoretical analyses of various common-law and statutory questions).
562
Id.
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ing, either intentionally or unintentionally, the disposition of class actions
in allegedly “impartial” and “competent” federal courts as well as in supposedly “biased” and “incompetent” state courts. In light of the author’s
prior studies and findings, the results appearing in this study were not
surprising: although learned and well-intentioned judges profess to use
only established legal doctrines and public policy to achieve fair outcomes, the evidence in this class action study suggests otherwise.563
A. Data Sources and Sampling Procedures
The dominant general proposition in this study is that no statistically
significant difference exists between the disposition of complainants’ class
actions against multinational corporations and insurers in federal and state
courts. To construct the class action database, the author employed a multipronged methodology. First, Westlaw and Lexis data retrieval systems
were used to locate every reported class action decision that had terminated in a trial, an appellate, or a supreme court. Second, if the electronically
reported cases mentioned or cited other unreported class action cases, the
author canvassed various regional reporters to locate those latter cases.
Third, the author wanted to secure a representative sample of corporate or
business related class action cases. Therefore, the author took a proportional stratified random sample564 of all class action cases that had been
decided procedurally or on the merits between 1925 and 2011.565 Those
efforts produced 824 corporate entities and insurance related class actions.566 But note that the author’s entire database comprises 2,657 state
and federal court decisions.567
563

See infra Part V.C–E.
See, e.g., Ratanasen v. Cal. Dep’t of Health Servs.,11 F.3d 1467, 1470–72 (9th Cir.
1993) (discussing the differences between and the efficacy of employing “simple random
sampling” and “stratified random sampling”); Bruce M. Price, From Downhill to Slalom:
An Empirical Analysis of the Effectiveness of BAPCPA (And Some Unintended Consequences), 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 135, 138 (2007) (“Using a proportional, stratified,
random sample of bankruptcy cases from [two twelve-month periods, the author created
a] ... database of cases for every state in the Tenth Circuit.”).
565
The investigator searched Westlaw’s MIN-CS, ALLSTATES, ALLFEDS, CTA
and DCT databases between May 2008 and June 2011. In addition, the author searched
various regional reporters as well as LEXIS’s Genfed Library, COURTS File during the
same period.
566
See supra note 565.
567
The study was also designed to perform a small, exploratory comparative analysis
of class actions and non-class action dispositions in state and federal courts between 1925
and 2011. Therefore, see infra Table A in the Appendix, along with a brief discussion of
the most relevant variables and statistics in that table.
564
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Again, the author’s general and corollary hypotheses are these: (1) No
statistically significant difference exists between class action plaintiffs and
defendants’ likelihood of prevailing in state and federal courts; (2) class
action defendants rather than class members are significantly more likely
to prevail in class action controversies regardless of whether the actions
originated in state courts or in federal courts; and (3) both state and federal
courts are likely to permit immaterial factors such as complainants’ ethnicity, litigants’ geographic origin, and litigants’ legal status to influence
complainants’ or defendants’ likelihood of winning or losing class actions
procedurally or on the merits. To test these hypotheses, the author performed a content analysis of each case in the study.568
B. Background Characteristics of Class Action Litigants in State and Federal Courts, 1925–2011
There are 824 class action cases in the study, 407 and 417 state and
federal class actions, respectively.569 Table 1 presents frequencies and
percentages that illustrate the disposition of those class actions.570 First,
“Litigants’ Ethnicity” is a variable that appears in Table 1.571 The results
show very little difference in the racial composition of class members who
initiated class actions in state and federal courts.572 As would be expected,
nearly 90% of the members comprising both state and federal class actions
have diverse ethnic backgrounds.573 The reported percentages are 88.2%
and 85.6%, respectively.574 The results do reveal, however, that a higher
percentage of “African-American, only” class actions are filed in federal
courts than in state courts—9.8% versus 1.5%.575 Perhaps, this tendency
568

See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive
Theory in the Constitutional Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 567, 588–95 (1991) (performing a content analysis to examine Justices
Brennan and Rehnquist’s opinions and learning that both justices employed precedents
rather than other methods to reach conclusions); Darrell L. Ross, Emerging Trends in
Correctional Civil Liability Cases: A Content Analysis of Federal Court Decisions of
Title 42 United States Code Section 1983: 1970–1994, 25 J. CRIM. JUST. 501, 506–07
(1997) (performing a content analysis of 3,205 reported decisions and finding an unexpected overrepresentation of jail inmates in the sample).
569
See infra Table 1. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of
the William & Mary Business Law Review.
570
See infra Table 1.
571
See infra Table 1.
572
See infra Table 1.
573
See infra Table 1.
574
See infra Table 1.
575
See infra Table 1.
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can be explained by looking at the second variable, “Claims & Causes of
Action,” in Table 1.576
TABLE 1
THE DISPOSITION OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS BY VARIOUS DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS, 1925–2011
(N = 824)
Demographics

Litigant’s Ethnicity:
Diverse Groups
Anglo-American, only
African-American, only
Other Minorities
+

Claims & Causes of Action:
Common-Law Contracts
Common-Law Torts
Consumer-Protection
Civil-Rights
Securities
Antitrust
Environmental

Circuits:
First
Second
Third
Fourth
Fifth
Sixth
Seventh
Eighth
Ninth
Tenth
Eleventh
Federal

State Class Actions (N = 407)

Federal Class Actions (N = 417)

Frequency

Frequency

Percent

Percent

359
18
6
24

88.2
4.4
1.5
5.9

357
5
41
14

85.6
1.2
9.8
3.4

185
117
132
20
30
10
16

45.5
28.8***
32.4***
5.0***
7.4
2.5***
3.9

111
103
157
92
73
23
5

26.6
24.7***
37.7***
22.1***
17.5
5.5***
1.2

6
24
78
16
41
35
35
38
37
19
75
3

1.5
5.9****
19.2****
3.9
10.1****
8.6
8.6
9.3
9.1
4.7
18.4****
0.7

16
41
45
17
58
31
41
37
44
12
66
9

3.8
9.8****
10.8****
4.1
13.9****
7.4
9.8
8.9
10.5
2.9
15.8****
2.2

+
The sums of these columns exceed unity (100%), since multiple claims and causes appeared in many class-action
complaints.

Levels of statistical significance:
**** Chi Square = 27.1669, df =11, p # 0.001
*** Spearman’s rank test: rho = 0.86, p # 0.01

First, when complainants commenced class actions in state courts, a
greater proportion of class members are more likely to sue corporate entities and insurers for allegedly breaching contracts, committing various
common law torts and violating consumer-protection laws.577 The per576
577

See infra Table 1.
See supra Table 1.
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centages are 45.5%, 28.8%, and 32.4%, respectively.578 Although the
order and magnitudes of the percentages differ a bit, class members presented the same theories of recovery when members filed class actions in
federal courts—26.6%, 24.7% and 37.7%, respectively.579
There are, however, three notable variations when comparing state and
federal class members’ theories of recovery.580 Among federal class actions, greater numbers of class members sued multinational insurers and
other corporate entities for violating federal antitrust, securities, and civil
rights statutes.581 The corresponding percentages are 5.5%, 17.5% and
22.1%, respectively.582 And very likely, the fairly large percentage of
federal civil rights claims explains the relatively larger percentage of “African-American, only” class actions that are litigated in federal courts
rather than in state courts—9.8% versus 1.5%.583
“Circuits” is the last variable appearing in Table 1.584 It identifies the
location of both state and federal courts within the twelve federal circuits;
it also shows the numbers of and percentages for class actions that commenced within those respective courts.585 First, the results show that state
courts within the Third, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits heard and tried a
significant percentage (47.7%) of state law class actions.586 The respective
individual percentages are 19.2%, 10.1%, and 18.4%.587 Likewise, federal
courts within those same circuits, Third, Fifth, and Eleventh, also heard
and resolved an appreciably large percentage (40.5%) of federal class
actions.588 Those corresponding percentages are 10.8%, 13.9%, and
15.8%.589 The majority of the remaining class actions were distributed
among state and federal courts in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth
Circuits.590 In the next section, the relevance of these particular numbers
and percentages will be discussed more fully.591

578

See supra Table 1.
See supra Table 1.
580
See supra Table 1.
581
See supra Table 1.
582
See supra Table 1.
583
See supra Table 1.
584
See supra Table 1.
585
See supra Table 1.
586
See supra Table 1.
587
See supra Table 1.
588
See supra Table 1.
589
See supra Table 1.
590
See supra Table 1.
591
See infra Part V.C.
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TABLE 2
THE PROCEDURAL AND FINAL DISPOSITION OF CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS IN
STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1925–2011
(N = 824)
Demographics

State Class Actions (N = 407)

Federal Class Actions (N = 417)

Frequency

Frequency

Percent

Percent

Disposition—Trial Courts:
Procedural
Merits

317
90

77.9
22.1

328
89

78.6
21.4

Disposition—Appeals Courts:
Procedural
Merits
No Appeals

232
73
102

57.0***
17.9
25.1***

154
60
203

37.0***
14.4
48.6***

Disposition—Supreme Courts:
Procedural
Merits
No Appeals

108
31
268

26.5***
7.6
65.9***

2
1
414

0.50***
0.25
99.3***

Outcome—Trial Courts:
Class Members Won
Class Members Lost

179
228

44.0
56.0

170
247

40.8
59.2

Outcome Among Class
Members Who Appealed
to Appellate Courts:
Class Members Won
Class Members Lost

138
167

45.2**
54.8

81
133

37.9
62.1**

Outcome Among Class
Members Who Appealed
to Supreme Courts:
Class Members Won
Class Members Lost

60
79

43.2
56.8**

2
1

66.7**
33.3

Levels of statistical significance:
*** Spearman’s rank-order test: States vs. Federal Comparison—rho = 0.84, p 0.01
** Spearman’s rank-order test: States vs. Federal Comparison—rho = -0.54, Prob|t| = 0.2657 (ns)

Table 2 presents the procedural and final dispositions of class actions
in state and federal courts, without knowing any of the litigants’ demographic characteristics, theories of recovery, or other attributes.592 The first
half of Table 2 shows the procedural dispositions of class actions in state
and federal judiciaries’ respective trial, appellate, and supreme courts.593
Overall, the percentages reveal that class actions in both state and federal

592
See supra Table 2. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of
the William & Mary Business Law Review.
593
See supra Table 2.
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courts are significantly more likely to be decided procedurally rather than
on the merits.594
To illustrate, the first two rows of percentages show that state trial
courts and federal district courts decided relatively smaller numbers of
class actions on the merits.595 The reported percentages are 22.1% and
21.4%, respectively.596 Conversely, the overwhelming majority of class
actions in those lower state and federal courts were decided procedurally—77.9% and 78.6%, respectively.597 More telling, the percentages are
nearly identical for both state and federal lower courts.
Furthermore, although there are some notable differences in the magnitudes of the percentages, state and federal appellate courts generally
resolve class actions in a similar pattern.598 Consider Table 2 again and
look at the percentages appearing in the third and fourth rows. Of the class
actions reaching state and federal courts of appeals, only a few were decided on the merits—17.9% and 14.4%, respectively.599 On the other
hand, state appellate courts decided 57.0% of all cases procedurally; and
federal courts of appeals decided 37.0% of all class actions procedurally.600 But it is significant to note that 25.1% of state court litigants decided
not to appeal state trial courts’ class action decisions.601 However, nearly
48.6% of federal court litigants did not appeal federal district courts’ class
action rulings.602 And even fewer state and federal litigants appealed adverse class action decisions to the various supreme courts.603 The corresponding percentages in that table’s eighth row are 65.9% and 99.3%,
respectively.604
The remaining numbers and percentages in the bottom half of Table 2
illustrate state and federal class members’ win/loss ratios within various
state and federal courts. First, consider the variable “Outcome-Trial
Courts.”605 The results indicate that class members were more likely to
lose than win class actions in state trial courts—56.0% versus 44.0%.606
594

See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 2.
596
See supra Table 2.
597
See supra Table 2.
598
See supra Table 2.
599
See supra Table 2.
600
See supra Table 2.
601
See supra Table 2.
602
See supra Table 2.
603
See supra Table 2.
604
See supra Table 2.
605
See supra Table 2.
606
See supra Table 2.
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And the pattern was similar for class members who filed class actions in
federal district courts.607 Those federal complainants lost and won 59.2%
and 40.8% of the cases, respectively.608
The next variable, “Outcome Among Class Members Who Appealed
to Appellate Courts,” shows win/loss ratios for litigants who decided to
appeal adverse class action rulings to state and federal courts of appeals.
Again, the results are clear: on appeal, class defendants rather than class
members won the majority (54.8%) of class actions in state appellate
courts.609 Furthermore, among litigants who appealed disappointing federal district court decisions, class members’ likelihood of success deteriorated considerably.610 Specifically, before federal courts of appeals, class
members prevailed in just 37.9% of the class actions, while class defendants won an impressive 62.1% of the cases.611 In addition, the last variable
in Table 2 shows a similar win/loss ratio in state supreme courts. Again,
class defendants won 56.8% of the class actions in state supreme courts,
while class members won 43.3% of the cases in state supreme courts.612
C. Bivariate Relationships Between Litigants’ Characteristics and the
Disposition of Class Actions in Allegedly “Biased” State Courts and in
Purportedly “Impartial” Federal Courts
Again, the percentages in the previous section present a description of
class members and defendants’ demographic characteristics as well as
litigants’ win/loss ratios in various state and federal courts between 1925
and 2011. Thus, in light of those findings, reconsider briefly the general
tone of the Senate and House debates just before Congress enacted the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Class action reformers strongly asserted that “class action reform [was] badly needed.... [because] crafty lawyers [were] gam[ing] the system by filing large, nationwide class action
suits in certain preferred State courts.”613 Other reformers embraced that
view and added a little more: “[I]n recent years, class actions have been
subject to abuses that actually work to the detriment of individual consumers [and] plaintiffs .... [Therefore such] gaming of the system clearly

607

See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 2.
609
See supra Table 2.
610
See supra Table 2.
611
See supra Table 2.
612
See supra Table 2.
613
151 CONG. REC. 2645 (2005) (statement of Rep. Ric Keller).

608
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works to the detriment of business [as well as the economy and jobs creation].”614
Still, other reformers asserted that lawyers’ “gaming of the system”
and class action abuses only occurred in “sympathetic courts known as
‘magnet courts.’”615 In fact, CAFA’s supporters called such state courts
“judicial hellholes,”616 because state court judges allegedly certified “frivolous class actions,”617 created “judicial cultures that ignore legal protections,” and “intimidate[d] proponents of tort reform.”618 But even more
importantly, class action reformers claimed that biased state judges—who
hear and decide cases in “judicial hellholes”—are more concerned about
protecting the interests of in-state class members619 than about protecting
out-of-state corporate defendants’ and insurers’ due-process rights.620
Where are the purportedly biased and anti-corporate state courts located? According to some class action reformers, those tribunals are distributed nationwide—within and across the jurisdictional boundaries of the
respective federal circuits.621 But other reformers assert that “judicial hell614

Id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter).
See, e.g., id. (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“Often the [class action] decisions
coming out of ... hand-picked and carefully selected venues are huge windfalls for trial
lawyers and big law firms and a punch line for consumers and the people the lawyers
claim to represent. There is now ... a full blown effort aimed at mining for jackpots in
sympathetic courts known as ‘magnet courts’ for the favorable way they treat these
cases.”).
616
Id. at 2081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“Forum shopping occurs when the attorney sets out to try to find the best place to file the class action lawsuit.... [T]hat is not
healthy. A report issued this year by the American Tort Reform Association about the
abuse of this choice named ... various counties around the country as ‘judicial hellholes.’”).
617
See id. (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions); see also id. at 1664 (statement of Sen.
Chuck Grassley) (“[M]any of these class actions are just plain frivolous lawsuits that are
cooked up by the lawyers to make a quick buck, with little or no benefit to the class
members who the lawyers are supposed to be representing. Out-of-control frivolous
filings are a real drag on the economy. Many a good business is being hurt by this frivolous litigation cost. Unfortunately, the current class action rules are contributing to the
cost of business all across America, and it particularly hits small business .... Too many
frivolous lawsuits are being filed. Too many good companies and consumers [must] pay
for this lawyer greed.”).
618
Id. at 2081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
619
See generally supra notes 389–90 and accompanying text.
620
See 151 CONG. REC. 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (claiming that “magnet
courts” in certain states violate class action “defendants’ due process rights”); id. at 2081
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
621
See, e.g., id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“I [strongly] support ... the
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.... [W]e need to pass this bill [because] there are
loopholes in the class action system .... Such abuses happen mainly in State and local
615
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holes” are located in only a few states and counties within the Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits.622 In particular, reformers alleged that state
court judges in Florida, Illinois, and Texas—in Palm Beach County,623
Madison County,624 and Jefferson County,625 respectively—have the worst
records for (1) certifying frivolous class actions, (2) allowing class members’ lawyers to corrupt the legal system, (3) issuing pro-plaintiff rulings,
and (4) violating class action defendants’ procedural-due-process rights.626

courts in cases that really ought to be heard in Federal court.... Often, these suits have
very little, if anything, to do with the place in which they are brought. Rather, lawyers
select the venues for strategic reasons, or for political reasons, a practice known as forum
shopping.”); id. at 1670 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“Over the past
decade, class action lawsuits have grown by over 1,000 percent nationwide, spurring a
mass of these kinds of hasty, unjust [class action] settlements.”).
622
See infra notes 623–26.
623
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“[I]n their effort
to gain a financial windfall in class action cases, some aggressive plaintiffs’ lawyers file
copycat class action lawsuits. This tactic helps explain the dramatic increase in filings in
these magnet courts.... [T]hese duplicative actions are the product of forum shopping by
the original lawyers who file similar actions in different State courts ... perhaps with the
sole purpose of finding a friendly judge willing to certify the class.... There is not a single
magnet State court in this country that has not encountered the copycat phenomenon....
[One] example of copycat lawsuits is Flanagan v. Bridgestone/Firestone, filed in Palm
Beach County, FL. [That] lawsuit was but one of the approximately 100 identical class
actions filed in State courts throughout the country ....”).
624
See, e.g., id. at 2663 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“What has happened as a result of the abuse of the class action system is that judges in small out-of-theway counties, like Madison County, Illinois and Jefferson County, Texas end up being
the ultimate arbiters of interstate commerce. [CAFA] puts some balance back into the
system.”).
625
Id.
626
See, e.g., id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“Madison County is a great
example of one of these magnet jurisdictions. Once their reputation as a magnet jurisdiction is established, they attract major nationwide [class action] lawsuits that deal with
interstate commerce—exactly the types of lawsuits that should be decided in the Federal
court. As noted in one study: ‘Virtually every sector of the United States economy is on
trial in Madison County, Palm Beach County, FL, and Jefferson County, TX—long
distance carriers, gasoline purchasers, insurance companies, computer manufacturers and
pharmaceutical developers.’”); id. at 1654–55 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Lincoln’s words no longer carry much meaning for some of the lawyers who have descended
on Madison County. In the land of Lincoln, the rule of law has too often been corrupted
almost beyond recognition by self-interested plaintiffs’ lawyers and seemingly pliant
public officials. Some unscrupulous personal injury attorneys go forum shopping to find
friendly jurisdictions. Certainly Madison County, IL is one of them.... [L]awyers often
pick Madison County.... because it is what some call a magic jurisdiction.”).
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First, to prove that “judicial hellholes” really exist, pro-CAFA supporters have cited year-to-year class action filings across all states. 627
When the number of filings appeared to be greater or worse than “expected” in certain state courts, class action reformers concluded that those
were “judicial hellholes,” “magnet” jurisdictions or “magic courts.”628
Stated another way, since class action filings allegedly “skyrocketed” in
Madison County, Jefferson County, and Palm Beach County,629 class
action reformers maintained that state court judges in those jurisdictions
are appreciably more likely to be biased against out-of-state corporate
defendants and more likely to undermine or violate fundamental principles
of judicial federalism.630
Second, to prove that supposedly “corrupt” and “self-interested” plaintiffs’ lawyers’ and “enabling” and “biased” state court judges’ collusive
acts631 prevent class action defendants from securing favorable outcomes,
627

See, e.g., id. at 2636 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“I rise in strong
support of ... the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005. Today marks the culmination of
nearly a decade of legislative efforts to end systematic abuse of our Nation’s class action
system.... Since these reforms were first proposed, the magnitude of the class action crisis
... has become more and more urgent. The crisis now threatens the integrity of our civil
justice system and undermines the economic vitality upon which job creation depends. A
major element of the worsening crisis is the exponential increase in State class action
cases in a handful of ‘magnet’ or ‘magic’ jurisdictions, many of which deal with national
issues in classes. In the last 10 years, State court class actions filings nationwide have
increased over 1,315 percent.”).
628
151 CONG. REC. at 2636.
629
See, e.g., id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“It has not taken the plaintiffs’ lawyers long to figure out which courts are good for their bank accounts. There was
an 82-percent increase in the number of class actions filed in Jefferson County, TX,
between the years of 1998 and 2000. During the same time span, Palm Beach County,
FL, saw a 35-percent increase. The most dramatic increase, however, has occurred in
Madison County, IL. Madison County has seen an astonishing 5,000-percent increase in
the number of class action filings since 1998.... [T]he number of class actions filed in
State courts has skyrocketed under current law: Palm Beach County, 35 percent in just 2
years or 3 years; Jefferson County, 82 percent in the same 2 or 3 years; and Madison
County, over 5,000 percent.... [T]he overall increase in State courts [has been a] 1,315percent growth.”).
630
See infra notes 642, 644 and accompanying text.
631
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2636 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner)
(“[W]hen the House considered this important [class action] reform in the last Congress, I
remarked that, ‘[t]he class action judicial system has become a joke, and no one is laughing except the trial lawyers ... all the way to the bank.’ I imagine that laughter turned to
nervous chuckles when [CAFA] emerged unscathed from the gauntlet in the other body
with 72 votes last week .... [A]s the House prepares to pass this bill, I suspect you could
hear a pin drop in the halls of infamous courthouses located in Madison County, Illinois
and Jefferson County, Texas, where for so long the good times have rolled for forum-
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class action reformers have cited purportedly large numbers of “forced
settlements” and “judicial blackmails” in “magic jurisdictions.”632 For
example, during the fairly recent class action debates in the Senate, one
influential pro-CAFA legislator asserted emphatically: “Many class actions appear to be filed solely for the purpose of forcing a settlement, not
the protection of an interest of a class.”633 Thus, according to that senator,
and many other class action reformers, allegedly “forced settlements” are
nothing less than “judicial blackmail.”634 In addition, class action reformers have concluded that “judicial blackmail” only benefits class members’
unscrupulous lawyers,635 while undermining the Nation’s economy,636
consumers’ interests,637 and the legitimate business interests of multinational corporations and insurers.638
Certainly, anti-reformers dispute multinational corporations’,639 large
insurance conglomerates’,640 and other class action reformers’ allegations
shopping plaintiffs’ attorneys and the judges who enable them.”); see also id. at 1654–55
(statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
632
See, e.g., id. at 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“[E]ven if [a] class certification ruling is unmerited or even unconstitutional, it often cannot be appealed until
after an expensive trial on the merits of the case. Facing the cost of litigation often forces
defendants to settle out of court with sizable payments, even when the defendant will
likely prevail under the law.”).
633
See id. at 1081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
634
Id. (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“[F]orcing a settlement ... has been referred
to in debate frequently as ‘judicial blackmail.’”).
635
See supra notes 629, 631 and accompanying text.
636
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback) (“These settlements have come to be known as a form of traditional blackmail and are problematic to
all Americans because they make trial lawyers rich while imposing increased costs on the
economy, causing lower wages and higher prices for consumers.”).
637
Id.
638
See, e.g., id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[T]he [class action] system
is broken and we need to fix it so we do not hurt legitimate business, legitimate jobcreation efforts .... Right now, businesses, fearing the mere threat of legal action, settle
cases a form of judicial blackmail. The whole economy is dragged down and fewer jobs
are created as a result.”).
639
Cf. id. at 2653 (statement of Rep. Marty Meehan) (“I rise in opposition to ... the socalled Class Action Fairness Act. Few of us would ... argue that there is too much accountability in corporate America .... In recent years, millions of our constituents have
been swindled out of their retirement savings by corporate crooks at Enron, WorldCom,
and other companies.”).
640
Cf. id. at 1094 (statement of Sen. Harry Reid) (“The rejection of the FeinsteinBingaman amendment shows this bill’s true colors.... [W]ithout that change, the truth is
plain to see: [CAFA] is designed to bury class action lawsuits, to cut off the one means
by which individual Americans ripped off by fraudulent or deceptive practices can band
together to demand justice from corporate America.... [I]nsurance companies are ripping
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about the supposedly large prevalence of biased state court judges and the
wanting administration of justice in so-called “judicial hellholes.”641 To
counter the specific allegation that numerous “hellholes” exist and are
undermining federalism,642 one senator has stressed:
I oppose ... the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, because I do not believe it is fair to litigants who have legitimate claims that are most appropriately addressed [in] state courts.... There have been many claims
about ‘judicial hellholes’ and ‘magnet jurisdictions’ but the evidence
shows that these claims are ... overstated, and ... not so widespread so
as to justify passage of this legislation that turns 200 years of federalism on its head.643

In addition, class action reformers insist that state courts generally—
like the alleged “judicial hellhole” in Madison County, Illinois—“are
quick to certify classes.”644 Therefore, reformers stress that it is unfair to
force out-of-state corporations and their insurers to litigate “class actions
of national importance” in those state courts.645 But anti-reformers emphasize that class action reformers intentionally or unintentionally cloud the
important distinction between the number of class action filings and the
number of class certifications.646 Therefore, states’ righters or opponents
of class action reforms argue that even if the numbers of class action filings have increased in recent years, state courts are likely to certify only
an infinitesimal number of class actions for trial.647
people off all the time, and this legislation will give the biggest, best businesses in the
world, the insurance companies, more money.”); id. at 2653 (statement of Rep. Joe Baca)
(“[CAFA] is a payoff to large companies and special interests. It takes rights away from
consumers in order to protect drug manufacturers, insurance companies, HMOs and
negligent doctors. There is no accountability on their part.”).
641
151 CONG. REC. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton).
642
Cf. id. at 2072–73 (2005) (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[O]ur system of federalism is undermined today because one State’s legal system, rather than the legal system
of the Federal branch of the courts, is making [class action] decisions that affect many or
even all other States. So the system is not working for anyone but the lawyers and law
firms gaming that system.”).
643
Id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton).
644
See id. at 2645–46 (statement of Rep. Ric Keller) (“[Plaintiffs’ lawyers file] large,
nationwide class action suits in certain preferred State courts such as Madison County,
Illinois, where judges are quick to certify classes .... Let us take a look at Madison County .... In 2002 ... there were 77 class action filings, and in 2003 there were 106 class
action lawsuits filed. The movie ‘Bridges of Madison County’ was a love story. The
‘Judges of Madison County’ would be a horror flick.”).
645
Id. (statements of Rep. Linda Sanchez).
646
See infra note 647 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton).
647
Compare 151 CONG. REC. 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“Perhaps the
best example nationwide, in terms of preferred venues for trial lawyers, is Madison
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TABLE 3
THE DISPOSITION OF CLASS ACTIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS OF
APPEALS BY SELECTED DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF LITIGANTS
(N = 519)
State Courts’ Disposition of Actions
From Class Members’ Perspectives

Federal Courts’ Disposition of Actions
From Class Members’ Perspectives

Favorable Unfavorable (N = 305)

Favorable Unfavorable (N = 214)

Percent

Percent

Number

Percent

Percent

Number

Class-Action Defendants Insurers
Corporations
Public Entities

43.3
56.3
39.4

56.7
43.7
60.6

(N = 201)
(N = 94)
(N = 10)

31.3
43.0
44.4

68.7
57.0
55.6

(N = 99)
(N = 94)
(N = 21)

Claims & Causes

Breach-of-Contract
Common-Law Torts
Consumer-Protection
Civil-Rights
Securities
Antitrust
Environmental
Others

35.6
68.6
44.0
44.4
46.3
50.0
60.0
40.9

64.4
31.4
56.0
55.6
53.7
50.0
40.0
59.1

(N = 90)**
(N = 51)**
(N = 109)
(N = 9)
(N = 10)
(N = 4)
(N = 10)**
(N = 22)**

20.8
18.8
26.1
55.4
43.2
56.2
___
___

79.2
81.2
73.9
44.6
56.8
43.8
___
___

(N = 24)***
(N = 16)***
(N = 65)***
(N = 56)***
(N = 37)
(N = 16)***
___
___

Region of Country

East
Midwest
South
Southwest
West

31.0
41.9
59.3
51.0
35.0

69.0
58.1
40.7
49.0
65.0

(N = 42)***
(N = 86)***
(N = 86)***
(N = 51)
(N = 40)***

32.5
37.8
46.3
33.3
35.9

67.5
62.2
53.7
66.7
64.1

(N = 40)
(N = 45)
(N = 54)
(N = 36)
(N = 39)

Courts’ Location
Within
Federal Circuits

First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Federal Circuit

16.7
18.2
38.0
64.3
46.3
40.0
46.9
47.2
38.7
22.2
61.1
33.3

83.3
81.8
62.0
35.7
53.7
60.0
53.1
52.8
61.3
77.8
38.9
66.7

(N = 6)
(N = 11)**
(N = 21)**
(N = 14)**
(N = 41)
(N = 20)**
(N = 32)
(N = 36)
(N = 31)
(N = 18)**
(N = 72)**
(N = 3)

40.0
33.3
33.3
44.4
42.1
50.0
15.8
52.6
41.4
18.2
39.5
50.0

60.0
66.7
66.7
55.6
57.9
50.0
84.2
47.4
58.6
81.8
60.5
50.0

(N = 5)
(N = 12)
(N = 18)
(N = 9)
(N = 38)
(N = 14)
(N = 19)
(N = 19)
(N = 29)
(N = 11)
(N = 38)
(N = 2)

Selected
Demographics

Subcategories

*** Chi square test statistically significant at p 0.01
** Chi square test statistically significant at p 0.05

Given the severity of class action reformers’ and anti-reformers’
charges and counter-charges, the author decided to test the proposition that
out-of-state defendants—multinational corporate entities and insurers—
County, IL, where class action filings between 1998 and 2000 increased nearly 2,000
percent.”), with id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“[A] recent report by
Public Citizen found that there were, at most, two jurisdictions—Madison County and St.
Clair County, IL—of the 3,141 court systems in the United States for which bill proponents have provided limited data that they are ‘magnet jurisdictions.’ As to Madison
County in particular, the facts ... do not support the rhetoric. In 2002, only 3 of 77 class
actions were actually certified to proceed to trial, and in 2003, only 2 of 106 class actions
filed were certified.”).
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are substantially more likely to lose class actions in allegedly “biased and
hostile” state courts than in supposedly “more principled and competent”
federal courts.648 Therefore, consider the information appearing in Table 3.
At the outset, it is important to note that Table 3 presents the bivariate
relationships between four independent variables and the outcome of class
actions in both state and federal courts of appeals.649 The author decided to
explore the disposition of class actions in state and federal appellate courts
for two reasons. First, appellate-court cases comprise arguably the truly
dissatisfied class members and defendants who received adverse procedural and substantive outcomes in both state trial courts and federal district courts. Second, as illustrated in Table 2 and discussed above, state
and federal appellate-court class action decisions are substantially more
likely to be the “final decisions” than either state or federal trial-court or
supreme-court decisions.650
The first variable in Table 3 is labeled “Class Action Defendants.”651 It
describes the types of defendants that class members sued in both state and
federal courts of appeals from 1925 to 2011,652 and the reported percentages illustrate the courts of appeals’ dispositions of class actions from the
perspectives of class members.653 The results are clear: when insurers and
various public entities or corporations are sued, class members are more
likely to lose in state courts of appeals.654 Class members’ state court percentages are 56.7% and 60.6%, respectively.655 On the other hand, when
class members sue corporations in state appellate courts, plaintiffs are
more likely to prevail. The reported percentage is 56.3%.656
The results are fairly similar for class members who sought relief in
federal appellate courts: when insurers and various public entities were
class action defendants, class members were more likely to lose the lawsuits in federal appellate courts.657 The percentages are 68.7% and 55.6%
respectively.658 And although class members are more likely to prevail
(56.3%) in state appellate courts when multinational corporate entities are
648

See supra Table 3. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of
the William & Mary Business Law Review.
649
See supra Table 3.
650
See supra Table 2.
651
See supra Table 3.
652
See supra Table 3.
653
See supra Table 3.
654
See supra Table 3.
655
See supra Table 3.
656
See supra Table 3.
657
See supra Table 3.
658
See supra Table 3.
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defendants, class members are more likely to lose (57.0%) when multinational corporations are class defendants in federal courts of appeals.659
When reviewing the general effects of types of defendants on the dispositions of class actions, the results show no statistically significant difference between class members’ win/loss ratios, when comparing class action
outcomes in state appellate courts to those in federal courts of appeals.660
These initial findings, therefore, do not support class action reformers’
broad assertion that corporate defendants are substantially more likely to
lose class actions in allegedly “biased” and “unprincipled” state courts
than in “competent” and “impartial” federal courts.661
For added statistical evidence that class action defendants—rather than
class members—are substantially more likely to prevail in state and federal courts of appeals, one needs only to review the variable “Region of
Country” in Table 3 and the corresponding percentages. First, the results
are clear: multinational corporate entities, large insurance conglomerates
and other class action defendants are more likely to prevail in federal
courts of appeals than class members.662 That finding appears regardless
of whether the federal appellate courts are located in the Eastern, Midwestern, Southern, Southwestern, or Western regions of the country.663
More precisely, federal class action defendants’ “win” percentages are
67.5%, 62.2%, 53.7%, 66.7%, and 64.1%, respectively.664
Also, barring two exceptions, class action defendants—rather than
class members—are more likely to prevail in state courts of appeals.665
Class members are more likely to win class action lawsuits in state courts
of appeals that are located in the Southern and Southwestern regions of the
country.666 Those “win” percentages are 59.3% and 51.0%, respectively.667 On the other hand, class members are exceedingly more likely to
lose in state courts of appeals, which are located in the Eastern, Midwestern, and Western regions of the country.668 State-appellate-court class
members’ “loss” percentages within these latter regions are 69.0%, 58.1%,
and 66.0%, respectively.669
659

See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
661
See supra Table 3.
662
See supra Table 3.
663
See supra Table 3.
664
See supra Table 3.
665
See supra Table 3.
666
See supra Table 3.
667
See supra Table 3.
668
See supra Table 3.
669
See supra Table 3.
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The final variable in Table 3 is labeled “Courts’ Location Within Federal Circuits.”670 It has two meanings. First, when considering federalcourt class actions, the variable retains its ordinary meaning. It describes
the proper names of the twelve federal courts of appeals that reviewed
federal district courts’ class action rulings.671 The overwhelming majority
of class action percentages reinforce earlier findings.672 The First, Second,
Third, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Courts of Appeals were substantially more likely to decide against federal class members and in favor of corporate defendants.673 Before those nine federal
appellate courts, class members’ losses varied between 55.6% and
84.2%.674 On the other hand, federal class members were more likely to
win a majority (52.6%) of lawsuits only in the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit.675 And in the Sixth and Federal Courts of Appeals, federal
complainants won just 50.0% of the class actions in each appellate
court.676
“Courts’ Location Within Federal Circuits” also has a second meaning: it describes state class action litigants’ percentages of wins and losses
in state appellate courts by considering whether a state court of appeal was
located within the jurisdictional boundary of, say, the First Circuit, the
Fourth Circuit, or some other federal circuit. Therefore, looking at the two
left columns of percentages at the bottom of Table 3, we find generally no
substantial statistical evidence suggesting that allegedly “prejudiced” and
“hostile” state-appellate-court judges are more likely to decide class actions against out-of-state corporate defendants.677 Or stated slightly differently, the results do not support class action reformers’ general assertion
that supposedly “unprincipled” and “less competent” state-appellate-court
judges predictably and consistently violate class action defendants’ procedural-due-process rights, and habitually undermine corporate and other
defendants’ ability to win class actions procedurally or on the merits.678
Instead, the results show generally that multinational corporations, insurers, and other class action defendants are substantially more likely to
prevail than lose in state appellate courts.679 And the finding is consistent
670

See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
672
See supra Table 3.
673
See supra Table 3.
674
See supra Table 3.
675
See supra Table 3.
676
See supra Table 3.
677
See supra Table 3.
678
See supra Table 3.
679
See supra Table 3.
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among state courts of appeals which are located within regions of the
country over which the following federal circuits have jurisdictions: First,
Second, Third, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Federal
Circuits.680 Put simply, in those state courts of appeals, class members’
losses ranged between 52.8% and 83.3%.681 On the other hand, class
members were more likely to prevail in in-state appellate courts that are
located within the jurisdictional boundaries of the Fourth and Eleventh
Circuits.682 Those “win” percentages are 64.3% and 61.1%, respectively.683
D. Choice of Law Questions—The Bivariate Relationships Between Litigants’ Theories of Recovery and the Disposition of Class Actions in
State and Federal Courts
Earlier, this Article briefly discussed choice of law rules,684 and two
important constitutional principles were highlighted: under the KlaxonErie doctrine, a federal district court must apply the choice of law rules of
the state in which it sits;685 under the principle appearing in Shutts, a state
court may freely choose and apply one of several state laws in a nationwide class action as long as the parties have “significant contacts” with the
states and the choice of law is not arbitrary or fundamentally unfair.686
Yet, conflicting opinions about choice-of-substantive-law rules still generate numerous problems for class action complainants who commence
actions in state trial courts or in federal district courts.687
Even more noteworthy, Congress spent an inordinate amount of time
debating choice of law rules, before enacting CAFA and sanctioning defendants’ right to remove allegedly “class actions of national importance”
from state to federal courts.688 As reported earlier, both CAFA’s support680

See supra Table 3.
See supra Table 3.
682
See supra Table 3.
683
See supra Table 3.
684
See supra Part IV.A.
685
See Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (requiring a
federal court that sits in Delaware to apply conflict of laws rules that mirror rules cited
and applied in Delaware’s state courts); Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Transp. Ins.
Co., 953 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is the duty of the federal court to determine
as best it can, what the highest court of the state would decide.”).
686
Phillips Petrol. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 821–22 (1985).
687
See supra Part V.A.
688
Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 1646 (2005) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“We were also
told [CAFA] would not shift cases to Federal courts unless they truly involve national
issues, while State cases would remain in state court. [CAFA’s] actual effects are quite
681
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ers and opponents understood that federal district courts are substantially
more likely to deny Rule 23(b)(3) certification motions when wide variances exist among proposed class members’ state law theories of recovery.689
Therefore, citing a need to remove a major class certification hurdle
and codify Shutts’s constitutional principle in CAFA, legislators debated
the merits of the earlier-discussed Feinstein-Bingaman amendment.690
That proviso would have created an exception and allowed federal judges
to certify a class, even though a class action pleading cited multiple and
conflicting state laws.691 However, a majority of class action reformers
rejected that amendment.692 The majority concluded that fundamental
principles of federalism would have been undermined because the Feinstein-Bingaman proviso would have allowed federal district courts to
apply a single state’s law in a nationwide class certification proceeding.693
Conversely, anti-reformers were concerned about the adverse effects
of CAFA’s removal provisions on class members’ ability to litigate federal
substantive issues in state courts.694 Specifically, some legislators claimed
that class action reforms would allow primarily corporate defendants to
remove civil-rights,695 consumer-protection,696 and wage-and-hour697 class

different. It does not just affect cases where the events affect people in multiple States
....” ).
689
See supra notes 413–24 and accompanying text.
690
See 151 CONG. REC. 1818.
691
See id. at 1813 (Senator Feinstein’s outlining of the parameters of the defeated
Feinstein-Bingaman choice of law amendment); id. at 1832 (“The [Feinstein-Bingaman]
amendment ... was rejected.”).
692
Id.
693
See id. at 1820–21 (reporting CAFA supporters’ embrace of legal conclusions and
cases in a letter that Walter E. Dellinger of O’Melveny & Myers, LLP submitted to help
defeat the Feinstein-Bingaman amendment).
694
See, e.g., id. at 1828–30 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy).
695
See, e.g., id. at 1828 (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“I urge all of my colleagues
to support this amendment to exclude civil rights and wage and hour cases from the bill’s
provisions on removal of cases to Federal court. Working Americans and victims of
discrimination seeking justice under State laws don’t deserve to have the doors of justice
slammed on such claims, but that is exactly what this bill will do.”); id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott) (“47 Attorneys General in States and territories, have come
out against [CAFA] because it puts the Attorneys General in the same crack. They do not
know where [a] case is going to be heard. If they bring a State action in State court, they
may get removed. Some ... States have better wage laws, civil rights laws, sometimes
consumer protections, and if the Attorneys General want to come in to protect their own
citizens in their own States, they ought to have that right and not get jerked around to
Federal court.”).
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actions from state to federal courts. But class action reformers argued that
such concerns were unfounded, and strongly asserted that federal rather
than state courts have been more favorable forums for class action plaintiffs to litigate civil rights and other federal law disputes.698
Finally, more than a century and a half ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the choice of law principle: to determine parties’ rights and obligations under a contract, the law of the place—where the contract was consummated—must govern the deliberations.699 And, nearly eighty years
ago, the Court also reconfirmed an equally important choice of law rule in
Ormsby v. Chase.700 In a tort action, a judge must apply the law of the
696

See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2648 (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[CAFA] also
makes it impossible for States to pursue actions against defendants who have caused
harm to the State’s citizens. State attorneys general often pursue these claims under State
consumer protection statutes, antitrust laws, often with the attorney general acting as the
class representative for the consumers of the State. Under [CAFA], would we want these
cases to be thrown into Federal court and severely impede the State’s ability to enforce its
own laws for its own citizens? That is what will happen. That is what will take place.”).
697
See, e.g., id. (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[I]t is very clear that ... this is not
a simple procedural fix to class actions in our courts.... [And] it is clear that all of the
totally unsatisfactory provisions have not been removed.... [CAFA] harms working
Americans and victims of discrimination who are in no position to bring individual actions of wage-and-hour cases or civil rights discrimination claims. Moving the cases to
federal court will result in many never being ever heard at all.”).
698
See, e.g., id. at 1830–31 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“[C]ontrary to what has
been suggested ... Federal courts have a long record of protecting workers in employment
class actions. Congress has passed strong laws, such as title VII, that were specifically
crafted to give workers access to Federal courts so they could bring employment discrimination cases in a fair forum. We have always believed Federal court is a fair, objective
forum for people who have been discriminated against, whether they claim employment
rights or civil rights. As a result, Federal courts already have jurisdiction over most
employment discrimination and pension claims, and their record is in sharp contrast to
courts such as in Madison County, IL and Jefferson County, TX.... [Therefore,] contrary
to the position of the amendment’s proponents, [CAFA] will not impose new, burdensome and unnecessary requirements on civil rights litigants and the federal courts.... This
bill protects the rights of civil rights plaintiffs.”).
699
See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 308 n.11 (1981) (“Prior to the advent
of interest analysis in the state courts as the ‘dominant mode of analysis in modern choice
of law theory,’ ... the prevailing choice-of-law methodology focused on the jurisdiction
where a particular event occurred.... For example, in cases characterized as contract
cases, the law of the place of contracting controlled the determination of such issues as
capacity, fraud, consideration, duty, performance, and the like.”); Le Roy v. Beard, 49
U.S. 451, 464 (1850) (“[I]n the state of New York it has been repeatedly held ... that ...
such device, without a wafer or wax, are not to be deemed a seal, and that the proper
form of action must be such as is practi[c]ed on an unsealed instrument in the State where
the suit is instituted ....”).
700
Ormsby v. Chase, 290 U.S. 387 (1933).
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place where the tort occurred before determining whether to award damages as well as other common-law and equitable remedies.701
Therefore, citing and fiercely embracing those choice of law principles,702 CAFA’s opponents had a major concern. They did not want federal district court judges to ignore unwittingly, or wittingly, the “law of the
place” rules when class members filed post-CAFA breach-of-contract and
tort-based class actions against multinational corporations, insurers and
other defendants in federal courts.703 In fact, after carefully reading the
proposed legislation, many state attorneys general opposed it and concluded:
[Class action reforms] would vastly expand federal diversity jurisdiction, and ... [cause] most class actions [to be] filed in or removed to
federal court. This transfer of jurisdiction in cases raising questions of
state law will inappropriately usurp the primary role of state courts in
developing their own state tort and contract laws, and will impair [state
courts’] ability to establish consistent interpretations of those laws.704

However, a majority of CAFA’s supporters stressed that these additional choice of law concerns were unfounded.705 Mirroring the sentiments
of most reformers, one Senator stated:

701

Id. at 388 (“[T]he law of the place of the wrong determines whether the claim for
damages survives the death of the wrongdoer.”) (citation omitted); see also Hague, 449
U.S. at 308–09 n.11 (“In the tort context, the law of the place of the wrong usually governed traditional choice-of-law analysis.”).
702
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1818 (statement of Sen. Jeff Bingaman) (“Under current
doctrines, federal courts hearing state law based claims, must use the ‘choice-of-law’ rule
of the state in which the federal district court sits. These procedural rules vary among
states, but many provide that the federal court should apply the substantive law of a home
state of the plaintiff, or the law of the state where the harm occurred. In a nationwide
consumer class action, such a rule would lead the court to apply to each class member’s
claim the law of the state in which the class member lives, or lived at the time the harm
occurred.” (quoting a passage from a letter submitted by Arthur Miller, Harvard’s Bruce
Bromley Professor of Law)).
703
Id.
704
Id. at 1649 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen State Attorneys General).
705
See, e.g., id. at 2092 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“Opponents of
[CAFA] claim that, by in any way altering the procedural rules governing class actions,
substantive rights will be denied. However, this argument is trumped by a little document
called the U.S. Constitution.”).
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[These reforms do] not alter substantive law...or...affect any injured individual’s right to seek redress or to obtain damages. It does not limit
damages .... [and] does not impose stricter pleading requirements....
Federal courts will continue to apply the appropriate State or States’
laws in adjudicating a class action suit.706

On the other hand, a different reformer’s cautionary remarks reinforced anti-reformers’ general concerns. He stressed that when federal
courts hear and decide class actions of national importance, a rational
desire to achieve “efficient federalism” entails allowing federal judges to
sort through complex substantive questions of law and apply “law of the
place” rules if the application “would make sense.”707
Finally, state attorneys general have successfully litigated illegal-tradepractices class actions in state courts to protect consumers’ rights. For
example, states have filed “enforcement actions on behalf of consumers
against large, often foreign-owned, drug companies for overcharges and
market manipulations that illegally raised the costs of certain prescription
drugs.”708 Therefore, anti-reformers have argued that class action reforms
would terminate or undermine the power of state attorneys general to
litigate antitrust class actions in state courts.709 But class action reformers
706

Id. at 1670 (statement of Sen. Sam Brownback).
Cf. id. at 2641 (statement of Rep. Rick Boucher) (“Suppose that a California State
court class action were filed against a California pharmaceutical drug company on behalf
of a proposed class of 60 percent California residents and 40 percent Nevada residents
alleging harmful side effects attributed to a drug sold nationwide. In such a case, it would
make sense to leave the matter in Federal court. After all, the State laws that would apply
in all of these cases would vary, depending on where the drug was prescribed and purchased.... [A]llowing a single Federal court to sort out such issues and handle the balance
of the litigation would make sense both from added efficiency and a federalism standpoint.”).
708
151 CONG. REC. 2650 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from National
Association of Attorneys General); see id. (“Such cases have resulted in recoveries of
approximately 235 million dollars, the majority of which is earmarked for consumer
restitution.... This often meant several hundred dollars going back into the pockets of
those consumers who can least afford to be victimized by illegal trade practices, senior
citizens living on fixed incomes and the working poor who cannot afford insurance.”).
709
See id. (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from National Association of
Attorneys General) (“[We support the bipartisan amendment’s], clarifying that [CAFA]
does not apply to, and would have no effect on, actions brought by any State Attorney
General on behalf of his or her respective state or its citizens. As Attorneys General, we
frequently investigate and bring actions against defendants who have caused harm to our
citizens. These cases are usually brought pursuant to the Attorney General’s parens
patriae authority under our respective consumer protection and antitrust statutes.... It is
our concern that certain provisions of [CAFA] might be misinterpreted to hamper the
ability of the Attorneys General to bring such actions .... We encourage you to support
707

532

WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:419

have insisted that CAFA would not interfere with the ability of state attorneys general to enforce their respective antitrust statutes.710 In the end, the
state attorneys’ general amendment to exempt state antitrust class actions
under CAFA failed.711
Breach-of-contract, tort-based, consumer-protection, civil-rights, antitrust, and securities causes of action—these theories of recovery have
presented choice of law problems for both complainants and defendants
who litigated class actions in state and federal courts. However, in the
wash of CAFA’s new removal provisions, it would be difficult to measure
at this point whether these specific choice of law challenges will substantially increase or decrease defendants’ or complainants’ likelihood of
winning or losing class actions in federal courts.712
Still, consider the statistical findings in Table 4. They present a picture
of the relationship between various theories of recovery and the disposithe ... amendment [that exempts] all actions brought by State Attorneys General from the
provisions [in CAFA].”); id. at 2086 (statement of Sen. Hillary Clinton) (“[T]he National
Conference of State Legislatures, NCSL, has noted ... its strong opposition to [CAFA],
[because] the legislation ‘sends a disturbing message to the American people that state
court systems are ... inferior or untrustworthy.’ The NCSL [also concluded] ... ‘that state
laws in the areas of consumer protection and antitrust, which were passed to protect the
citizens of a particular state against fraudulent or illegal activities, will almost never be
heard in state courts. Ironically, state courts, whose sole purpose is to interpret state laws,
will be bypassed and the federal judiciary will be asked to render judgment in those
cases.’ Although bill proponents have sometimes suggested the contrary, make no mistake: if enacted, [CAFA] will [cause] the majority of class action lawsuits [to be] transferred from our state to Federal courts, [and will] ... terminate some class action lawsuits
....”).
710
See id. at 2077 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“Valid trade secrets and proprietary information—sensitive information that goes to the heart of a company being
able to compete in the market place should and will be protected.... [T]hey have a right to
protect valid trade secrets—patents and other proprietary information.... [W]e have ...
tried to balance the legitimate interests of companies, who we want to remain strong
competitors in the marketplace, with the public’s interest in disclosing potentially harmful products or practices.”).
711
See id. at 2083 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin) (“[F]orty seven attorneys general ...
expressed concern that [CAFA] could limit their powers to investigate and bring [antitrust class] actions in their State courts against defendants who have caused harm to their
citizens. The attorneys general supported an amendment ... that would have exempted all
[class] actions brought by State Attorneys General from the [CAFA] provisions stating,
‘It is important to all of our constituents, but especially to the poor, elderly and disabled,
that the provisions of the act not be misconstrued and that we maintain the enforcement
authority needed to protect them from illegal practices.’ The ... amendment was defeated.”).
712
As of this writing, CAFA has been enacted only six years; thus there are too few
CAFA-related decisions to do a sound empirical study.
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tion of class actions in state and federal courts of appeals.713 More importantly, the reported percentages strongly suggest that both class action
reformers and anti-reformers have sound reasons to be concerned about
how federal and state courts will interpret and apply choice of law rules
after CAFA.714
TABLE 4
CLASS MEMBERS’ WIN-LOSS RATIOS AGAINST NATIONAL AND
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND INSURERS IN STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS OF APPEALS
Class Members’ Win/Loss Ratios Against
Class Members’ Win/Loss Ratios ONLY
National & Multinational Corporations & Insurers Against National & Multinational Insurers
Variables

Class Members’ Claims:
Breach-of-Contract
Common-Law Torts
Consumer-Protection
Civil-Rights
Securities
Antitrust

State Courts

Federal Courts

State Courts

Win/Loss
Ratios

(N = 193)

Win/Loss
Ratios

(N = 201)

Win/Loss
Ratios

(N = 99)

(N = 24)
(N = 21)
(N = 77)
(N = 33)
(N = 17)
(N = 18)

0.333 / 0.667
0.675 / 0.325
0.405 / 0.595
0.500 / 0.500
0.333 / 0.667
0.500 / 0.500

(N = 72)*
(N = 40)*
(N = 79)*
(N = 2)*
(N = 6)*
(N = 2)*

0.250 / 0.750
0.154 / 0.846
0.263 / 0.737
0.667 / 0.333
0.357 / 0.643
0.444 / 0.556

(N = 16)
(N = 13)
(N = 38)
(N = 9)
(N = 14)
(N = 9)

Win/Loss
Ratios

(N = 295)

0.325 / 0.675
0.667 / 0.333
0.432 / 0.568
0.577 / 0.423
0.444 / 0.556
0.636 / 0.364

(N = 83)** 0.259 / 0.741
(N = 48)** 0.333 / 0.667
(N = 118)** 0.377 / 0.623
(N = 26)** 0.606 / 0.394
(N = 9)** 0.412 / 0.588
(N = 11)** 0.556 / 0.444

Federal Courts

** Chi square statistic = 17.4931, df = 5, p = 0.004
* Chi square statistic = 13.0229, df = 5, p = 0.02

First, it is important to note that two broad subheadings appear in Table 4. One is labeled “Class Members’ Win/Loss Ratios Against National
& Multinational Corporations and Insurers” (corporations and insurers
cases).715 The other subheading is labeled “Class Members’ Win/Loss
Ratios ONLY Against National & Multinational Insurers” (insurers only
cases).716 The reason for constructing two broad subcategories is not complicated. Depending on the types of insurance contracts, insurers have
different contractual obligations.717 Here is a pertinent example: under
residential and commercial property insurance contracts, property insurers
promise to pay certain proceeds or to indemnify property owners when

713

See infra Table 4. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of
the William & Mary Business Law Review.
714
See infra Table 4.
715
See supra Table 4.
716
See supra Table 4.
717
See infra notes 718–23.
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“covered perils” produce tangible and intangible losses.718 If the property
insurers breach those first-party agreements, the insured property owners
may file first-party, direct actions—including class actions—against the
insurers.719
Here is another example: liability insurance contracts are essentially
third-party contracts, since insureds purchase those contracts for the benefit of third-party victims.720 In addition, under a variety of liability policies, multinational insurers promise to pay and/or settle third-party victims’ claims and lawsuits.721 But even more significantly, liability
insurance contracts generally have duty-to-defend causes under which
insurers promise to defend insureds against third-party victims’ lawsuits.722 However, when liability insurers breach duty-to-defend clauses,
the insureds may also file first-party, direct actions—including class actions—against the insurers.723 In Table 4, the “Insurers’ Only Cases” comprise legal disputes like those appearing in the two examples.
Case law is also replete with excellent examples of multinational liability insurers’ honoring their contractual obligations when third-party
victims sue insureds in state and federal courts.724 Fairly often, multinational liability insurers enthusiastically provide a legal defense for their
insured, multinational corporations and businesses.725 And in those situa718

See Warrilow v. Norrell, 791 S.W.2d 515, 527 (Tex. App. 1989) (explaining that
to establish “coverage” under a property-insurance contract, one must prove that a covered peril—rather than an excluded peril—caused the loss); id. (“Property insurance,
unlike liability insurance, is unconcerned with establishing negligence or otherwise
assessing tort liability.” (quoting Garvey v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 P.2d 704,
710 (Cal. 1989))); id. (“Coverage in a property policy is commonly provided by reference
to causation, such as ‘loss caused by ...’ certain enumerated forces.... It is precisely these
physical forces that bring about the loss.” (citing Garvey, 770 P.2d at 710)); id. (“In
Texas, if one force is covered and one force is excluded, the insured must show that the
property damage was caused solely by the insured force, or he must separate the damage
caused by the insured peril from that caused by the excluded peril.” (citing Travelers
Indem. Co. v. McKillip, 469 S.W.2d 160, 162 (Tex. 1971))).
719
Rice, supra note 266, at 346–47.
720
See id. at 346 n.87 (“Liability insurance is purchased primarily to recompense injured third parties. Therefore, one would expect such parties to have little difficulty
obtaining the right to commence direct-action suits against liability carriers for
extracontractual damages.”).
721
Id. at 346.
722
See WILLY E. RICE, CONSUMER LITIGATION AND INSURANCE DEFENSE 573–75
(2011) (presenting a nutshell discussion of liability insurance contracts and insurers’
various obligations under duty-to-defend doctrines in multiple jurisdictions).
723
Id.
724
See id.
725
Id.
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tions, one can find allegedly third-party victims listing insurers and insured corporate entities as joint defendants.726 Those lawsuits are usually
called “third-party actions.”727 In Table 4, conflicts fitting this latter description are categorized as “Corporations and Insurers Cases.”728
There is, however, one final important point: regardless of whether
complainants sue insurance companies and corporations individually or
jointly, complainants’ theories of recovery or claims are typically the
following: breach-of-contract, tort-based claims, consumer-protection
actions, civil-rights claims, antitrust actions, and securities-violation causes of action.729 And these theories of recovery appear whether the lawsuits
are first-party or third-party actions.730
So, at this point, it is appropriate to ask: does Table 4 present any statistical findings that should generate or elevate choice of law concerns
among class action reformers and anti-reformers? First, reformers believe
that removing more civil-rights class actions from allegedly “biased” state
courts to professedly “more competent and impartial” federal courts will
significantly improve multinational corporations’ and insurers’ likelihoods
of winning civil-rights disputes in federal courts.731 The percentages in
Table 4, however, suggest otherwise.732 Class members are substantially
more likely to win or prevail in the overwhelming majority of civil-rights
cases.733 And those results appear repeatedly, regardless of (1) whether
class members filed civil-rights actions in state or federal courts, or (2)
whether civil-rights complaints named corporations and/or insurers as
defendants in the class actions.734 The complainants’ “win” percentages/ratios across the table are 0.557, 0.606, 0.500, and 0.667, respectively.735
726

See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 2004–2005 Disposition of Insurance Decisions: A Survey and Statistical Review, 38 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 821,
878 nn.477–80 (2006) (discussing third parties’ right to sue the original parties who
formed a contract).
727
See RICE, supra note 722.
728
See supra Table 4.
729
See supra Table 4.
730
See infra Appendix.
731
Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 1646 (2005) (statement of Sen. Ted Kennedy) (“[Under
CAFA], a corporate defendant with headquarters outside [of a] State can move State class
action cases, including civil rights cases and worker right cases, into Federal court, even
if all the underlying facts in the case happened in a single State.”); see also supra note
698 and accompanying text.
732
See supra Table 4.
733
See supra Table 4.
734
See supra Table 4.
735
See supra Table 4.
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What have been corporations’ and insurers’ successes as defendants in
antitrust class actions? Again, review the win/loss ratios in Table 4 under
“Corporations and Insurers Cases.” The reported ratios reveal that, in both
allegedly “biased” state courts and in supposedly “unprejudiced” federal
courts, class members are substantially more likely to win antitrust class
actions against the corporations and insurers.736 The class members’ “win”
ratios in state and federal appellate courts are 0.636 and 0.556 respectively.737 Furthermore, among “Insurers Only Cases,” class members won half
(0.500) of antitrust class actions that were filed against insurers in state
courts.738 On the other hand, national and multinational insurers were
significantly more likely to win a majority (0.556) of federal antitrust class
actions.739
Arguably, this latter finding could partially explain insurers’ general
perception: unlike state courts, federal courts are impartial forums; thus,
insurers have a greater chance of defending themselves and their insured
corporate clients against a variety of class actions, including antitrust actions.740 But if that conclusion is correct, it underscores and possibly justifies anti-reformers’ concerns about class action reforms generally, and the
previously discussed choice of law problems that class members might
face in the wake of CAFA. To appreciate why anti-reformers’ concerns
might be warranted, consider the first row of statistics in Table 4.
Those ratios show the dispositions of class actions involving breachof-contract claims and the general finding is clear: insurers and corporations are overwhelmingly more likely to prevail in breach-of-contract class
actions.741 More specifically, corporate defendants “win” repeatedly and
consistently, regardless of (1) whether the breach-of-contract complaints
named corporations or insurers as class action defendants, or (2) whether
class members appealed breach-of-contract actions to state or federal appellate courts.742 Conversely, the meager “win” ratios for class members
across all categories are just 0.325, 0.259, 0.333, and 0.250, respectively.743
Again, it is worth repeating class action reformers’ and corporate defendants’ general assertion that removing allegedly “class actions of na736

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
738
See supra Table 4.
739
See supra Table 4.
740
See supra Table 4.
741
See supra Table 4.
742
See supra Table 4.
743
See supra Table 4.
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tional importance” to federal courts is warranted because state court judges are (1) inherently “biased” against out-of-state corporate defendants,
and (2) significantly more likely to issue unfair and incompetent class
action rulings.744 But the author invites the reader to inspect the third and
fifth rows of ratios in Table 4. Those statistics do not support class action
reformers’ arguments.745 First, consider the coefficients in the third row,
which illustrate the disposition of consumer-protection class actions.746
Again, the statistically significant findings are consistent.747 Class action
defendants are substantially more likely to win the greater majority of
consumer-protection class actions in courts of appeals.748
More precisely, corporate defendants are significantly more likely to
win consumer-protection, class action lawsuits regardless of (1) whether
class members’ consumer-protection pleadings identified corporations or
insurers as defendants, or (2) whether class members appealed consumerprotection class actions to state or federal appellate courts.749 The corresponding ratios for corporate defendants’ extremely greater likelihood of
winning consumer-protection lawsuits—across all categories in the third
row—are 0.568, 0.623, 0.595, and 0.737, respectively.750
The fairly new class action removal provisions under CAFA do not
apply to class actions that involve corporate defendants’ alleged securities
violations.751 Nevertheless, a careful review of the statistics appearing in
Table 4’s fifth row also undermine class action reformers’ and corporate
defendants’ generally negative perceptions about state judges, and about
the perceived administration of justice in state courts.752 An examination
of the ratios illustrating the disposition of securities-violation class actions
reveals that corporations and insurers are statistically and substantially
more likely to win the greater proportion of securities-based class actions
in appellate courts.753 And, like earlier findings, class action defendants
744

See supra Part V.B.
See supra Table 4.
746
See supra Table 4.
747
See supra Table 4.
748
See supra Table 4.
749
See supra Table 4.
750
See supra Table 4.
751
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 5(d)(1), 119 Stat. 4, 13
(“EXCEPTION.—This section shall not apply to any class action that solely involves a
claim concerning a covered security as defined under section 16(f)(3) of the Securities
Act of 1933 (15 U.S.C. 78p(f)(3)) and section 28(f)(5)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(5)(E)).”).
752
See supra Table 4.
753
See supra Table 4.
745
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are more likely to win: (1) when the securities-violation pleadings identified corporations or insurers as defendants, and (2) when insurers and/or
multinational corporations defended themselves in state or federal courts
of appeals.754 The “win” ratios for securities-based class action defendants
across all categories are 0.556, 0.588, 0.667, and 0.643 respectively.755
Before leaving Table 4, one final, important observation is warranted.
In the wake of class action reforms and if certain conditions are satisfied,
CAFA allows the following: a corporate defendant may assert that a “mass
action” is essentially a class action and remove the state law lawsuit from
a supposedly “anti-corporate” state court to a purportedly “impartial”
federal district court.756 Under CAFA, a civil action qualifies as a “mass
action” if 100 or more persons present claims that have common questions
of law and fact, and each person wants monetary relief.757 But, historically, using the 100-or-more-persons-claim definition, mass-tort actions have
not been viewed as class actions or mass actions.758 Arguably, CAFA’s
definition overturns conventional wisdom and muddles the definition of
mass torts.759
In fact, before and in the wake of CAFA, anti-reformers asserted
strongly that “mass action” is simply a thinly disguised term for “mass

754

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
756
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 4(a)(11)(A), 119 Stat. 4,
11. Presently, citing CAFA’s mass action removal provisions, federal courts may treat
many state mass-tort actions as if they were class actions. See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2657
(2005) (statement of Rep. John Conyers) (“[T]his substitute [amendment] is the superior
piece of legislation .... The substitute is much better .... [because] we exclude non-class
action cases involving physical injuries. [CAFA] applies not only to class actions, but
also to mass torts. The Democratic substitute removes the mass tort language.”).
757
Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, § 4(a)(11)(B)(i), 119 Stat. at 11.
758
Cf. 151 CONG. REC. 2090 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“Anyone who reads
[CAFA] will notice that ... it affects more than just class actions. Individual actions,
consolidated by state courts for efficiency purposes, are not class actions. Despite the fact
that a similar provision was unanimously struck from the bill during the last Congress,
mass actions reappeared in this bill this Congress. Federalizing these individual cases will
no doubt delay, and possibly deny, justice for victims suffering real injuries.”).
759
See id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“Mass torts are large scale personal injury cases that result from accidents, environmental disasters, or dangerous drugs
that are widely sold. Cases like Vioxx ... and cases arising from asbestos exposure are
examples of mass torts. These personal injury claims are usually based on State laws, and
almost every State has well established rules of procedure to allow their State courts to
customize the needs of their litigants in these complex cases.”).
755
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torts.”760 And from anti-reformers’ perspective, class action reformers and
multinational corporations want to federalize all state mass-torts and personal-injury cases.761 Even more pointedly, a fairly large consortium of
anti-reformers insists that CAFA’s removal provisions are:
Patently unfair to citizens harmed by toxic spills, contaminated drinking water, polluted air and other environmental hazards .... [CAFA]
would allow corporate defendants in many ... “mass tort” environmental cases to remove these kinds of state environmental matters from
state court to federal court, placing the cases in a forum that could be
more costly, more time-consuming, and disadvantageous [for the victims of] toxic pollution.762

On the other hand, class action reformers have been just as adamant,
insisting that “[m]ass torts and mass actions are not the same.”763 But even
more ardent class action reformers have stressed that mass-tort actions are
indeed nothing less than nationwide class actions.764 Thus, according to
the more adamant reformers, mass-tort actions—like nationwide class
actions generally—should be removed to and litigated in federal courts,
because (1) mass-tort actions are abusive,765 (2) they allow unethical law760

See, e.g., id. at 1660 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“[S]upporters of [CAFA]
claim that mass actions are not the same as mass torts and ... they have no desire to affect
mass tort cases. I know that is their position, but it is not what [CAFA] says.”).
761
See, e.g., id. at 2648 (statement of Rep. Sheila Jackson-Lee) (“This class action
lawsuit legislation ... is excessive and overreaching.... [It] wants to federalize mass
torts.”); id. at 1660 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (“If the goal is to federalize all state
personal injury cases, supporters should be open about it and say it publicly.”).
762
Id. at 2649 (statements from a letter submitted by S. Elizabeth Birnbaum, Vice
President for Government, American Rivers, and various other environmental organizations).
763
See id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin) (quoting comment of Sen. Trent
Lott) (“The phrase ‘mass torts’ refers to a situation in which many persons are injured by
the same underlying cause, such as a single explosion, a series of event, or exposure to a
particular product. In contrast, the phrase ‘mass action’ refers to a specific type of lawsuit
in which a large number of plaintiffs seek to have all their claims adjudicated in one
combined trial. Mass actions are basically disguised class actions.”); id. at 2649.
764
151 CONG. REC. 2642 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“The mass action
provision was included in [CAFA] because mass actions are really class actions in disguise. They involve an element of people who want their claims adjudicated together, and
they often result in the same abuses as class actions. In fact, sometimes the abuses are
even worse because the lawyers seek to join claims that have little to do with each other
and confuse a jury into awarding millions of dollars to individuals who have suffered no
real injury.”).
765
See, e.g., id. at 1826 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Abuse of the class action
system has even become the inspiration for popular literature. In 2003, ... John Grisham
released a book entitled ‘The King of Torts.’ Grisham’s novel takes its reader into the
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yers to game the system to secure hefty attorneys’ fees,766 and (3) they
undermine the “economic competitiveness” of national and multinational
corporations.767
Therefore, against the backdrop of corporate defendants’ newly acquired right to remove larger numbers of purely state substantive law mass
actions from state courts to federal courts, there is one additional pressing
question: Are states’ righters and anti-reformers’ general fears about corporate defendants abusing that right warranted? Or, stated differently, are
corporate defendants more likely to win greater numbers of class action
lawsuits if state law mass actions or mass-tort actions satisfy the 100-ormore-persons class action rule and are removed from state courts to federal courts? Arguably, without considering any other variables, the remaining statistics in Table 4 provide some insight.
Once more, in the table, class members’ and class action defendants’
win/loss ratios appear under two broad categories—“Corporations and
Insurers Cases” and “Insurers Only Cases.”768 Now, examine the second
row of ratios. Those coefficients demonstrate the dispositions of tort-based
class actions, or class actions in which class members’ theory of recovery
sounded in tort.769 The results are mixed, which probably explains class
action reformers’ and anti-reformers’ passion about this issue and their
respective desires to litigate tort-based, personal-injury lawsuits either in
state or federal courts.770 First, class members are substantially more likely
to win tort-based class actions in state appellate courts, regardless of
whether complainants sued multinational corporations and insurers jointly
or individually.771 The class members’ “win” ratios in state appellate
courts are 0.667 and 0.675, respectively.772

world of the mass tort/class action lawyer where clients are treated like chattel and bargaining chips.... The end game is not the pursuit of justice for the class members and
clients, but in the pursuit of a hefty attorney’s fee. Although Grisham’s book is intended
as fiction, it is hard to distinguish it from the facts of our broken class action system.”).
766
Id.
767
Id. at 2091 (statement of Sen. John Cornyn) (“I have spoken previously on this
floor about my concerns that this legislation does not go far enough to address the scandal of litigation abuse that plagues our civil justice system. I stand by those concerns
today. We can and should do more to reduce the burden of frivolous, expensive litigation.
Our Nation’s economic competitiveness in the 21st century depends on it.”).
768
See supra Table 4.
769
See supra Table 4.
770
See supra Table 4.
771
See supra Table 4.
772
See supra Table 4.
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In contrast, corporate defendants are substantially more likely to win
tort-based class actions when those claims are litigated in federal courts of
appeals.773 And corporate defendants won large percentages of tort-based,
federal class actions regardless of whether class members sued multinational corporations and insurers jointly or individually.774 Corporate defendants’ “win” ratios in federal courts are 66.7% and 84.6%, respectively.775
To conclude the discussion of the results in Table 4, the brief comments of a class action reformer and anti-reformer are worth restating. The
proponent stressed: “The class action system ... is broken. Over the past
decade, class action lawsuits have grown by over 1,000 percent nationwide. This extraordinary increase has [produced] ... claims that are often
unjust. [Class actions involving multistate] plaintiffs and defendants ... are
tried in small State courts with known biases.”776 But the anti-reformer
asserted:
[T[he business community has worked ... long and ... hard to remove
the rights of consumers and citizens to sue in their own State courts....
The businesses know they can win more class action cases in Federal
courts than they could ever win in State courts. That is what this whole
[CAFA] debate is about.777

Which position is correct? Based on the limited findings in Table 4,
the anti-reformers’ position is only partially correct.778 It is true: multinational corporations, insurers, and other corporate defendants—rather than
class action complainants—are more likely to win class actions by substantially larger margins in federal courts of appeals.779 There is, however,
an even more surprising finding: multinational corporations and insurers
are also more likely to win class actions by substantial margins in state
appellate courts.780 This latter, unexpected finding seriously challenges,
and even negates, the accuracy of class action reformers’ unrelenting and
previously discussed assertions that class action reforms are needed, because (1) class action systems in state courts are broken, (2) state court
judges have known biases against out-of-state corporate defendants, and
773

See supra Table 4.
See supra Table 4.
775
See supra Table 4.
776
151 CONG. REC. 2084 (2005) (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi).
777
Id. at 2082 (statement of Sen. Dick Durbin).
778
See supra Table 4.
779
See supra Table 4.
780
See supra Table 4.
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(3) anti-corporate biases prevent corporate defendants from winning a
significant number of class actions in state courts.
E. Two-Stage Multivariate Probit Analysis of the Relationship Between
Litigants’ Characteristics and the Disposition of Class Actions in State
and Federal Courts of Appeals
The discussion above revealed several broad, statistically significant
findings: (1) litigants’ status—class members versus class defendants—
influences who is more likely to win an overwhelming majority of class
actions in both state and federal courts, (2) state and federal courts’ geographic locations influence whether class members or defendants win a
majority of class actions, and (3) class members’ theories of recovery—
choice of substantive laws—significantly influence whether class complainants win a majority of class actions in state or federal courts.781
Certainly, these broad findings preclude anyone from establishing persuasively that allegedly “biased” judicial rulings determine whether plaintiffs or defendants will win a majority of class actions in state or federal
courts. As the author has explained on other occasions in published law
review articles, to determine whether there is evidence of “judicial bias,”
several factors must be weighed. 782 But even more importantly, one must
address forthrightly questions about the quality of the sample data—
whether the cases appearing in regional law reporters actually reflect what
is occurring in courts, factually and generally.783 Therefore, to increase the
likelihood of one’s conducting a sound study, an investigator must (1)
employ a procedure that generates more “powerful” inferential statistics
and coefficients than simple percentages, (2) measure the unique as well
as simultaneous effects of legal and extralegal variables on the disposition
of class actions, and (3) test for “selectivity bias” in the sample data. 784
Why test for “selectivity bias” in sample data? Arguably, appellate
courts’ rulings are more important and persuasive, since those rulings are
781

See supra Table 4.
See Rice, supra note 296, at 1208–09 (discussing the inherent problems with using
only reported cases and simple percentages to make inferences). To be sure, there are
“full” judicial decisions which are not published in various federal and state reporters.
However, to address that limitation in part, the present study includes both cases appearing in the reporters as well as in multiple online state and federal databases.
783
See Rice, supra note 296, at 1208–09.
784
In several published articles, the author has discussed “selectivity bias,” the problems that it generates, and the test for it in sample data. See Willy E. Rice, Insurance
Contracts and Judicial Decisions over Whether Insurers Must Defend Insureds that
Violate Constitutional and Civil Rights: An Historical and Empirical Review of Federal
and State Court Declaratory Judgments 1900–2000, 35 TORT & INS. L. J. 995, 1088–89
nn.431–32 (2000); Rice, supra note 296, at 1209 n.386; Rice, supra note 266, at 371–75
nn.157–59 (1992).
782
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significantly more likely to be “final decisions” than federal district courts
or state trial courts’ rulings. However, after state trial courts and federal
district courts issue unfavorable class action rulings or judgments, some
class plaintiffs and defendants accept those decisions and choose not to
seek appellate review.785 Other class litigants, however, refuse to accept
lower courts’ adverse judgments, and the latter litigants decide to challenge unfavorable outcomes in either state or federal appellate courts.786
Therefore, the obvious question becomes whether any statistically significant difference exists between the attributes of litigants who choose to
appeal adverse rulings and those who decide not to appeal. Of course, if
there are significant differences between “appealers” and “nonappealers,”
their dissimilar personal attributes—rather than “judicial bias” or other
factors—might provide the better explanation of appealers’ propensity to
win or lose more or less class actions in state and federal courts of appeals.
Since the current sample contains some information about the attributes of
class action “appealers” and “nonappealers,” a test for “selectivity bias”
was warranted before attempting to measure whether “judicial bias” exists
in state and federal appellate courts’ class action proceedings.787
Again, in this Part, the goal is to understand more fully why class action defendants and plaintiffs are likely to have relatively larger or smaller
win/loss ratios in state or federal courts of appeals. And to help achieve
that end, the present analysis employs a statistical procedure that allows
one to measure unique as well as simultaneous effects of specific legal and
extralegal variables—say, theories of recovery, types of defendants, and
geographic locations of courts—on the disposition of class actions in state
and federal appellate courts. Stated slightly differently, the challenge is to
secure the specific individual, statistical effects (“explanations”) of certain
variables on the courts’ dispositions of class actions, while controlling for
and determining the multiple and simultaneous effects of other “presumed” random factors. Thus, to help increase the likelihood of achieving
the stated ends, the author employed a multivariate, two-staged, probit
procedure.788
785

See supra Table 2.
See supra Table 3.
787
See Rice, supra note 296, at 1209.
788
In multiple published law review articles, the author has discussed and employed
this statistical procedure to measure simultaneously unique and multiple effects of predictors on the disposition of court decisions. See Willy E. Rice, Federal Courts and the
Regulation of the Insurance Industry: An Empirical and Historical Analysis of Courts’
Ineffectual Attempts to Harmonize Federal Antitrust, Arbitration and Insolvency Statutes
with the McCarran-Ferguson Act—1941–1993, 43 CATH. U. L. REV. 399, 445–49
nn.213–19 (1994); Rice, supra note 296 at 1088–94 nn.431–32, 1208–14 n.386–87;
Willy E. Rice, Judicial and Administrative Enforcement of Title VI, Title IX, and Section
504: A Pre- and Post-Grove City Analysis, 5 REV. LITIG. 219, 287 nn.406–09 (1986)
(using StataCorp’s STATA STATISTICAL SOFTWARE to analyze the data generally and to
786
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Now, consider Table 5. It presents a multivariate probit analysis of the
disposition of class actions in state and federal courts of appeals.789 The
table illustrates several distributions, probit values, and statistics for two
multivariate models—Model A and Model B.790
TABLE 5
THE MULTIVARIATE EFFECTS OF SELECTED VARIABLES ON LITIGANTS’
DECISIONS TO COMMENCE CLASS ACTION LAWSUITS AND ON THE
DISPOSITION OF THOSE ACTIONS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS,
1925–2011 (N = 2657)

MODEL A
Selected Predictor Variables

Decision to Initiate Causes
of Action to State and
Federal Courts of Appeals
(N = 1680)

Decision of Causes of
Action in State and
Federal Courts of Appeals
(N = 1680)

Probit
Values

Probit
Values

Robust Std.
Errors

Complainants’ Ethnicity:
Anglo-American
African-American

-0.1370
-0.1439

0.0633*
0.1320

Circuits:
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eleventh Circuit

-0.0727
0.7487
0.5443
0.1619

INTERACTION EFFECTS:
ClassAction* STATE Courts
ClassAction* Insurers
ClassAction* Corporations
ClassAction* Contract Claims
ClassAction* Tort Claims
ClassAction* Civil-Rights Claims
ClassAction* Consumers’ Claims
ClassAction* Securities Claims
ClassAction* Antitrust Claims
CONSTANT

Robust Std.
Errors

-0.0070
-0.0466

0.0784
0.1409

0.1196
0.0981***
0.0968***
0.0877

0.1809
0.2076
0.2922
0.1559

0.1544
0.1668
0.1355*
0.0975

0.5255
0.5377
-0.0046
-0.4806
-0.3428
-0.3743
-0.5587
-0.6662
-0.4959

0.0948***
0.1144***
0.1376***
0.1102***
0.1096**
0.1474**
0.1061***
0.1359***
0.2467*

0.3776
-0.0126
0.0742
-0.5145
0.1736
0.0215
-0.4006
-0.3037
0.0509

0.1374**
0.1865
0.1637
0.1473***
0.1697
0.2071
0.1527**
0.2378
0.3120

0.3964

0.0500***

-0.3989

0.2258

Wald test for independent equations (“selectivity bias”): Chi square = 0.7900, p-value = 0.3743

*** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.001
** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.01
* Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.05

compute the multivariate-probit coefficients in particular); Rice, supra note 266, at 369–
77 nn.157–60.
789
See infra Table 5. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of
the William & Mary Business Law Review.
790
See infra Table 5.
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TABLE 5 (CONTINUED)

MODEL B
Selected Predictor Variables

Decision to Initiate Causes
of Action to State and
Federal Courts of Appeals
(N = 1680)

Decision of Causes of
Action in State and
Federal Courts of Appeals
(N = 1680)

Probit
Values

Probit
Values

Robust Std.
Errors

Robust Std.
Errors

Complainants’ Ethnicity:
Anglo-American
African-American

-0.2013
-0.1655

0.0633***
0.1339

-0.0565
-0.0582

Circuits:
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eleventh Circuit

-0.0512
0.7780
0.5634
0.1803

0.1205
0.0982***
0.0982***
0.0891*

0.1867
0.2554
0.3219
0.1739

0.1482
0.1329*
0.1129**
0.0944

INTERACTION EFFECTS:
ClassAction* FEDERAL Courts
ClassAction* Insurers
ClassAction* Corporations
ClassAction* Contract Claims
ClassAction* Tort Claims
ClassAction* Civil-Rights Claims
ClassAction* Consumers’ Claims
ClassAction* Securities Claims
ClassAction* Antitrust Claims

-0.8159
0.8100
0.2497
-0.2564
0.1826
0.1584
-0.2760
-0.1881
-0.1686

0.1007***
0.1145***
0.1375
0.1036*
0.1072
0.1668
0.1103**
0.1519
0.2563

-0.6309
0.2013
0.2632
-0.3560
0.2625
0.4205
-0.2147
0.0453
0.3122

0.1512***
0.1760
0.1596
0.1261**
0.1426
0.1961*
0.1268
0.2132
0.3014

0.4584

0.0498***

-0.4146

0.1455**

CONSTANT

Wald test for independent equations (“selectivity bias”): Chi square = 1.910, p-value = 0.1647

*** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.001
** Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.01
* Absolute value of the z statistic is significant at p < 0.05

0.0757
0.1373
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At the outset, it is important to note that the findings in Table 5 are
based on a multivariate probit analysis of 1,680 cases rather than 2,657
cases—the total sample size.791 Of the 1,680 cases, there are 824 state and
federal class action decisions.792 Of this latter number, litigants appealed
519 class actions to federal and state appellate courts, and they decided not
to appeal 305 class actions.793 The remaining 856 cases are non-class action decisions; they were also decided in state and federal lower courts.794
Of the non-class action cases, litigants decided to appeal nearly seventy
percent (69.3%) to appellate courts.795 The remaining thirty percent
(30.6%) were not appealed.796 Of course, we do not know why some class
action and non-class action litigants decided not to appeal adverse rulings
or outcomes. To use statistical jargon, those cases were “unobserved” in
either state or federal courts of appeals. Thus, their absence could be a
source of “selectivity bias” when attempting to explain class action litigants’ wins/losses in state and federal courts of appeals.
Against the backdrop of those preliminary remarks, consider the variables and coefficients in Model A, which appears left of the vertical line in
Table 5.797 That model comprises three predictor variables, along with
their subcategories: “Complainants’ Ethnicity” has two categories; “Circuits” has four categories; and, nine additional variables appear under the
heading “Interaction Effects.”798 To the right of the vertical line, Model B
791

See infra Table A. A copy of the author’s database is available at the office of
the William & Mary Business Law Review. The purpose of the content analysis was to
gather information about more than forty variables. Thus, if any case had a missing value
on any variable, those cases were omitted to increase the likelihood of performing a
sound multivariate probit analysis. Thus, the author omitted 977 cases.
792
See supra Table 2.
793
See supra Table 2.
794
See infra Table A.
795
See infra Table A.
796
See infra Table A. These percentages are based on a review of the non-class action
statistic in Table A.
797
See supra Table 5.
798
See, e.g., Pat K. Chew & Robert E. Kelly, Myth of the Color-Blind Judge: An Empirical Analysis of Racial Harassment Cases, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 1117, 1139–40 n.122
(2009) (“By testing multiple variables simultaneously in this way, we can evaluate
whether each characteristic has a statistically significant relationship with case outcome,
while controlling for all others.... [Regressions] provide a unified framework in which to
examine and test interaction effects, which indicate whether two (or more) variables
together have an effect different than would be expected from knowledge of their individual effects alone.... Finally, [one may test] for statistical interactions between variables
in ... regression models [to determine] ...whether the effect of each variable on case
outcome depends in magnitude and/or direction of the value of another variable.”); see
also Ian Ayres, Further Evidence of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Esti-
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appears.799 Barring one exception, the variables in Model B are identical
to those in Model A.800 The one exception becomes readily apparent if the
reader carefully reviews the nine interaction-effect variables in each model.801 Even more to the point, the first “dummy” interaction-effect variable
in Model A is “ClassAction*STATE Courts.”802 However, in Model B, the
first “dummy” interaction-effect predictor is “ClassAction*FEDERAL
Courts.”803
Model A presents two distributions of probit values, along with their
respective distributions of robust standard errors and z-statistics.804 The
various asterisks describe the probit values’ levels of statistical significance.805 The “Interaction Effects” are simply “categorical dummy variables” which measure the independent effects of categories within certain
predictor variables only among complainants who filed state law class
actions. The probit values appearing under the caption “Decision to Initiate Causes of Action in State and Federal Courts of Appeals (N=1,680)”
answer this inquiry: whether the multiple and simultaneous effects of
“Complainants’ Ethnicity, Types of Circuits and Interaction Effects” significantly influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal their adverse rulings.806
The findings show that some of the probit values are statistically significant.807 Thus, we may conclude that some of the factors influenced
class action litigants’ decisions to appeal unfavorable lower court rulings
to state and federal appeals courts.808 Likewise, in Model B, many of the
mates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109, 115–16 n.27 (1995) (explaining and measuring
the statistical effects of “dummy” interaction variables—zeros and ones—on sellers’ and
buyers’ decisions and bargaining outcomes).
799
See supra Table 5.
800
See supra Table 5.
801
See supra Table 5.
802
See supra Table 5.
803
See supra Table 5.
804
See supra Table 5.
805
See, e.g., Thomas J. Brennan, What Happens After a Holiday?: Long-Term Effects
of the Repatriation Provision of the AJCA, 5 N.W.J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 11–12 nn.34–35
(2010) (“Columns of the table represent separate regressions, and rows of the table represent variables corresponding to coefficients computed in the regressions.... The value
reported for each regression and variable is the point estimate of the coefficient, and the
value [to the right] is the robust standard error estimate.... In reports of regression results
in this Article the notations *, **, and *** are used to indicate statistical significance at
the levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. These values are computed using the robust
standard errors described in the above footnote.”).
806
See supra Table 5.
807
See supra Table 5.
808
See supra Table 5.
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same variables influenced litigants’ decisions to appeal state trial courts’
and federal district courts’ adverse rulings.809 In both models, the litigants’
decision to appeal or not appeal can be explained by (1) knowing the
complainants’ ethnicity, (2) knowing the circuits in which the state and
federal courts were located, and (3) knowing complainants’ theories of
recovery.810
Now, given those statistically significant findings, we must answer the
most important question: whether “selectivity bias” appears in the data.
Stated differently, is there any meaningful difference between litigants
who decided to appeal adverse class action rulings and those litigants who
decided not to appeal? This necessarily requires a researcher to “test” for
similarities between, say, two equations—the two distributions of probit
values within Model A as well as the two distributions of values within
Model B. At the bottom of each model in Table 5, two Wald tests for
independent equations suggest that no meaningful “selectivity bias” exists,
because the respective Chi-square values are not statistically significant.811
Therefore, in light of no apparent “self-selection bias,” the important inquiry becomes whether the simultaneous and multiple effects of the predictors in Model A and Model B are significantly more or less likely to
sway the dispositions of class action disputes in appellate courts. Put simply, the answer is yes.
Again, reconsider Model A and examine the probit values under the
heading “Disposition of Causes of Action in State and Federal Courts of
Appeals.” Four predictors have statistically significant probit values.812
The “Seventh Circuit” variable has a positive 0.2922 probit value.813 It
means that complainants generally are substantially more likely to prevail
in all state and federal appellate courts that are located within the borders
of the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.814 And it is important to repeat that
this applies to all complainants without controlling for whether they were
class action or non-class action plaintiffs.815
However, the next three statistically significant probit values in Model
A are class action-specific findings. Consider the first interaction-effect
variable. The positive 0.3776 coefficient reveals that class action complainants are significantly more likely to win their cases in state courts of
809

See supra Table 5.
See supra Table 5.
811
See supra Table 5.
812
See supra Table 5.
813
See supra Table 5.
814
See supra Table 5.
815
See supra Table 5.
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appeals.816 On the other hand, the remaining two interaction-effect variables tell a different story.817 Reviewing the “ClassAction*Contracts” variable, the corresponding probit value under the column “Disposition of
Causes of Action” is negative (-0.5145).818 It strongly suggests that class
action complainants are significantly more likely to lose on appeal when
their theory of recovery sounds in contract.819 Also, class action members
are substantially more likely to lose when they sue corporate defendants
for allegedly violating consumer protection laws.820 The corresponding
probit coefficient for the “ClassAction*Consumers’ Claims” variable is
negative (-0.4006).821
A review of the coefficients in Model B—under the caption “Disposition of Causes of Action in State and Federal Courts of Appeals”—reveals
five variables with corresponding statistically significant probit values.822
First, the positive 0.3219 probit value in Model B indicates that plaintiffs
generally are substantially more likely to prevail in both state and federal
courts of appeals located within the borders of the Seventh Circuit’s jurisdiction.823 This finding is consistent with the finding in Model A.824 But
the positive and statistically significant 0.2554 probit value indicates that
plaintiffs generally are also substantially more likely to prevail when they
appeal their cases to state and federal appellate courts within the borders
of the Fifth Circuit’s jurisdiction.825 Of course, this latter finding is inconsistent with the Fifth-Circuit finding in Model A.826
The third statistically significant variable—“ClassAction*Federal
Courts”—in Model B confirms what class action reformers know as well
as what anti-reformers and states’ righters fear: complainants who file
state law class actions in federal courts of appeals are substantially more
likely to lose than win.827 The corresponding statistically significant and
negative probit coefficient (-0.6309) supports this conclusion.828 And to
underscore this latter finding, one needs only to consider the next statisti816

See supra Table 5.
See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
819
See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
821
See supra Table 5.
822
See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
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See supra Table 5.
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cally significant finding in Model B: class action complainants are substantially more likely to lose on appeal when their theory of recovery
sounds in contract.829 The corresponding statistically noteworthy probit
coefficient (-0.3560) for the interaction-effect variable—“ClassAction
*Contract Claims”—is negative.830
The final statistically significant variable in Model B is “ClassAction
*Civil-Rights Claims.” Its corresponding probit value (0.4205) is positive.831 It strongly suggests that class action members are considerably
more likely to win than lose civil-rights actions in courts of appeals.832 By
comparison, the positive influence of this latter variable for class members
does not appear in Model A.833 Then again, in Model A, the “ClassAction
*Consumers’ Claims” variable has a statistically significant and negative
influence (-0.4006) on class members’ likelihood of success in courts of
appeal.834 On the other hand, the direction of this latter variable’s influence under Model B is also negative (-0.2147); its impact, however, is not
statistically significant.835
Finally, one additional observation is worth noting at this point. In
Models A and B, the respective probit values for complainants’ ethnicity—Anglo-American and African-American—are not statistically significant.836 Of course, in law, there is no sound reason why they should be
“predictive.”837 But several empirically based legal studies have shown
that, wittingly or unwittingly, both state and federal courts of appeals
allow complainants’ race/ethnicity to influence outcomes in a variety of
legal controversies.838
829

See supra Table 5.
See supra Table 5.
831
See supra Table 5.
832
See supra Table 5.
833
See supra Table 5.
834
See supra Table 5.
835
See supra Table 5.
836
See supra Table 5.
837
Willy E. Rice, Race, Gender, Redlining, and the Discriminatory Access to Loans,
Credit, and Insurance: An Historical and Empirical Analysis of Consumers Who Sued
Lenders and Insurers in Federal and State Courts, 1950–1995, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
583, 584 (1996).
838
See generally David C. Baldus et al., Racial Discrimination and the Death Penalty
in the Post-Furman Era: An Empirical and Legal Overview, with Recent Findings from
Philadelphia, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1638 (1998); Charlotte L. Lanvers, Different Federal
District Court, Different Disposition: An Empirical Comparison of ADA, Title VII Race
and Sex, and ADEA Employment Discrimination Dispositions in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia, 16 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 381
(2007); Rice, supra note 837.
830
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Therefore, in light of the positive and negative effects of the variables
discussed above, we must ask: what do the statistically significant class
action findings suggest? At a minimum, we may conclude that, when
examining the unique and concurrent impact of all variables in the two
models, complainants are significantly more likely to win when (1) state
courts of appeals decide the class action disputes, and (2) when appellate
courts hear and resolve civil-rights disputes.839 Conversely, class action
defendants—multinational corporations and insurers—are appreciably
more likely to prevail (1) when federal courts of appeals resolve the class
action controversies, and (2) when appellate courts hear and resolve class
actions involving breach-of-contract action and consumer violation
claims.840
But should one expect class members to win considerably more class
actions in state appellate courts than class defendants? Should defendants
prevail significantly more often when federal courts of appeals decide
questions of law and fact in class action cases? Furthermore, should one
expect the unique effects of class members’ theories of recovery or choices of law to predict class members’ likelihood of winning or losing in
either federal or state courts of appeals? Or should one expect any of the
variables appearing in Table 5 to influence the disposition of class actions
in state and federal courts of appeals? The resounding answer to each
question is no.841
Yet as we have seen in this empirical study, those variables affect class
action litigants’ likelihood of receiving favorable or unfavorable legal and
equitable rulings and remedies in state and federal courts of appeals.842 In
view of these unexpected statistical findings, one could reasonably conclude that both federal and state appellate courts are intentionally or unintentionally allowing irrelevant, prejudicial or extra-legal factors significantly influence the disposition of class actions. Perhaps the statistical
effects of immaterial variables on litigants’ likelihood of success or failure
explain, in part, class action defendants’ and complainants’ respective
reticence about litigating class actions in state courts or in federal courts.
CONCLUSION
Among objective judges and experienced practicing attorneys, there is
general agreement about one point: a class action is a more efficient pro839

See supra Table 5.
See supra Table 3.
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cedure to resolve numerous disputes at once, using a single lawsuit rather
than multiple, time-consuming, and expensive lawsuits.843 Moreover, the
Supreme Court has found and concluded on numerous occasions that state
court judges are remarkably competent to decide general actions involving
state and federal claims.844 Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that state
judges also have the requisite proficiency as well as the professional and
judicial character to hear and decide state substantive law class actions in a
fair manner. Yet, as reported throughout this Article, class action reformers—primarily multinational corporations, national insurance companies,
and their congressional supporters—have been quite vocal: reformers have
proclaimed incessantly that state court judges and juries are exceedingly
ill-prepared to hear and decide state law class actions, especially those
which are allegedly disputes of “national importance.”845 Moreover, class
843

See, e.g., Beverly Enterprises-Arkansas, Inc. v. Thomas, 259 S.W.3d 445, 451
(Ark. 2007) (“A class action is clearly a more efficient way of handling a case where
there is a predominating, common issue to be resolved for all 489 class members.”);
Citizens Ins. Co. of Am. v. Daccach, 217 S.W.3d 430, 455 (Tex. 2007) (“Aggregation of
claims in an appropriate class action is a more efficient way to resolve numerous disputes
at once.”).
844
See, e.g., San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 545 U.S. 323, 347
(2005) (“State courts are fully competent to adjudicate constitutional challenges to local
land-use decisions. Indeed, state courts undoubtedly have more experience than federal
courts do in resolving the complex factual, technical, and legal questions related to zoning and land-use regulations.”); Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438, 449
(2001) (“[We] concluded that both courts erred [by] failing to recognize that the state
court was competent to hear the employee’s personal injury claim and the vessel owner’s
claim for limitation.”); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 930 (1975) (“The principle underlying Younger and Samuels is that state courts are fully competent to adjudicate
constitutional claims, and therefore a federal court should, in all but the most exceptional
circumstances, refuse to interfere with an ongoing state criminal proceeding.”); Madruga
v. Super. Ct. of Cal., 346 U.S. 556, 560–61 (1954) (“[State courts are] ‘competent’ to
adjudicate maritime causes of action in proceedings ‘in personam,’ [if] the defendant is a
person [rather than] a ship or some other instrument of navigation.”) (citation omitted);
see also California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 399, 411 (1982) (noting that the
district court in this case was without jurisdiction unless there was no “plain, speedy and
efficient remedy” in state court); Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 528
(1980) (finding the Illinois’ legal remedy was a “plain, speedy and efficient” remedy”).
845
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 1828 (2005) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“This
[class action reform bill] is not an overwhelming antilawyer bill.... This is a bill that will
straighten out these egregious, wrongful actions by some of these jurisdictions by putting
these important cases in courts where it is much more likely that justice will prevail.... It
is just that these cases will be tried in federal jurisdictions in these very prestigious federal courts, as they should be because of the diversity problems that are presented by these
cases, and it is much more likely that we will have less fraud, less unfairness, less jackpot
justice in the federal courts.”); id. at 2643 (statement of Rep. Edward Markey) (“[H]ere it
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action reformers have argued that forcing corporations and national insurers to defend themselves and litigate “nationwide class actions” in state
courts is inefficient and unfair, because each state court judge has to weigh
and apply, if necessary, fifty-one different sets of substantive laws to resolve each dispute.846
Perhaps class action reformers’ more cutting and contentious charges
are these: (1) “crafty,” “abusive,” “unscrupulous,” and “profiteering” class
action lawyers shamelessly manipulate or “game” state courts’ civil procedures and file “frivolous class actions”—which allegedly harm consumers, businesses, the economy, and job creation;847 (2) “dishonest” class
is, ladies and gentlemen. Citigroup’s Smith Barney subdivision: ‘Tobacco. Flash—Senate
Just Passed Class Action Bill—Positive for Tobacco.’ Let me read it to you: ‘The Senate
just passed [a class action reform] bill, 72–26.... This bill is designated to funnel class
action suits with plaintiffs in different States out of State courts and into the federal court
system, which is typically much less sympathetic to such litigation. The practical effect
of the change could be that many cases will never be heard given how overburdened
Federal judges are, which might help limit the number of cases .... [The CAFA] is the
final payback to the tobacco industry, to the asbestos industry, to the oil industry, to the
chemical industry at the expense of ordinary families who need to be able to go to court
to protect their loved ones when their health has been compromised. And these people are
saying, your State is not smart enough, your jurors are not smart enough to understand
how the MTBE ruined the groundwater in their state and poisoned thousands of people,
that it has to go to a State where Amerada Hess or some large oil company feels comfortable.”).
846
See Cole v. Gen. Motors Corp., 484 F.3d 717, 721 (5th Cir. 2007) (discussing a
corporate defendant “asserting that the district court abused its discretion [by] certifying a
nationwide class ... under the laws of fifty-one jurisdictions”); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab.
Litig., 239 F.R.D. 450, 454 (E.D. La. 2006) (regarding a corporate defendant’s claim that
the application of the laws of fifty-one jurisdictions to the proposed class action claims
prevented class members from satisfying the typicality, adequacy, predominance, and
superiority requirements of Rule 23).
847
See 151 CONG. REC. 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[W]e need to pass
this [class action reform bill because] there are loopholes in the class action system.... [I]n
recent years class actions have been subject to abuses that actually work to the detriment
of individual consumers.... Additionally, this gaming of the system clearly works to the
detriment of business and our economy and the need for job creation. We currently have
a system, therefore, which some trial lawyers...game the system in an effort to maximize
their fees.”); id. at 1826 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Frequently, class actions are
the best way to compensate large groups of injured consumers. Yet, ... the financial
reward of a settlement is so great that the class action system has attracted a small group
of unscrupulous lawyers who will do anything, say anything, and sue anything or anybody—not to help their clients but to line their own pockets.... A small handful of
wealthy lawyers is profiting from the class action system.”); id. at 1809 (statement of
Sen. John Cornyn) (“We have seen that some of these egregious abuses of the class
action procedure have been used to make certain entrepreneurial lawyers very wealthy
when the consumers literally get a coupon worth pennies on the dollar .... I like to think
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action lawyers’ “sympathetic,” “friendly,” and unprincipled “accomplices”—state court judges—wield enormous judicial powers, creating injustice and “tilting” judicial proceedings in favor of class action lawyers;848
and (3) “intimidating” state court judges are intentionally biased against
out-of-state defendants and consistently violate corporate defendants’
fundamental rights of due process.849 Therefore, according to class action
reformers, multinational corporations and insurers are more likely to
“lose” class action lawsuits procedurally and on the merits in state
courts.850
anybody with common sense recognizes the very real abuses that have occurred in the
class action system.”); see also supra notes 613 and 726 and accompanying text.
848
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2636 (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner) (“I rise
in strong support of ... the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005.... The crisis now threatens
the integrity of our civil justice system and undermines the economic vitality upon which
job creation depends.... [Among the] infamous handful of magnet courts ... the increase in
filings now exceeds 5,000 percent. The only explanation for this phenomenon is aggressive forum shopping by trial lawyers to find courts and judges who will act as willing
accomplices in a judicial power grab, hearing nationwide cases and setting policy for the
entire country.”); id. at 2085 (statement of Sen. George Allen) (“We have heard about
cases where lawyers shop around to find courts in particular counties that have a proven
track record of being sympathetic to class action lawsuits with absurdly large judgments.
When justice arbitrarily hinges on [the location of the] county in which a case is tried,
that is not fair.”); id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“Over the past several
years, we have seen a rise in the number of class action lawsuits filed in a few state courts
known for tilting the playing field in favor of the plaintiffs’ bar ... dishonestly ... getting
the courts to not do justice. These courts, referred to as ‘magnet courts’ for their attractive
qualities to enterprising plaintiffs’ lawyers, certify class actions with little regard to
defendants’ due process rights.”).
849
See, e.g., id. at 2645 (statement of Rep. Christopher Cannon) (“[Class action lawyers will] find a person who is the named plaintiff.... Sometimes they have to promise to
pay off that named plaintiff at this point, but that is all part of the game.... Rule 23 is the
rule that would apply in federal courts that defines when a class action can be certified
consistent with fundamental fairness and due process considerations. But in this game,
there is no fairness. There is no due process. So [class action lawyers] easily convince
their magnet state [court] to certify ... a class.”); id. at 2081 (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) ([T]he American Tort Reform Association [conducted a study, outlining] large
number[s] of frivolous class actions [by counties. It also listed] judicial cultures that
ignore basic due process and legal protections and ... [the county judges who] intimidate
proponents of tort reform.”); id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[T]rial lawyers seek out jurisdictions in which the judge will not hesitate to approve settlements in
which the lawyers walk away with huge fees and the plaintiff class members often get
next to nothing. The judges in these jurisdictions will decide the claims of other State
citizens under their unique State law. They will use litigation models that deny due process rights to consumers and defendants.”).
850
See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 2084 (statement of Sen. Mike Enzi) (“Lawsuits that
have plaintiffs and defendants from multiple States are tried in small State courts with
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Certainly, the empirical study discussed in this Article cannot and was
not designed to determine whether state court judges and jurors are more
or less competent to decide class actions than their counterparts who sit on
the federal bench. Furthermore, the present study cannot adequately resolve two additional controversies: (1) whether allegedly “intimidating”
and “hostile” state court judges conspire with supposedly “abusive” and
“unscrupulous” class action lawyers to violate class action defendants’
procedural and substantive due-process rights, and (2) whether state court
or federal court judges are more or less likely to allow politics or political
considerations to influence their class action rulings.851 On the other hand,
the statistical findings reported here are clear about one matter: multinational insurers and other corporate defendants are exceedingly more likely
to win class actions in both state and federal courts.852
Moreover, the findings reveal that corporate defendants are more likely to “win” large numbers of class actions regardless of whether federal
district courts or state courts of general jurisdiction decide class actions
procedurally or on the merits.853 But even more telling, corporate defendants—rather than class complainants—are significantly more likely to win
known biases.... [I]n a case involving plaintiffs from Wyoming and Alabama and defendants from New York and Idaho that no party [should have] the inevitable ‘home-court’
advantage that comes when a case is tried in your backyard.... [This bill] is a step in the
right direction.... [I]t ensures that cases involving folks from Illinois, Arkansas, and
Mississippi are not decided in a State court in Wyoming. These ... interstate cases ...
should [be] decided without a home state bias that can exist in some State courts.... [This
bill] gives the defendants in a lawsuit a chance to have their day in an impartial court.”).
851
Cf. id. at 2071 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[S]ome trial lawyers seeking to
game the system in an effort to maximize their fees seek out some small jurisdiction to
pursue nationwide [class action] cases.... Often, these suits have very little, if anything, to
do with the place in which they are brought. Rather, lawyers select the venues for strategic reasons, or for political reasons, a practice known as forum shopping.”); id. at 1831
(statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions) (“[T]he only class of workers that will be negatively
affected by [CAFA] is the trial lawyers who will no longer be able to bring major nationwide class actions in their favorite county court.... It has long been recognized that
Federal courts, by virtue of their independence from political pressure, provide a more
objective, hospitable forum ... than State courts.”); id. at 1827 (statement of Sen. Orrin
Hatch) (“Many State courts appear at times to be nothing more than rubberstamps for
[lawyers].... This is not civil justice.... The Class Action Fairness Act would alleviate
many of the problems present in the current class action system.... [Consumers’ class
actions will] have to be brought in a legitimate way, in Federal court where it is much
less likely that they will be hammered by political judges who are in cahoots with the
plaintiffs’ lawyers in that jurisdiction. Federal courts as a general rule will adequately
dispense justice in these matters.”).
852
See supra Table 3.
853
See supra Table 2.
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the overwhelming majority of class actions in state as well as in federal
courts of appeals.854 In fact, none of the reported statistically significant
findings support class action reformers’ general assertion that multinational corporations and national insurers are substantially more likely to lose
class actions in state courts, because purportedly “incompetent,” “intimidating,” and “prejudiced” state court judges have a noticeable propensity
to abuse out-of-state defendants’ procedural and substantive rights.855
But let us assume that the empirical findings reported here are indisputable and they do not support class action reformers’ and their congressional supporters’ “biased state judges” theory. Still, one might appropriately ask: why should CAFA’s questionable class action removal provision generate the slightest concern among fair-minded states’ righters and
commonsensical jurists—practitioners, judges, and legal scholars? Once
more, under CAFA, a defendant may remove an arguably purely state law
class action from a state trial or circuit court to a federal district court, if
the controversy is a “case of national importance.”856 To prove that a controversy has “national importance,” a defendant must establish three elements: (1) the citizenship of a single class member is different from any
other litigant’s citizenship—“minimal jurisdiction”; (2) the class comprises at least 100 members; and (3) the class members’ requested damages
exceed $5 million.857
854

See supra Table 3.
Cf. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Weickert, 638 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829–30
(N.D. Ohio 2009) (“The ‘Findings’ section of CAFA [states in relevant part]: ‘(4) Abuses
in class actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United
States Constitution, in that State and local courts are (A) keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against
out-of-State defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on
other States and bind the rights of the residents of those States.’ CAFA § 2(a)(4), Pub. L.
No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005). Congress went on to state that one of the purposes of
CAFA was to ‘restore the intent of the framers of the United States Constitution by
providing for Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction.’ CAFA § 2(b)(2).”).
856
See, e.g., Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448 (7th Cir.
2005); Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 2005 WL 1799414, at *4 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005)
(concluding that “a removing defendant bears the burden of establishing federal court
jurisdiction and that all doubts must be resolved in favor of remand” and that CAFA did
not alter this rule).
857
See Weickert, 638 F. Supp. 2d at 829–30 (“Congress intended to expand federal
diversity jurisdiction in certain qualifying class actions (those where the claim exceeds $5
million, the class includes at least 100 plaintiffs, and minimal diversity exits [sic]). The
‘Findings’ section of CAFA reflected this ‘national importance’: (4) Abuses in class
actions undermine the national judicial system, the free flow of interstate commerce, and
855
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To be sure, an intelligible discussion of the “overbroad doctrine” under
the Constitution is neither possible nor warranted here.858 But the procedural test to establish that a class action of national importance is “overbroad,” undermines or attacks at least two key fundamental principles of
judicial federalism: (1) like federal judges, state court judges have the
competence, temperament, and more importantly, common sense to protect all litigants’ basic civil and economic rights; and, (2) state courts are
better suited to hear and decide purely state law causes of action.859
The second principle has been seriously undermined or questioned. To
illustrate, consider these facts. Among other claims, consumers often allege that corporate defendants violate states’ anti-pollution, fair debt collection, consumer protection, deceptive trade practices, employment disthe concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are (A) keeping cases of national importance out of
Federal court; (B) sometimes acting in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State
defendants; and (C) making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States
and bind the rights of the residents of those States. CAFA § 2(a)(4), Pub. L. No. 109-2,
119 Stat. 4, 5 (2005).”); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523,
531 n.7 (1967) (reiterating that Article III of the Constitution grants diversity jurisdiction
and permits federal courts to decide cases with only “minimal diversity”—proof that just
one party or litigant has citizenship which is different from all other parties).
858
See generally In re FedPak Sys., Inc., 80 F.3d 207, 214 (7th Cir. 1996) (questioning federal bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction and favoring a narrow “related to” standard “to
prevent the expansion of federal jurisdiction over disputes that are best resolved by the
state courts”); In re Lemco Gypsum, Inc., 910 F.2d 784, 787–88 (11th Cir. 1990) (questioning federal bankruptcy courts’ jurisdiction and stating that an “overbroad construction” of “related to” jurisdiction may bring into federal court matters that should be
decided by state courts).
859
Cf. Note, Bankruptcy and the Limits of Federal Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV.
703, 709–11 (1982) (“The broadest construction of federal question jurisdiction views
congressional action under article I as a source of judicial power.... Congress, by virtue of
its article I power to create a bankruptcy trustee, can confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over all controversies to which the trustee is a party.... The article III approach does
not limit the federal courts to cases in which the governing law is federal; it has long been
held that some state law claims (even outside such areas as diversity jurisdiction) are
properly the subject of federal jurisdiction. But the article III approach does require the
court to identify a ‘federal interest’ at stake in the litigation of a state law claim. The
range of permissible federal interests thus determines the breadth of federal jurisdiction.
A broad construction of federal interests would grant ‘protective jurisdiction’ when
Congress has enacted legislation ‘expressing a national policy in the area concerned’ ....
But the broad article III approach is flawed by an underlying assumption that state courts
are ill-suited to participate in a national program. That assumption is out of step with the
Supreme Court’s growing reliance on the state courts to protect basic civil and economic
rights. When state courts are viewed as the partners of federal courts, ‘protective jurisdiction’ becomes an overbroad justification for federal jurisdiction over state law claims, the
resolution of which is not necessary to promote federal objectives.” (footnotes omitted)).
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crimination, and products liability statutes.860 Still other class members
file breach-of-contract claims against sellers and vendors who sell defective goods and services within a state.861 However, in the wake of CAFA,
860

See, e.g., Health Group Sues McDonald’s over Happy Meal Toys, SAN JOSE
MERCURY, Dec. 15, 2010 (“A California mother [is] ... suing McDonald’s Corp. to get
the fast-food chain to stop using toys to market meals to young children.... They say
McDonald’s is violating several consumer protection laws .... [L]awyers ... filed the
lawsuit in state court in San Francisco ... [and] have asked that it be certified as a class
action.”); Minnesota Prepares to Sue a Debt Collection Agency, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 29,
2011, at B9, (“Minnesota’s attorney general accused the Encore Capital Group of cutting
corners by filing ‘robo-signed’ affidavits in debt collection lawsuits, the same practice for
which banks have come under fire in home foreclosures.... The Minnesota attorney general, Lori Swanson, accused Encore of fraud .... Ms. Swanson wants the Ohio court to
clarify that the proposed class-action settlement does not bar government agencies from
pursuing similar litigation. She is seeking to file her lawsuit in a Minnesota state court.”);
P. J. Huffstutter, Suits Against Supermarkets Advance: A Judge Certifies Two Class
Actions Brought by Employees of Ralphs and Albertsons, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2010, at
B3 (“A federal judge has certified two separate class-action lawsuits against grocery
chains Ralphs and Albertsons -- advancing a legal fight between the retailers and 9,000
workers who contend they were illegally denied millions of dollars in [unemployment]
benefits during the 2003–04 grocery lockout and strike.”); Dana Littlefield, Two Car
Owners in County Sue Toyota in State Court; Lawyers Are Seeking Class-Action Status,
SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Mar. 27, 2010, at B1 (“A lawsuit was filed ... in state court on
behalf of two San Diego County car owners who claim they’ve experienced the same
problems and defects with their vehicles that led to a recent recall.... [L]awyers said the
[class action] lawsuit was filed in Superior Court because Toyota has offices in California, an option that was unavailable to out-of-state plaintiffs. The attorneys said unfaircompetition laws here would be more beneficial to their clients than federal law.”);
Mireya Navarro, Better Cleanup Is Planned at a Former Chrome Plant, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
6, 2011, at A19 (“New Jersey officials have identified more than 160 sites ... contaminated by chromium. Most of it came from the production of coatings for machine parts and
from chromium-laced waste used as fill material in construction in the 1950s and the
1960s.... [A] class-action lawsuit [was] filed ... in state court against both Honeywell and
PPG seeking compensation for landowners whose properties have been devalued and
payments for regular medical screenings.”); Karen Robinson-Jacobs, Suits Accuse Snapple of False Health Claims, DALL. MORNING NEWS, Nov. 20, 2010, at D1 (“The Planobased maker of Snapple faces lawsuits in California and Florida that accuse the company
of false and misleading’ claims about the health benefits of its Acai Mixed Berry Red
Tea.... [T]he California lawsuit ... was filed ... in federal court and seeks class-action
status .... The Florida case [was] filed in state court [and] ... makes a similar claim.”).
861
See, e.g., Keith Herbert, Customers Seek Class-Action Status, NEWSDAY (New
York), Oct. 28, 2010, at A18 (“Cablevision subscribers, upset over not having Fox television programs during the network’s fee dispute with the cable television provider, have
begun filing class-action lawsuits that seek refunds. Five Cablevision subscribers were
named as complainants in two separate lawsuits, one filed in state court in Nassau County
... [They asked] that a judge approve class-action status, which allows the courts to deal
with a large number of small claims collectively.”).
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disgruntled consumers have filed thousands of such class actions in state
courts, which have been removed to federal district courts.862 Moreover,
even if one uses a conservative and rough estimate, an examination of preand post-CAFA reported cases suggests that nearly ninety percent of the
class actions filed in state courts could qualify as “disputes of national
importance.”863
Thus, in view of the empirical findings reported in this Article, Congress fashioned and enacted an extremely “overbroad” class action removal provision, and Congress achieved that end by embracing class action
reformers’ uninformed arguments which have no sound foundation in fact
or in law.864 As of this writing, there are 94 federal district courts,865 and
approximately 2,177 state trial courts of general jurisdiction.866 Even more
significantly, there are about 10,387 trial judges who try cases in state

862

See Christopher Chorba et al., Year-End Update on Class Actions: Explosive
Growth in Class Actions Continues Despite Mounting Obstacles to Certification, GIBSON
DUNN (Feb. 10, 2009) http://www.gibsondunn.com/Publications/Pages/Year-EndUpdate
OnClassActions.aspx (“The number of class actions has grown exponentially in recent
years. Although reliable numbers are hard to come by, Federal Judicial Center statistics
suggest that new class action cases filed in or removed to federal court increased 72%
between 2001 and 2007, reaching approximately 4,000 to 5,000 annually as of mid-2007
(the last period for which data are available). This represents more than a dozen new
lawsuits every day. And while the Class Action Fairness Act (‘CAFA’) has shifted many
putative nationwide class actions from the state to the federal system, ... class action
lawyers ... report that state court class action activity in many courts has not diminished.
CAFA has prompted a flurry of single-state class actions filed in state courts, and recent
statistics show that in at least one forum favored by the plaintiffs’ bar (Los Angeles),
state class action filings continue to grow.” (footnotes omitted)).
863
The author searched Westlaw’s ALLSTATES database and submitted the following
query on June 21, 2011: sy(“class action” /p damages) & da(aft December 21, 1989).
That submission generated 535 cases. Later, the author executed the Westlaw’s “locate
command,” looking for the following words or phrases in each case: “class size,” million, size, damages, and large. The statement appearing in the text is based on a twentyfive percent sampling of the reported, state law cases.
864
See 151 CONG. REC. 2651–52 (2005) (statement of Rep. Mark Udall).
865
See BNA’S DIRECTORY OF STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, JUDGES, AND CLERKS 1
(2011).
866
See generally id. at xvii. State trial courts of general jurisdiction appear under various headings—circuit courts, commonwealth courts, courts of common pleas, district
courts, superior courts, and supreme court in New York. Id. For each state, the author
reviewed and added the statistics appearing under the heading “Court Structure as of
Fiscal Year 2007.” Id. “The Directory contains listings for courts of record, which are the
top three courts levels; the limited-jurisdiction trial courts are not included. The court
structure charts are included in order to provide a view of the entire court structure of a
state.” Id. Thus, total number appearing in the text is a fair approximation. Id.
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courts.867 Consequently, the implicit message that CAFA’s removal provision communicates is resoundingly clear: year in and year out, ninety-four
federal district courts’ judges—rather than ten thousand-plus state trialcourt judges—are decidedly more efficient, more impartial, and intellectually more talented to adjudicate thousands of purely state law class actions
in a timely manner.868
In addition, contrary to what some class action reformers have proclaimed, the prevailing view is that the ninety-four federal district courts
are already overburdened.869 And, although reasonable minds may differ,
there is general agreement about another matter: CAFA’s “class actions of
national importance” removal test is an easy-to-satisfy standard and it is
likely to exacerbate federal district courts’ overload problems by producing a massive backlog of cases.870 Thus, the author embraces the current
867

BNA’S DIRECTORY, supra 865, at xvii.
151 CONG. REC. 1828 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch).
869
See, e.g., id. at 2074 (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) (“I have heard some opponents ... argue that the Class Action Fairness Act will somehow result in a delay or even a
denial of justice to consumers. They have argued that state courts resolve claims more
quickly, and that removing these actions will result in the overburdening of our federal
courts. I have yet to see or hear a single shred of persuasive evidence to support these
claims. In fact, according to the data, a strong case in the opposite direction can be made.
According to two separate examinations of the state and federal court systems conducted
by the Court Statistics Project and Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, the average
state court judge is assigned nearly three times—nearly three times—as many cases as a
federal court judge. The increase of State court class actions further compounds this
burden and interferes with the ability of the state court judges to provide justice to their
citizens.”). But see id. at 2079 (statement of Sen. Tom Carper) (“Finally ... [when] shifting some class action litigation of a national scope [to federal district courts] ... [we need
to be sure that] we do not overburden the already busy Federal judiciary.”).
870
Cf. id. at 2653 (statement of Rep. Joe Baca) (“[CAFA] will send the majority of
class action suits from State to Federal courts, making it more difficult for people who
have been unfairly hurt to collect compensation for their injuries.”); id. at 2651–52
(statement of Rep. Mark Udall) (“Mr. Speaker, one of the most important rights we have
as Americans is the ability to seek redress from the courts when we believe our rights
have been abridged or we have been improperly treated. And, when a complaint arises
under a State law, it is both appropriate and desirable that it be heard in State court because those are the most convenient and with the best understanding of State laws and
local conditions. Of course, it is appropriate to provide for removing some State cases to
Federal courts. But I think that should be more the exception than the rule, and I think
this bill tends to reverse that. I think it excessively tilts the balance between the States
and the Federal government so as to throw too many cases into already-overburdened
Federal courts—with the predictable result that too many will be dismissed.”); id. at 1657
(statement of Sen. Russell Feingold) (“A particularly troubling result of this bill will be
an increase in the workload of the Federal courts. We all know these courts are already
overloaded.... The Congress has led the way in bringing more and more litigation to the
868
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conventional wisdom that allowing corporate defendants to remove thousands of purely state law class actions to already-overburdened federal
district courts will decrease those tribunals’ likelihood of hearing and
deciding so-called “class actions of national importance” judicially, meticulously, efficiently, impartially, and in a timely manner.871
Before closing, one additional point needs emphasis. Even assuming
that state and federal courts will be able to secure adequate resources to
hear and decide efficiently and timely all types of class actions, one problem still remains. As reported earlier, the types of state law and federal
theories of recoveries appearing in class members’ pleadings influence
states’ as well as federal courts’ disposition of class actions.872 In particular, class action litigants’ likelihood of prevailing or losing is based on (1)
whether consumer protection claims or securities violation claims form the
basis of complainants’ class actions, and (2) whether breach-of-contract
claims or tort-based allegations formed the basis of class members’ complaints.873
The present study, however, also uncovered some debatably unsettling
findings. Again, class members and defendants are substantially more
likely to “win” or “lose” when state and federal judges intentionally or
unintentionally allow arguably impermissible or extralegal variables to
influence the disposition of class actions.874 For example, class members
and defendants are likely to “win” or “lose” class actions procedurally or
on the merits depending on: (1) whether complainants filed class actions
in courts located in the western region or in the southern region of the
country, (2) whether racial minorities filed class actions in federal district
courts or in state trial courts, (3) whether the Fifth Circuit or the Fourth
Circuit resolved substantive and procedural class action issues on appeal,
and (4) whether the Seventh Circuit or the Eleventh Circuit resolved class
action questions of law and fact on appeal.875
Certainly, after a painstaking review of the common law as well as
state and federal statutes, one would be hard-pressed to find any statement
Federal courts ....”); id. at 1649 (Letter to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen
State Attorneys Generals) (“[B]y transferring most state court class actions to an already
overburdened federal court system, this [Act] will delay (if not deny) justice [for] a
substantial number of injured citizens.”).
871
See 151 CONG. REC. 2653 (statement of Rep. Joe Baca); id. at 2651–52 (statement
of Rep. Mark Udall); id. at 1657 (statement of Sen. Russell Feingold); id. at 1649 (Letter
to the Majority and Minority Leaders from Fifteen State Attorneys General).
872
See supra Table 3.
873
See supra Table 5.
874
See, e.g., supra Table 3 and Table 5.
875
See supra Table 1 and Table 3.
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suggesting that a particular theory of recovery is more or less likely to
influence or predict the disposition of class actions. The absence of such a
finding is neither good nor bad, neither expected nor unexpected. Of
course, one’s discovering that certain theories of recovery have fairly
strong “predictive power” might be enlightening or even useful for some
lawyers who commence class actions, or defend corporate clients against
class actions in state and federal courts. Contrarily, upon carefully examining state and federal laws, one also would have to search extensively and
diligently to find any intelligible reasons to explain federal and state judges’ propensity to allow any extralegal factors—ethnicity, politic, occupation, years of education, gender or geography—to influence the disposition of class actions. Simply put, federal and state laws do not predict such
outcomes and such statistically significant findings should not appear
among otherwise competent and impartial federal and state judges’ class
action declarations, motions, judgments, or jury charges. Yet, in the present study, such influences are clearly evident.876
Again, the doctrines of comity, finality, and federalism evolved for
important reasons.877 In part, they are designed to ensure “harmonious
state-federal relations”878 and to create efficient federal and state judiciaries—which will conserve precious judicial resources, decide cases in a
timely manner and award appropriate remedies.879 Second, “federal courts
876

See, e.g., supra Table 3, infra Table A.
See, e.g., Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 337 (2003) (concluding that the statute’s purpose “further[s] comity, finality, and federalism” (quoting Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 420, 436 (2000)); Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167, 178 (2001) (reiterating that
the purpose of the federal statute is “to further the principles of comity, finality, and
federalism” (quoting Williams, 529 U.S. at 436)); Williams, 529 U.S. at 436 (recognizing
that the purpose of the federal statutes is “to further the principles of comity, finality, and
federalism.”); Nat’l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 515 U.S. 582, 586
(1995) (“We have long recognized that principles of federalism and comity generally
counsel that [federal] courts should adopt a hands-off approach with respect to state tax
administration.”).
878
See Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67 (1948) (Frankfurter)
(“[A] close observation of the limitation upon the Court is not ... a strangling technicality.
History bears ample testimony that it is an important factor in securing harmonious Statefederal relations.”).
879
See Panetti v. Quarterman, No. 06-6407, slip op. 1, 12 (U.S. June 28, 2007); see
also Day v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198, 205–06 (2006) (“The AEDPA statute of limitation promotes judicial efficiency and conservation of judicial resources, safeguards the
accuracy of state court judgments by requiring resolution of constitutional questions
while the record is fresh, and lends finality to state court judgments within a reasonable
time.” (quoting Acosta v. Artuz, 221 F.3d 117, 122 (2d Cir. 2000))); Pennsylvania v.
Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 49 n.7 (1987) (“The goals of finality would be frustrated, rather
than furthered, by these wasteful and time-consuming procedures. Based on the unusual
877
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are courts of limited jurisdiction.”880 Their power to hear and decide federal or state law controversies is constrained.881 Furthermore, more than a
century and a half ago, the Supreme Court stressed that the “efficient administration of judicial power” is paramount882 when division-of-labor
decisions are made about allocating cases for hearings in federal and state
courts, or when one fashions a system to manage federal or state courts’
finances and bureaucracies.883
Thus, in light of these fundamental principles and acknowledging that
state court judges have the expertise and temperament to fashion “plain,
speedy and efficient” remedies, the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld
state judges’ authority to hear and decide various actions involving both

facts of this case, the justifications for the finality doctrine—efficiency, judicial restraint,
and federalism—would be ill served by another round of litigation on an issue that has
been authoritatively decided by the highest state court.” (citing Radio Station WOW, Inc.
v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 124 (1945))); Radio Station WOW, 326 U.S. at 123–24 (“Since
its establishment, it has been a marked characteristic of the federal judicial system not to
permit an appeal until a litigation has been concluded in the court of first instance.... This
requirement has the support of considerations generally applicable to good judicial administration. It avoids the mischief of economic waste and of delayed justice. Only in
very few situations, where intermediate rulings may carry serious public consequences,
has there been a departure from this requirement of finality for federal appellate jurisdiction”).
880
See Enochs v. Lampasas Cnty., 641 F.3d 155, 160 (5th Cir. 2011) (“[I]t was certainly fair to have had the purely Texas state law claims heard in Texas state court, and
there is nothing to indicate that either party would have been prejudiced by a remand to
Texas state court.... [C]omity demands that the ‘important interests of federalism and
comity’ be respected by federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction and ‘not
as well equipped for determinations of state law as are state courts.’” (quoting Parker &
Parsley Petrol. Co. v. Dresser Indus., 972 F.2d 580, 588 (5th Cir. 1992))); Durant, Nichols, Houston, Hodgson & Cortese-Costa, P.C. v. Dupont, 565 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2009)
(“It is a fundamental precept that federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and lack
the power to disregard such limits as have been imposed by the Constitution or Congress.”).
881
See Enochs, 641 F.3d at 160; Durant, 565 F.3d at 62.
882
See Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. 583, 594 (1857) (noting “that the question presented
... is not a new question [or] determinable upon any novel principle” and stressing that the
application of a “just and equal” principle resolved without undermining the “efficient
administration of the judicial power”).
883
Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 389 n.15 (1989) (“[T]he Administrative Office of the United States Courts handles the administrative and personnel matters
of the courts, matters essential to the effective and efficient operation of the judicial
system [and that] Congress also has established the Federal Judicial Center which studies
improvements in judicial administration.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 604 (1982 ed. & Supp.
IV1982))).
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state and federal law disputes.884 Class actions are included among the
list.885 However, CAFA’s “cases of national importance” removal clause
is arguably an overbroad and unfair procedural tool that undermines
states’ rights as well as consumers’ right to obtain timely and fair hearings
in state courts.886 Quite simply, class action defendants must satisfy only
884
See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039–40 (1983) (stressing that the
Court’s examining “generally unfamiliar” state laws as well as a vacation and a continuance for clarification were unsatisfactory because the process would create “delay and
decrease in [the] efficiency of judicial administration” (quoting Dixon v. Duffy, 344 U.S.
143 (1952))); California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393, 411 (1982) (concluding
that “a state-court remedy is ‘plain, speedy and efficient’” if it gives the litigant “a ‘full
hearing and judicial determination,’” which allows the litigant to “raise any and all constitutional objections” (citing Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat. Bank, 450 U.S. 503, 514 (1981)));
Rosewell, 450 U.S. at 528 (“Illinois’ legal remedy that provides property owners paying
property taxes under protest a refund without interest in two years is a ‘plain, speedy and
efficient remedy’ under the Tax Injunction Act.”); Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 376 (1978) (observing that the plaintiff voluntarily chose to commence
a suit in federal court that involves a state law claim and stressing that “[a] plaintiff
cannot complain if ancillary jurisdiction does not encompass all of his possible claim ...
since it is he who has chosen the federal rather than the state forum,” and concluding that
“the efficiency that plaintiff [wanted] so avidly [was] available without question in the
state courts” (quoting Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th
Cir. 1972))). But see Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 390
(1985) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“If state law is simply indeterminate, the concerns of
comity and federalism ... do not come into play. At the same time, the federal courts have
direct interests in ensuring that their resources are used efficiently ... as well as in ensuring that parties asserting federal rights have an adequate opportunity to litigate those
rights. Given the insubstantiality of the state interests and the weight of the federal interests, a strong argument could be made that a federal rule would be more appropriate than
a creative interpretation of ambiguous state law.” (footnote omitted)).
885
151 CONG. REC. 2652–53 (2005) (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt).
886
See Lonny S. Hoffman, Burn Up the Chaff with Unquenchable Fire: What Two
Doctrinal Intersections Can Teach Us About Judicial Power over Pleadings, 88 B.U. L.
REV. 1217, 1245 (2008) (“Defendants need not do much to remove a case from state to
federal court. Removal is one of the very few procedural tools that a party ... [may] use:
the defendant files a notice of removal, not a motion to remove.... [T]he notice must
contain ‘a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal.’” (footnote omitted)); see
also 151 CONG. REC. 2652–53 (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt) (“Mr. Speaker, we have
before us a bill that would sweep aside generations of State laws that protect consumers.
Citizens will be denied their basic right to use their own State courts to file class action
lawsuits against companies—even if there are clear violations of State [laws].... [This bill
is] the latest in a series of assaults on States’ rights to provide legal remedies for harm
suffered by their citizens.”); id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt) (“This bill ...
will effectively undermine the utility, practicality, and choice the class action mechanism
has offered to injured persons with legitimate claims against powerful entities.... [And
suddenly, why do] my States rights friends believe that the Federal courts and the Federal
Government can solve every problem in our society? That is just simply absurd, incon-
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three exceedingly easy-to-prove “numerical elements” to establish a class
action of national importance.887 As a consequence, they may remove an
inordinate number of truly substantive state law actions to federal
courts.888
But even more importantly, allowing corporate defendants and others
to remove such large numbers of state law class actions to federal courts is
statistically and economically irrational.889 Why? Again, the current empirical findings disclose that class actions reformers’ submitted reasons for
wanting to enact the removal statute never existed.890 “Long-overdue”
class action reforms were not warranted, because allegedly “incompetent,”
“biased,” and “intimidating” state court judges do not have a long history
of deciding class action controversies overwhelmingly against defendants.891 In fact, the opposite is true.892 To repeat, class action plaintiffs are
substantially more likely to lose procedurally and on the merits in state
trial and appellate courts, as well as in federal district and appellate
courts.893 Furthermore, multinational corporations and national insurers
have a long history of filing “truly substantive national class actions”

sistent with any kind of consistent philosophy about federalism.”); id. at 2090 (statement
of Sen. Patrick Leahy) (“[This reform will] make it harder for American citizens to protect themselves against violation of State civil rights, consumer, health, environmental
protection laws, to take these cases to State court.... These courthouses have experience
with the legal and factual issues within their States.... Cynics might even speculate
that...the business groups [who are] behind this purported ‘procedural’ change are really
seeking the dismissal of meritorious cases on procedural grounds by the federal courts....
Anyone who reads this bill will notice that ... it affects more than just class actions.
Individual actions, consolidated by state courts for efficiency purposes, are not class
actions.... Federalizing these individual cases will no doubt delay, and possibly deny,
justice for victims suffering real injuries.”).
887
Lowery v. Ala. Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1202–03 (11th Cir. 2007).
888
151 CONG. REC. 2090 (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy).
889
Id. at 2646 (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt).
890
See supra Table 4.
891
See 151 CONG. REC. 2095 (statement of Sen. Christopher Dodd) (“[T]o my colleagues who are strong opponents of all of this ... [CAFA] is a simple matter of court
reform.... It is long overdue.”); id. at 2076 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham) (“I agreed
to support [CAFA] some time ago because I believe we are long overdue for reform in
the class action area.”); id. at 2072 (statement of Sen. David Vitter) (“[CAFA] is long
overdue.... Time and again, it has been said by parties on all sides that class actions have
a proper place in the legal system. This bill is a modest effort to swing the pendulum back
toward common sense, making the system work as it was intended.”).
892
See supra Table 2.
893
See supra Table 2.
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against other corporations in state courts—where judges are supposedly
highly “prejudiced,” “inept,” and “dishonest.”894
Finally, in the course of researching this Article, the author uncovered
an unexpected finding: CAFA’s jurisdictional and removal provisions
have begun to generate serious intra-circuit and inter-circuit conflicts
among federal courts over the interpretation of “jurisdictional amount”
and over the extent of federal courts’ authority to remove and remand
purely substantive state law class actions.895 Read more broadly, these
894

See, e.g., Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 969 P.2d 337, 340 (Okla. 1998)
(“Black Hawk Oil Company, brought a class action ... for itself and others similarly
situated against Exxon Corporation, Oryx Energy Company, and many others as defendants. [Black Hawk sought] damages in both contract and tort for defendants’ failure to
pay for the slop oil the Plant operators collected.”); Canal Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Budget
Plan, Inc., 41 So. 3d 375, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2010) (reporting a case in which three
premium finance companies filed a class action suit against Canal Insurance Company
and Canal Indemnity Company, asking for a declaration of rights and presenting a
breach-of-contract claim.); Tunica Pharmacy, Inc. v. Cumberland Mut. Fire Ins. Co.,
2010 WL 4116964, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2010) (“Business Pro Communications, Inc., an Illinois corporation, filed a class action complaint against Express Products
in the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois.... [claiming] that Express Products ... violated the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C.A. § 227, and
the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, 815 ILL. COMP. STAT.
505/2, and had committed common-law conversion of fax paper, toner, fax memory, and
valuable time by sending unsolicited fax advertisements to businesses nationwide.”);
Myron Corp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Corp., 970 A.2d 1083, 1085 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2009) (“Stonecrafters, Inc., an Illinois corporation, filed a class action complaint against
Myron in Illinois state court,” alleging that Myron violated the Illinois Consumer Fraud
and Deceptive Business Practices Act and committed common-law conversion.); Holiday
Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 766, 767 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (considering a case in which a marketing company commenced a class action against computer
memory chip company, alleging that the latter violated the Cartwright Act and unfair
competition law by engaging in allegedly anticompetitive conduct in connection with
patents and licensing.); Paragon Networks, Int’l v. Macola, Inc., 1999 WL 280385, *1
(Ohio Ct. App. 1999) (“Paragon, a Delaware corporation, filed a class action complaint in
the Court of Common Pleas of Marion County against Macola, an Ohio corporation that
develops and supplies computer software,” alleging that Macola breached an express
warranty and induced Paragon and other members of the class to purchase software based
on Macola’s false and misleading representations.).
895
Compare Yocham v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 2007 WL 2318493, at *3 (D.N.J.
Aug. 13, 2007) (failing to find with a legal certainty that the amount in controversy had
been met), Dent v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, 2007 WL 1797653, at *7 (D.N.J. June 20,
2007) (concluding that a defendant must show with legal certainty that the amount in
controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold), and Lamond v. Pepsico, Inc., 2007 WL
1695401, at *3–5 (D.N.J. June 8, 2007) (noting the “confusion” surrounding the nature of
defendant’s burden, and concluding that the defendants must prove with legal certainty
that the requisite amount-in-controversy element has been satisfied), with Lowery v. Ala.
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conflicts arguably call into question (1) whether CAFA’s removal provision undermines “harmonious state-federal relations,” respect for state
court judges’ competence in particular and judicial federalism generally,896 (2) whether CAFA’s removal provision is too broad,897 and (3) whet-

Power Co., 483 F.3d 1184, 1208 (11th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the removing party
bears the burden of establishing the jurisdictional amount has been met by a preponderance of the evidence), Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Assoc., 479 F.3d 994, 998 (9th
Cir. 2007) (stressing that a defendant “seeking removal must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement has been met.” (quoting Abrego
Abrego v. The Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 683 (9th Cir. 2006))), and Home Depot,
Inc. v. Rickher, 2006 WL 1727749, at *1 (7th Cir. May 22, 2006) (concluding that the
removing litigant must establish with reasonable probability that the amount-incontroversy requirement has been satisfied (quoting Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans,
Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 449 (7th Cir. 2005))); see also In re Fannie Mae 2008 Sec. Litig.,
2009 WL 4067266, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“Defendants removed the [class action] from
New Jersey state court to the [federal district court] ... based on 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) and
77p(c), and alternatively [on] 28 U.S.C. § 1332, as amended by the Class Action Fairness
Act .... [The class representative] argues that [we] should remand the [class action] because [this] Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over it. According to [the representative], the 1933 [Securities] Act prohibits the removal of 1933 Act claims from state court
to federal court and [the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998’s (SLUSA)
amendments] ... do not change the anti-removal provisions.... SLUSA targets state class
actions alleging false and misleading statements under state law, and those actions are
removable. On the other hand, state class actions alleging only 1933 Act violations are
still within the warm embrace of the antiremoval provisions of the 1933 Act. Nothing in
the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 alters this result.... There is conflicting authority on
whether SLUSA eliminates state court jurisdiction over state class actions asserting 1933
Act claims.”); Knox v. Agria Corp., 613 F. Supp. 2d 419, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (“District
courts are divided [over] whether the anti-removal provision, as amended by SLUSA,
allows for removal of covered class actions raising only 1933 [Securities] Act claims.”).
896
Cf. Breakman v. AOL LLC, 545 F. Supp. 2d 96, 100 (D.D.C. 2008) (“[Since] significant federalism concerns [are] involved, this court strictly construes the scope of its
removal jurisdiction.” (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 107–09
(1941))); Strawn v. AT&T Mobility, Inc., 513 F. Supp. 2d 599, 604 (S.D. W. Va. 2007)
(noting that “removal statutes must be construed in light of the federalism concerns that
animate the policy of strictly confining federal jurisdiction within the congressionally-set
limits” (citing Sheets, 313 U.S. at 108–09)); Lowery v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 460 F.
Supp. 2d 1288, 1295 (N.D. Ala. 2006) (“While CAFA admittedly broadens federal removal jurisdiction, it does not unanchor the federal courts from the basic principle of
federalism that requires the construction of removal statutes against a removing defendant.”).
897
Cf. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (concluding that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and possess jurisdiction to
hear a particular case only if a statute or the Constitution authorizes a hearing); Eufaula
Drugs, Inc. v. Tmesys, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 1240, 1245 (M.D. Ala. 2006) (reaffirming
that “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction” and that “removal statutes are
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her federal courts are precluded from exercising jurisdiction over certain
state law class actions because the phrase “national importance” is too
ambiguous.898 Perhaps, if and when one of these inter-circuit removal-andjurisdictional conflicts reaches the Supreme Court in the not too distant
future, that esteemed body will conclude what the research and empirical
findings in this Article strongly suggest: (1) CAFA’s highly questionable
removal and jurisdictional rules evolved from untruths or just plain fabrications, and (2) the new rules undermine principles of judicial federalism.
Therefore, the Supreme Court or, preferably, a new and more enlightened
Congress, needs to restore some balance.
APPENDIX
A Comparison of Non-Class Action and Class Action Litigants in State
and Federal Courts, 1925–2011 (N = 2,657)
The entire database (N=2,657) for this study comprised both class action and non-class action cases. Necessarily, to test whether courts permit
extralegal factors to determine outcomes in class action cases and to test
for “selectivity bias” in the sample of cases, the author had to consider
courts’ dispositions of non-class action cases, too. Thus, it is important to
consider some of the statistics in Table A—which illustrates a number of
demographic attributes for litigants who were parties in non-class action
(ordinary) and class action lawsuits. Here, only the most relevant percentages are highlighted:

construed narrowly” (citing Burns v. Windsor Ins. Co., 31 F.3d 1092, 1095 (11th Cir.
1994))).
898
Cf. Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc., 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2003) (“[I]f federal
jurisdiction is doubtful, a remand to state court is necessary.” (quoting Mulcahey v.
Columbia Organic Chems. Co., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994))); In re Bus. Men’s
Assurance Co. of Am., 992 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1993); Ongstad v. Piper Jaffray &
Co., 407 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1087–88 (D.N.D. 2006) (“Following removal of a case to
federal court, a plaintiff can seek remand of the action back to state court. Removal
statutes are strictly construed in favor of state court jurisdiction and federal district courts
must resolve all doubts concerning removal in favor of remand.” (citing 28 U.S.C.
§ 1447(c))); Johnson-Brown v. 2200 M Street LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 175, 177 (D.D.C.
2003) (stressing that federal courts “must resolve any ambiguities concerning the propriety of removal in favor of remand” (citing Univ. of S. Ala. v. Am. Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d
405, 411 (11th Cir. 1999))).
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TABLE A
DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-CLASS ACTION AND CLASS
ACTION LAWSUITS IN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS, 1925–2011
(N = 2657)
Demographics

Non-Class Action Suits (N = 1833)

Class Action Suits (N = 824)

Frequency

Frequency

Percent

Percent

Jurisdiction:
Federal Cases
State Cases

957
876

52.2
47.8

417
407

50.6
49.4

Tribunals:
Trial & District Courts
Appellate Courts
Supreme Courts

397
913
520

21.7
49.9
28.4***

303
378
143

36.7***
45.9
17.4

Region of Country:
East
Midwest
South
Southwest
West

451
525
285
198
365

24.6
28.6
15.5
11.0
20.0***

228
203
182
109
102

27.7
24.6
22.1***
13.2
12.4

Litigant’s Ethnicity:
Diverse Groups
Anglo-American, only
African-American, only
Mexican-American, only
Other Minorities

672
987
99
14
61

36.6
53.9
5.4
0.8
3.3

716
23
47
5
33

86.9
2.8
5.7
0.6
4.0

Primary Defendants:
Insurers
Corporations
Public Entities & Others

1725
108
___

94.1
5.9
___

402
200
222

48.7
24.3
27.0

Plaintiffs’ “Favorable”
Outcomes by Courts:
All Trial/District Courts
All Appellate Courts
All Supreme Courts

773
554
285

42.2
47.3
54.0**

349
221
62

42.4
42.6
43.7**

Defendants’ “Favorable”
Outcomes by Courts:
All Trial/District Courts
All Appellate Courts
All Supreme Courts

1060
618
243

57.8
52.7
46.0**

475
298
80

57.6
57.4
56.3**

*** Chi square test statistically significant at p # 0.0001
** Chi square test statistically significant at p # 0.02

First, a review of the “Jurisdiction” variable and corresponding percentages indicates that the proportional-stratified-random sampling produced nearly identical numbers of federal and state cases within each
broad category of litigants. Among non-class action cases, the percentages
for federal and state cases are 52.2% and 47.8%, respectively; and, among
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class action cases, the respective percentages for federal and state cases
are 50.6% and 49.4%.899
The variable “Region of Country” reveals that nearly equal proportions of ordinary cases and class action cases were litigated in similar
regions of the Unites States.900 However, the variable labeled “Tribunal”
illustrates the types of courts in which each case terminated or was decided ultimately.901 Those percentages show some significant differences
between the groups. Among both regular and class action cases, the “finality” for the greater majority cases occurred in appellate courts.902 The
reported percentages are 49.9% and 45.9%, respectively.903 On the other
hand, among the class action cases, 36.7% terminated in a trial or federal
district court.904 But 21.7% of the regular cases ended in a trial or district
court.905 These findings lend some credence to a prevailing argument that
class actions are generally more difficult to litigate and win than regular
lawsuits, because class complainants must face and overcome a substantial
number of procedural hurdles even before a trial on the merits occurs.
Without doubt, the two most important variables appearing in Table A
are “Plaintiffs’ Favorable Outcomes by Courts” and “Defendants’ Favorable Outcomes by Courts.” Consider the former variable. A comparison of
regular and class action cases shows that aggrieved plaintiffs are likely to
win nearly equal percentages of cases in trial/district courts—42.2% versus 42.4%.906 Also, fairly equal percentages of regular and class action
plaintiffs prevailed in appellate courts—47.3% versus 42.6%.907 On the
other hand, while 54.0% of plaintiffs won regular suits in state supreme
courts, a lesser percentage (43.7%) of class action plaintiffs won in supreme courts.908
Now, consider the next variable “Defendants’ Favorable Outcomes by
Courts” and the corresponding percentages. Right away, we learn two
important facts. First, a comparison of regular and class action cases
shows that defendants are likely to win nearly equal percentages of cases
in trial/district courts—57.8% versus 57.6%.909 An examination of de899

See supra Table A.
See supra Table A.
901
See supra Table A.
902
See supra Table A.
903
See supra Table A.
904
See supra Table A.
905
See supra Table A.
906
See supra Table A.
907
See supra Table A.
908
See supra Table A.
909
See supra Table A.
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fendants’ appellate-court wins among non-class action and class action
cases shows very similar results. The percentages are 52.7% and 57.4%,
respectively.910 Second, as the last row of percentages in Table A shows,
56.3% of the defendants prevailed in class actions which were decided
ultimately in various supreme courts; however, multinational corporate
entities and insurers’ success rate in various supreme courts was less
(46.0%) when those entities were defendants in non-class action lawsuits.911
Finally when comparing all defendants’ outcomes to all plaintiffs’ outcomes, defending corporate entities and insurers are significantly more
likely to win the majority of all lawsuits—regardless of whether the actions were regular actions or class action lawsuits.912 Generally, across the
various courts, plaintiffs’ and defendants’ aggregate successes are 45.4%
and 54.6%, respectively.913 Please note: two percentages were computed
(1) by adding all of the “Plaintiffs’ Favorable Outcomes” percentages and
dividing by six, and (2) by adding all of the “Defendants’ Favorable Outcomes” percentages and dividing by six.

910

See supra Table A.
See supra Table A.
912
See supra Table A.
913
See supra Table A.
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